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Unger's

Philosophy:

A

Critical

Legal

Study

William Ewaldt

Of all the scholars associated with the Critical Legal Studies movement, none
has garnered greater attention or higher praise than Roberto Unger of
Harvard Law School. In this Article, William Ewald argues that Professor
Unger's reputation as a brilliant philosopher of law is undeserved. Despite
the seeming erudition of his books, Professor Unger's work displays little fa
miliarity with the basic philosophical literature, and the philosophical, legal,
and political analysis in those works-in particular, the celebrated critique of
liberalism in Knowledge and Politics-is so riddled with logical and histori
cal errors as to be unworthy of serious scholarly attention.

t Jun ior Research Fellow, The Queen's College, Oxford. I should l ike to thank Robert Alexy,
Delf Buchwald, Robert Clark, Jonathan Cohen , Ralf Dreier, Ronald Dworkin , Charles Fried, Geof
frey H azard, Susan Hurley, Geoffrey Marshall, Brian McGuinness, Derek Parfit, Gunther Patzig,
H ilary Putnam, W.V. Quine, Eric Rakowski, John Rawls, Joseph Raz, Paul Seabright, Thomasz
Studnick i , and Robert Summers for their encouragemeqt and suggestions. M uch of the writing was
done at the University of Gottingen under the auspices of the Alexander von H umboldt Stiftung; I am
grateful to both institutions for their generous support.
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I.

INTRODL'CTION

In his first book, Professor Roberto l\1angabeira Unger of Harvard
Law School announced that he had discm·ered "the context of ideas and
sentiments within which philosophy and politics must now be practiced."1
Since that time, he has become a prominent thinker in Critical Legal
Studies (CLS), a movement that, in his own words, "has undermined the
central ideas of modern legal thought and put another conception of law
in their place."2
If anyone in CLS can claim to have undermined the central ideas of
modern legal thought, that person is Professor Unger. There is wide
spread agreement that he is the philosophical leader of CLS and that his
most inOuential work is the critique of liberalism in his first book, Knowl

edge and Politics.3
His books on political and legal theory4 range over the whole of the
Western philosophical tradition.

Quine,

They cite authors

from

Aristotle to

from Hobbes to Hegel to Emil Lask. They bristle with footnotes

to works in German, French, Latin, Italian, Greek, and Dutch. They

1.
1

R. L'v;ER. K:--:OII'LEDCE .\:\D PoLITICS 1 (197)) [hereinJI'ter KP ] .

l'nger. The Critical Legal Studies .\Io,·ement. 96 H.\R\'

CLS\1].

L. Rr:v. )61. 561 (1983) [hereinafter

3. Thi> book hJs been cJ!Ied "the most extensi1e and influential critique of liberalism in recent
..
menl<Jrl· . Lninsl;n. Book Re1ie1,·. 96 H.\RV. L. Rn·. 1466. 1466 n.4 (1983). Opponents and propo
nents of

\..:LS

agree about l'nger·s importance and about the importance of KP

.\ckerm;;:;. Foreu•ord: Lau· in an :\ctil'ist State. 92 \'\u

LJ. 1083.

to

CLS

.

See. e.g..

1127 & n.78 (1983) (KP is

"[t]he most significant theoretical ,,·ork" of communitarian form of "de,·iationist legal doctrine''): Fiss.
The Death of the Lazi'?. 72 CoR:\ELL L. Rr.v. I. 10 (198 6) (l'nger's 11·ork is "the true inspiration of

J . LEGAL STt D. I. 6
& n.l4 (1986) (L.nger's l'alue to CLS is in his "general theoretical critique of liberalism,'' and his

the [CLS] mo1ement''): Hunt. The Theory of Critical Legal Studies. 6 OxFORD

'

''influence within [CLS] is primarily through his earlier text Knowledge and Politics"); Hutchinson

& \fonahan, Law, Politics and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama of American

Legal Thought, 36 STA N . L.

REv.

199 . 231 n.1 4 1 (1984) (Unger's CLSM "builds on his earlier

\\'Ork. Knowledge and Politics and Law in ,\Iodern Society"); see also infra note 234 and text accom

panying note 7); Schwanz, \\'ith Gun and Camera Through Darkest CLS Land. 36 S TA N . L. REV.

413, 416 ( !984) ("If Kennedy is the Pope of CLS, Unger is the Christ figure"); Stick, Can .\'ihilism
be Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L.

REv.

332, 334 n.9 (1986)

("Roberto

Unger's study of liberalism,

Knowledge and Politics," is one of "[t]he seminal legal texts that gave rise to legal nihilism"). Ob
serve that all of these quotations appeared after the publication of Unger's article on CLS-an article
which had been widely disseminated before it appeared in print.
4.

In addition to Knowledge and Politics, Unger has written Law in .Hod ern Society ( 1976);

Passion: An Essay on Personality (1984); and Politics, A. Work in Constructive Social Theor)' (3 vols.
1987). CLS�f, supra note 2, also appeared as a book, The Critical Legal Studies .Hovement ( 1983);
my page references will be to the article. In this article I shall discuss the two works that have had the
most inOuence on CLS-i.e., KP and CLS!\1-and Unger's encyclopedic new project, Politics. Law
in ,Hodern Society is shorter than KP, heavily dependent on its theses. concerned with sociology rather
than with philosophy, and less frequently cited in the CLS literature. Passion is largely superseded by
Politics. Unger's "Note" at

the

beginning of Law in Modern Society remarks:

"This

study builds

upon my Knowledge and Politics (Free Press, 1975). To make the present work intelligible to readers
unfamiliar with Knowledge and Politics, it was necessary in some cases to restate ideas developed in
the earlier work." Similarly, in one of the volumes of Politics Unger points out: "The argument of the
fragment on cultural revolution stands in close relation to the main pan of my book, Passion: ,-In
Essay on Personality." R. CNGER, FALSE NECESSITY: ANTI-NECESSITARIA"i SociAL THE ORY

IN

THE SERVICE Of RADICAL DEMOCRACY. PART I Of Poi.ITics, .'\ WoRK IN CoNSTRUCTIVE SoCIAL
THEORY 630 (1987) [hereinafter FN ] . Accordingly, I shall not discuss these two works.
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purport to show that "no coherent theory of adjudication is possible
within liberal political thought,''11 and they embark on a "search for
changes in social life that might serve as the basis, or as the inspiration, of
a nonliberal doctrine of mind and society."6 These books received a num
ber of favorable reviews. For example:

Law in Modern Society is a truly profound book. It defies coherent

summarization in a few hundred words. It contains more fundamen
tal insights into the human condition than any other book I have
read by a living author. The sheer breadth of Unger's knowledge
and the unrelenting force of his analysis can only be regarded with
something approaching awe. One leaves this book with the feeling
that a century from now scholars may still be poring over it, much as
they now do with the works of Marx, D urkheim and Weber.7

Unger has also been compared to S pinoza, Dante, and Virgil.8
Unger's own claims have not been modest. He compares his fellow
professors of law to "a priesthood that had lost their faith and kept their
jobs" -until the gospel of C LS liberated the legal academy .9
More recently, Unger has published three volumes, forming the first
part of Politics: A Work in Constructive Social Theory.10 In this work,
too, Unger makes grand claims: H e says he aims to provide a new t heo
retical vision for the left-a radical alternative to both Marxism and so
cial democracy. 1 1 Having noticed that radical social theory was "an i n
stance of illusion passing into prejudice," he wanted to write a book "to
set things straight."12 Again, his followers have been supportive. One con
tributor to the Northwestern University Law R evi ew ' s Symposium on
Politics, while noting t hat "neither Politics nor theory nor the human i n
tellect can work the redemption of h umanity ," nevertheless holds that
"Politics is a remarkable achievement. It warrants study, attention, and
celebration. It contributes aid to the rescue of humanism from the failures
of liberal democracy, Marxism, modernism, and Christendom." 1 3
5.
6.

KP, supra note 1 , at 98.
Id. at 20.

Monahan, Book Review, 61 Soc. & Soc. REs. 43 1 , 432 ( 1 977).
See Boyle, Book Review, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1 066, 1 079 ( 1 985) ("the Spinozian latticework of
epistemological argument that characterizes U nger's earlier works"); H utchinson & Monahan, The
"Rights" Stuff: Roberto Unger and Beyond, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1 477, 1 49 1 ( 1 984) (passage comparing
Unger's work to Dante and Virgil q uoted infra note 2 34).
9. This comment occurs in the conclusion to CLSM, supra note 2, at 67 5; the passage is quoted
in ful l infra p. 756.
1 0. Individually entitled: ( 1 ) Social Theory: Its Situation and Task. A Critical Introduction to
Politics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory ( 1 987) [ hereinafter ST]; (2) FN, supra note 4; and
(3) Plasticity into Power: Comparative-Historical Studies on the Institutional Conditions of Eco
nomic and Military Success. Variations on Themes of Po(itics, a Work in Constructive Social Theory
( 1 987) [ hereinafter PP]. Unger also plans a Part II of Politics. See FN, supra note 4, at 630.
1 1 . FN, supra note 4, at I.
12. ST, supra note 1 0, at 79.
1 3 . Bal l , The City of Unger, 8 1 Nw. U.L. REv. 625 , 627 ( 1 987). This Symposiu m is to be

7.
8.
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I propose to examine the accuracy of all these claims-to see w hether
Unger's philosophy is as impressive as he and his admirers say .
Unger's work falls into three areas: philosophy, law, and politics. I
shall accordingly proceed i n three stages. I begin by discussing the most
philosophical of Unger's works, Knowledge and Politics, concentrating on
the passages that are most relevant to CLS. I n this Section , I shall try to
gauge the quality of his scholarship, and to explain what I think is askew
with his philosophy. Next I turn to his essay on The Critical Legal Stud
ies Movement, and say something about the relationship of his philosophy
to law and legal theory. Finally, I turn to the concrete political recom
mendations of Politics-speci fi cally, to Unger's theory of cultural revolu
tion. These recommendations seem to me deeply troubling, for reasons I
shall explain i n due course. I f my analysis is correct , there i s a l i near
progression from the philosophy , through the l aw , to the politics, and the
seeds of Unger's recent pol itical views are already to be found in his early
philosophy.
Throughout this discussion, I shall try to be intelligible to a general
audience, even if this means explaining points that will be obvious to pro
fessional philosophers. And I shall try not to presuppose any previous
acquaintance with Unger's writings, even if this means summarizing ar
guments that will be familiar to his readers. M y goal is to obtain a clear
view of the "sheer breadth of Unger's knowledge and the u nrelenting
force of his analysis." Neither, I argue, is as great as his fol lowers believe.
But before we start, a few words about the movement of w h i ch Unger
is the philosophi cal leader may be in season . I shall in particular try to
explain why his critique of l iberalism is important to C L S and what sig
nificance my criticisms of Unger have for C LS as a whole.
To begin with, I should emphasize that CLS is a diverse movement.
Professor Duncan Kennedy, one of the leaders of CLS, described i t as "a
ragtag band of leftover '60s people and young people with nostalgia for
the great events of 15 years ago . " 14 Not all of its members claim to be
philosophers, and not all of t hose who do build directly u pon U nger. So a
refutation of Unger is not by itself enough to "refute C LS " ; the movement
is too complex, too multi farious, for such a simple refutation to be possi
ble. Nevertheless, all members of the movement agree, with varying de
grees of intensity, on the following theses: first, that traditional legal doc
trme IS "incoherent"15 or "impossible"1 6 or "contradictory and
published as a book by the Cambridge U niversity Press.
1 4. Eastland, Radicals in the Law School, Wall St. ]., Jan. 1 0 , 1 986, at 1 6, col . 4.
1 5 . See, e.g. , Excerpts from Critical Legal Studies Q & A , 38 HARV. L . BuLL. 22 (Summer
1 987) [ hereinafter Excerpts] ("Kennedy identified three basic C LS propositions about traditional legal
doctrine: it is neither coherent nor determinate nor objective; it is the basis of corporate capitalism,
and as such dictates who gets how much in the society; and its outcome is radically u njust.").
1 6. KP, supra note I, at 97 ("a coherent theory of adjudication or of legal justice is not possible
on the premises of liberal thought"); Kairys, Introduction, in THE PO!.ITICS OF LAw: A PRoCRES-
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manipulable"/7 second, that the ex1stmg legal order is "radically unjust"
and "contributes to the legitimization of an oppressive social order"/8
and, third, that existing social and legal arrangements ought to be trans
formed so as to create a society that will be free from the "hegemony" and
"hierarchies" that prevail at present. 19 In consequence of these views,
CLS deprecates traditional legal scholarshi p and traditional legal educa
tion. I nstead of behaving like the "toadying jurists" of the past, instead of
treating the existing legal materials as "given" and "rigidly defi ned,"2 0
CLS attempts "to free us from the illusion of the necessity of existing
social arrangements. "2 1 Professor Kennedy's opinion is characteristic, and
shows how these theses are connected:
To say that law school is ideological is to say that what teachers
teach along with basic skills is wrong, is nonsense about w hat l aw is
and how it works; that the message about the nature of l egal compe
tence, and its distribution among students, is w rong, is nonsense; that
the i deas about the possibilities of life as a lawyer that students pick
u p from legal education are w rong, are nonsense. But all this i s non
sense with a tilt; it is biased and motivated rather than random er
ror. What it says is that it is natural, efficient, and fai r for law
firms, the bar as a whole, and the society the bar services to be or
ganized in their actual patterns of hierarchy and domination . 22
These views have drawn heated criticism, and the resulting dispute has
attracted the attention of the mass media,23 but i n fact there is much here
SIVE CRITIQUE 3 (D. Kairys ed. 1 982) [ hereinafter POLITICS OF LAw ] ("[ t ]here is no legal reasoning
in the sense of legal methodology or process for reaching particular, correct results").
1 7 . CLSM, supra note 2 , a t 5 6 3 n. 1 (CLS emphasizes "the contradictory and manipulable char
acter of doctrinal argument").
1 8. See Excerpts, supra note 1 5; Kennedy, Cost-Reduction Theory as Legitimation, 90 YALE L.J.
1 27 5 , 1 27 6 ( 1 98 1 ) ; see also Note, Round and Round the Bramble Bush: From Legal Realism to
Critica l Legal Scholarship, 95 H ARV. L. Rt�V. 1 669, 1 68 1 n.80 ( 1 982) (citing further references in
similar vei n).
1 9. E.g. , CLSM, supra note 2, at 587 ("The guiding and unifying aim of the cultural
revolutionary practice I have in mind lies perhaps in the systematic remaking of all direct personal
connections-like those between superiors and subordinates or between men and women-through
their progressive emancipation from a background plan of social division and hierarchy."); see also
U nger's theory of "Organic Groups" (discussed infra Section II. E); Professor Tushnet's call for a
"community of understanding" in which "we will destroy the need for constitutional theory,"
Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of lnterpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96
H ARV. L. REv. 78 1 ( 1 983); Klare, Critical Theory and Labor Relations Law, in PoLITICS OF L Aw ,
supra note 1 6, at 65, 84 (withering away of law).
20. "The dominant view treats the existing i nstitutional structure as given. I t regards the imagi
native scheme of models of possible and desirable h u man association, including the contrast of contract
to community, as rigidly defined." C L S M , supra note 2, at 633. For the remark on toadying jurists,
see id. at 570.
2 1 . Klare, Labor Law as Ideology: Toward a New Historiography of Collective Bargaining Law,
4 INDUS. REL. L.j. 450, 482 ( 1 98 1 ) .
22. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy, i n PoLITICS OF LAw, supra note 1 6,
at 40. For similar sentiments, see also CLSM, supra note 2, at 668-70.
23. See Margolick, The Split at Harvard Goes Down to its Foundation, N . Y . Times, Oct. 6,
1 98 5 , § 4, at 7 , col . 1 ; Lacayo. Critical Legal Times at Harvard, TI M E , Nov. 1 8, 1 98 5 , at 87; Tril l i n ,
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that any lawyer might agree with. That the law contains deep conflicts;
that the legal system is frequently unjust; that the wealthy are more likely
to receive justice than the poor; that legal education is imperfect-these
ideas are not new to C LS. Likewise, when C LS attempts to reth ink fun
damental legal concepts, or searches for speci fic examples of i nj ustice, or
proposes new methods of resolving disputes, it is engaged in a famil iar
and important enterprise which all lawyers might applaud. The actual
proposals put forward by C LS are often less radical than the flamboyant
rhetoric would suggest;24 Unger's three-point program for governmental
reform in The Critical Legal Studies Movement is an example.2�
I n fact, one may well wonder whether CLS i s as novel as it
claims-whether lawyers really need to be freed "from the illusion of the
necessity of existing social arrangements. " Oliver Wendell H olmes long
ago poured cynical acid on the "brooding omnipresence" theory of law,
arguing vigorously that our legal system cannot "be worked out l i ke math
ematics from some general axioms of conduct."2 6 The L egal Real ists'
elaboration of Holmes's theory has indelibly marked our j urisprudence.
The idea that law is malleable, a human creation, an i nstrument for serv
ing social ends has been a central tenet of American legal thought for
generations. I t is not news.
This is a point in favor of C LS . For when critical legal scholars devote
themselves to the analysis of relatively concrete legal problems, they some
times, despite the rhetoric, engage in a perfectly traditional form of legal
scholarship. To take an example, Unger's analysis of A nglo-American
contract law, despite being encased i n a welter of five levels o f "visions"
and "countervisions," is, i n the end, nothing more than a p ro posal for
reforming the law of contract.27 This scholarship can be very able (as in
A

Reporter at Large: Harvard Law School, NEw YoRKER, M ar. 26, 1 984, at 5 3 ; see also Kennedy,
Rebels from Principle: Changing the Corporate Law Firm From Within , H ARV. L. BuLL., Fall
198 1 , at 36.
24. !1. good example is furnished by a student piece in the Harvard Law Review. N ote, supra
note 18. The Note begins with a nourish of radical rhetoric: "!1. radical scholarsh i p of practice would
enmesh legal scholars in activity, in endeavors that, beginning with a transformative objective, would
explore the capacity of social structure to respond to efforts toward fundamental change . " !d. at 1 687.
But this "radical scholarship of practice" is not, in fact, as extreme as it sounds. On the contrary, it
resembles a typical clinical program at almost any American law school :
Scholars might, for example, create situations that would b l u r t h e boundary between pol i tical
and legal discourse by setting up conOict-resolution mechanisms in which com m u n i ty members
served as arbitrators of neighborhood disputes. Community organ ization, perhaps inviting the
participation of law students, would i nvolve scholars in the implementation of participatory
democracy and place them in environments in which property, contract, or tort doctrines could
be imaginatively recast. Total environments-prisons, hospitals, or workplaces-could provide
unique opportunities for the involvement of relatively homogeneous populations i n activities
that would explore the possibili ties for sustained social and political engagement.
!d. (footnote omitted and emphasis added).
2 5 . See infra text accompanying note 267.
26. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 1 0 H ARV. L. REv. 457, 465 ( 1 897).
27. This point is made by Finnis, On 'The Critical Legal Studies Movement, ' in 3 OXFORD
EsSAYS ON jURISPRUDENCE 1 54-58 (J Eckelaar & J Bell eds. 1 987). For fu rther discussion, see
infra text accompanying notes 2 57-60. I follow Finn is here, and more genera l l y in his evaluation of
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Professor Horwitz's Transformation of American Law28), or rather less
so. Because my concern is with philosophy, I shall make no attempt to
decide how much of the narrowly legal C LS l iterature fall s into the for
mer category and how much into the latter: That is ultimately a matter
for the legal community to establ ish. My point is that some C LS scholar
ship is not as extreme a departure from the tradition as it may seem-that
it may be doing the same sort of thing as H olmes and the Realists, and
doing it very wel l .
But although some C LS scholarshi p is i n the tradition of Holmes and
Legal Realism, the differences are as striking as the similarities. To begin
with, CLS is much more extreme in its conclusions. The attitude of
Holmes might be paraphrased like this: "Do not suppose that the law is a
set of eternal truths, given to you by Logic or by Nature and incapable of
change. Law is a human creation and must be made to serve the interests
of the community; it must be reformed in the light of the best insi ghts of
economics and history and philosophy. "29 H olmes did not doubt that law
exists, that it can be said to function either well or badly; he did not deny
the importance of meticulous legal scholarshi p or the value of legal educa
tion. His attitude was not that "law is nonsense," or that it is just the
interests of the rich, or that there are no right answers in l egal disputes,
or that "trashing . . . [is] the most valid form of legal scholarsh i p availa
ble at the moment. "3 0 He and his Realist successors were practitioners,
and they were deeply i nvolved at the bench and bar-in the w riting of
treatises, in the drafting of legislation, in the litigation and adjudication of
cases. Whatever their criticisms of the existing legal system, they took it
seriously enough to try to work within it.
C LS , in contrast, has been largely a movement of theoreti cians and phi
losophers. Its members have not been heavily engaged in the practice of
law, nor do they recognize an obligation to be the "technical assistants" of
judges and legislators.31 A good example is furnished by M ar k Tushnet,
another leading figure in the movement. Like Unger, Professor Tushnet
Unger's theory of contract.
M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW ( 1 977).
28.
29. E.g. , Holmes, supra note 26, at 465-78 (importance of history , economics, and jurisprudence
in shaping law).
30. Freeman, Truth and Mystification in Legal Schola rship, 90 YALE L.J. 1 22 9 , 1 229 ( 1 98 1 )
3 1 . Unger is explicit on this matter:
So when asked whether deviationist doctrine can suitably be used by judges, we answer as
follows. We are neither servants of the state (not at least in the conventional sense) nor their
technical assistants. We have no stake in finding a preestablished harmony between moral
compulsions and institutional constraints. We know, moreover, that the received views of insti
tutional propriety count for little except as arguments to use against those who depart too far
from professional consensus. Most of what courts actually do-brokering smal l deals against a
background of disputed facts and uncontested though vaguely conceived rights and supervising
the police and prosecutors as they decide which violent members of the u nderclass to im
prison-hardly fits those conceptions of institutional competence.
CLSiv1, supra note 2, at 581 .
.
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has little use for practlcmg lawyers. H e i s a theorist, devoted t o the
''world of scholarshi p . " He regrets that law professors are led by their
ambition into the world of public affairs; he contrasts the "corruption"
and "moral obtuseness" of Laurence Tribe with the purity of those schol
ars who strive for "intellectual substance. "32 The claim seems to be that
CLS owes its primary allegiance to learning and high theory , not to prac
tical lawyering: What matters is the philosophy. This aspect of C LS-this
repudiation of legal practice-is novel: So far as I am aware, there has
never been anything like it in English or American law.
Now, I agree with CLS that philosophy has an important role to play
in the legal academy, but if you are going to make this kind of argument,
if you are going to reject the legal system and describe yourself as a phi
losopher, then your philosophy had better be u p to professional standards.
There is little merit i n a philosophy of law that makes no contri butions to
law or to philosophy. In particular, if you want to write about H obbes or
mathematical logic or Aristotle's metaphysics, you would do well to pro-
ceed with a certain degree of care: These are not topics for amateurs.
Perhaps for this reason, the l eaders of C LS have been eager to claim
the mantle of high scholarship. Professor Kennedy says:
believe in high standards of academic excellence, and I don't think
the debate is about that at all. I think the real danger of the move
ment is that people who have produced work which meets the high
est possible academic standards will be denied tenure because of
their political agendas, and I think that has already happened at the
[ Harvard Law] School i n one case. 33
I

32.

Professor Tushnet's remarks a r e contained i n h i s review of Laurence Tribe's A merican Con-

stitutional Law. Tushnet, Dia-Tribe, 78 MICH. L. REv. 694 ( 1 980). Tushnet says:
I hope that what has gone before raises a serious puzzle: how could so morally obtuse a work
be taken so seriously? The answer can be found in Professor Tribe's ambition, w hich, like that
of constitutional scholars generally, lies outside the world of scholarship and in the world of
contemporary public affairs. Not that there is anything intrinsically wrong with ambition. Its
rewards, enumerated by Ward Just as honor, power, riches, fame, and the love of women, are,
with one obvious modification, nothing to be sneered at. Most of us have imagined ourselves as
Justices of the Supreme Court, and Professor Tribe, whose chances are better than those of the
rest of us,* would surely be a better J ustice than many.
The question, though, is to what activities the rewards of ambition accrue. In the world of
public affairs, they accrue not necessarily to intellectual substance. One who addresses the real
questions of justice is by that fact alone disqualified from serious consideration for public
position and influence, because raising those questions raises i n turn questions abo u t the world
of the positions that now exist, to be occupied or i n fluenced. Under the circumstances, I take
some pleasure, not however unmixed with regret, in noting that the Framers would have un
derstood the phenomenon that Professor Tribe's work represents: they called it corruption.
*[Tushnet's footnote:] I do offer Professor Tribe two bits of gratuitious advice. The track
record of appointments of academics to the Supreme Court is weak indeed, as some of Profes
sor Tribe's own colleagues could tell him. And I pass on an observation by J udge Henry
Friendly, who ought to know about this question: "Don't take one job expecting that it will
lead to another."
!d. at 7 1 0 & n.SO (footnotes otherwise omitted).
33. Excerpts, supra note 1 5, at 23 (quoting D uncan Kennedy).
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I propose to take the leaders of C L S at their word. My discussion will
be resolutely non-political , and will focus on the central issue of academic
quality. This procedure is in any case the only way to evaluate the deci
sion of the leading philosophers of the movement to remain aloof from the
practice of law . That decision rests on the claim that (as P rofessor Ken
nedy says) law is " nonsense," that legal doctrine is "contradictory and
mani pulable" and will remain so until l iberal society has been radically
reformed. If this exciting thesis is correct, then Tushnet's remarks about
Tribe are fully justified. There is no point i n tinkering with minor aspects
of the legal system-in using bandages on an i llness that needs the knife.
Of course, C LS scholars cannot merely assert that law is "nonsense";
they need an argument. But here, too , they have a straightforward an
swer, namely, that they have applied "philosophy, social theory, history,
psychology and anthropology" to legal thought34 and their i nvestigation
has establ ished the "nonsense" theory of law.
It is at precisely this point that Unger's Knowledge and Politics be
comes crucially i mportant to C LS . Unger is the most renowned thin ker i n
the movement. Knowledge and Politics i s (as w e shall see) his most schol
arly work. His critique of l iberalism ("the most extensive and i n fl uential
critique of l iberalism in recent memory"36) is the most sophisticated argu
ment C LS has produced for the thesis that "no coherent theory of adjudi
cation is possible within l iberal political thought."36 Moreover, he i s the
only C LS theorist who has attempted to describe his "vision" of a new
society-of "organic groups" and of "the practical and spiritual, i ndivid
ual and collective empowerment made possible by the disentrenchment of
formative structures. "37 I shall therefore concentrate on these aspects of
his work.
II.

KNOWLEDGE AND

Pouncs

I begin by discussing Knowledge and Politics. I shall examine this
work in detail because it gives Unger's ful lest argument against the possi
bility of a l iberal legal theory. His later writings build on thi s argument,
so it will be worthwhile to examine it closelv . 38
I

A.

Unger's Argument

Let us start by taking a brief survey of the book as a whole. It divides
i nto three parts. Part One describes a philosophical theory, shows the
34. See Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 209, 210
( 1 979).
35. Levinson, supra note 3, at 1466 n.4.
36. KP, supra note I, at 98.
37. CLSM, supra note 2, at 650.
38. In claiming that Unger's later writi ngs build u pon Knowledge and Politics I am fol lowing the
authors quoted supra note 3.
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baleful consequences of its acceptance, and argues that it is self
contradictory . Parts Two and Three attempt to replace it with something
better.
Unger cal ls the theory he deplores "liberalism, " and it is important to
observe at the outset that his use of the term "liberal " is not the familiar
one whereby politicians are classified as "liberal" or "conservative . " As
defined by Unger, liberalism is not just a political attitude, but a Weltan
schauung-an all-pervasive vision embracing our attitudes towards ethics,
society, human personality, the social and natural sciences , pol itics, meta
physics, jurisprudence, epistemology , and psychology. Despite this seem
ing multiplicity of subject-matter, liberalism is "a single mode of
thought. . . . The premises of this vision of the world are few ; they are
tied together; and they are as powerful in their hold on the mind as they
are unacknowledged and forgotten ."39 Although unacknowledged and for
gotten, the premises of liberalism are nevertheless "the dominant and cen
tral element in modern thought. "4 0
The heart of Unger's argument is the connection he d raws between
liberal epistemology and the social organization of the liberal state: that is,
between the "knowledge and politics" of his title. In his view, the modern
state is both the reflection and the protector of liberal thought. This fact is
of great importance for three reasons. First, the disintegration and resig
nation experienced by those who live in modern societies can be explained
as the consequence of the deficiencies of the liberal theory. Second, the
fact that these theoretical defi ciencies h ave remained undetected for so
long can be explained by pointing out that the liberal ideas are deeply
entrenched within the organization of society (they are, U nger says, "a
way men have in fact come to experience their moral life"41 )-a fact
which also explains why a radical critique ("total criticism") is now nec
essary . Third, by bringing the inner contradictions of li beral thought to
light, Unger will be able to expose the flaws i n l iberal social organization;
thus , the link between knowledge and politics proves to be the entire sys
tem's undoing. I shall elaborate these points i n turn.
1.

The Sins of Liberalism

First, consider the practical failings of liberalism. These may be treated
under two headings: the moral predicament of the individual , and the po
litical predicament of modern society.
The predicament of the individual is that he is subject to two "seem
ingly opposite" moral sentiments, each of which "is, in a sense, the truth
of the other and brings to the fore w hat is hidden as a secret in its coun39.
40.
41.

KP, supra note 1 , at 3.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 1 7 .
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terpart. "42 The first sentiment is that of disintegration .43 The second is
that of resignation: "Resignation is a despairing submission to a social
order whose claims are inwardly despised. It is the governing idea and
emotion of the pecul iar Stoicism in which the bureaucratic and profes
sional classes of the welfare-corporate state so deeply participate."44 These
two sentiments "share a common view of the relation of thought to life" i n
which the public realm o f factual and technical discourse i s severed from
"an intimate world of feeling. Within the cage of private emotion all reli
gion, art, and personal love i s arrested, and from it all rational thought is
banished."46 In consequence, "[t]he self is split i n two, each half finding
the other first incomprehensible, then mad. Thus, the subversion of the
standards of sanity and madness is a consequence of the progress of these
sen tim en ts. "4 6
Unger's principal aim inKnow ledge and Politics is to extricate us from
this predicament: "There is a moving hand behind the critique of l iberal
thought. It is the desire to escape from the condition of the moral senti
ments I have described into that state of simultaneous union and division
of self and world in which all resignation becomes i mmanence and all
disintegration transcendence. "47 His ambition is not hopeless, because,
"for all its power, the liberal doctrine is not powerful enough to subjugate
the full range of our feelings and ideas."4 8 There remain a n umber of
ideals which liberalism has been unable to eradicate!9 As for the political
and social predicament, it too is caused by the dominant consciousness in
the liberal state, and Unger describes it eloquently.60
42. !d. at 26.
43.
Its characteristics are the falling apart of different elements of the self, and revulsion against
the external world, especially against the social world. Disintegration is the defi n i ng experi
ence of the culture of modernism. It is the fate of the dejected, the defeated, and the damned,
who have never shared the consciousness of which the liberal doctrine is a philosophical
expression.
!d.
44. !d.
45. !d. at 27
46. !d.
47. !d. at 28.
48. !d.
49. For example, there remains:
an ideal, which l iberalism never succeeded in stamping out and whose force was acknowledged
even by many of the l i beral phil osophers. It is the view that the conscious self should be, and
i n a sense always is, related to nature, to others, and to its own concrete l i fe and station, yet, in
another sense, remains independent from them. The ideal of the relation between self and
nature I call natural harmony, that of the relation between self and others sympathy, and that
of the relation between the abstract and the concrete self concrete universality.
!d. at 2 1 -22.

50.
The dominant consciousness in the l i beral state i ncludes a characteristic view of the relation
between man as an agent or a thi nker and the external world, between man and his fellows,
and between man and his work or social place. With respect to the first, it emphasizes the
subjection of nature to human w i l l as the ideal of action and the choice of efficient means to
given ends as the exemplary procedure of reason. With regard to the second, it u nderlines the
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Not only does liberalism warp people's relationships to themselves and
to others: It distorts their i ntellectual life as wel l . Unger's own experience
bears this out. H e says that, having turned his mind to some problems of
legal theory , he found that "the house of reason in which I was working
proved to be a prison-house of paradox whose rooms did not connect and
whose passageways led nowhere"; it was this discovery, he says, that
caused him to write his book.11 1

2.

Partial Criticism

Unger does not suppose that these problems have hitherto gone wholly
unremarked . He says that there have been attempts to solve the dilemmas
of liberalism in a piecemeal fashion, but these attempts h ave not met with
success: "Our approaches to social study are nothing but partial assaults
on a mode of thought they have neither repudiated nor understood in its
entirety. "112 So long as we proceed i n this way, we shall get nowhere:
"The sciences are simply partial critiques of the classical theory. It is the
parti ality of their criticism, rather than the criticism itself, that both sepa
rates the sciences from each other and enslaves them to the theory from
which they already imagine themselves free. "113
Why should partial criticism be doomed to failure ? Because of the in
terconnections of knowledge and politics: specifically, because of the recip
rocal dependence of liberal theory and the liberal social order.114 The fail
ure of the partial assaults "shows the unbroken tyranny that the classical
theory, in this case the liberal doctrine, exercises over the m i nds of those
separateness of person [ sic], the artificial character of society, and the ties of reciprocal need
and hostility among i ndividuals. As to the third , it focuses on the ambivalent value of work as
both a manifestation and a surrender of personality.
These three aspects of consciousness express a more general view of the world, the religion
of transcendence, which asserts the radical separation of God and man, heaven and earth , soul
and body. But transcendence takes a secularized form in the liberal mentality. The conse
quences of secularization are so far-reachi ng that they ultimately imply a radical transforma
tion of the dominant consciousness itself.
!d. at 19.
5 1 . !d. at 3.
52. !d. at 5 .
53. !d. a t 2.
54. Consider, for instance, what Unger says about the di fficulty of critici zing l iberal theory's
"Principle of Analysis":
The axiom of analysis stands opposed to any attempt to pass, i n the d iscussion of l i beral
thought, from partial to total criticism. It always points toward the study of i nd ividual
problems by denying that there is any whole in the tradition of liberalism except a collection of
particular ideas entertained al different limes. The emperor of Japan, separated by a screen
from his groveling subjects, could not have hoped for a better h iding place than the one this
view of knowledge gives to the l i beral doctrine.
The principle of analysis may owe much of its appeal to a particular form of social order, to
whose perpetuation it in turn contributes: the situation in which each man's social existence is
. A fractured social existence can only produce a fractured
divided into a diversity of roles.
knowledge of the social order.
!d. at 48.
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who believe they have extricated themselves from its clutches. "�>�> And the
partial criticism of liberalism has suffered "the fate of all partial criticism:
to remain enslaved by that from which it claims to be free. "156
Even such great thinkers as Marx, D urkheim , and Weber did not "suc
ceed in establishing a psychology that escaped the implications of the lib
eral distinction of reason and desi re, and this failure in psychology runs as
a poison through thei r political i deas . "�>7
3.

Total Criticism

How is one to overcome the limitations of partial criticism ? By resort
ing instead to what Unger calls total criticism. It is not enough to attack
the l iberal doctrine in a fragmentary fashion. "Liberalism must be seen all
of a piece, not just as a set of doctrines about the disposition of power and
wealth, but as a metaphysical conception of the mind and society . Only
then can its true nature be understood, and its secret empire
overthrown. »r>s
Total criticism requires the cnt1c to work with concepts of great ab
straction. The first step in U nger's argument is therefore to u ncover what
he calls the "deep structure" of liberal thought. The deep structure is
defined by six interconnected principles, three of which come from psy
chology , and three from political theory. The deep structure is not some
thing that all l iberal thinkers have believed; i ndeed, "there is no one
thinker who accepts the liberal theory, in the form in which I present it,
as a whole, or whose doctrines are completely defined by its tenets. "�>9 In
other words, his "deep structure" is to be an i dealization of historical lib
eralism.60 Without an understanding of this "deep structure," U nger says,
his task would be hopeless. 6 1
The deep structure of liberalism having been described, the next step i n
Unger's program o f total criticism is t o show that the s i x principles defin
ing the socio-politico-metaphysical deep structure of l iberalism are self
contradictory: "that they produce antinomies that cannot be resolved
within the system itself. " 6 2 As for the implications of this i nvestigation for
55. Jd. at 5.
56. Id. at 1 0.
57. ld.
58. /d. at 6.
59. !d. at 8.
60. See infra Section II.

C.2

("Unger's Logic").

6 1.

The critique of the metaphysical framework of our ideas about knowledge and politics would
be reduced to an endless game of hide-and-go-seek. In the game the one who h ides will change
position each time the one who seeks draws near, and the chaser will be trapped in a hall of
echoes i n which the mocking voice of his quarry will seem to come from everywhere and
nowhere.
KP, supra note 1, at 9.
62. !d. at 13 (Unger defines an antimony as "a contradiction among concl usions derived from the
same or from equally plausible premises"); see a lso id. at 1 8 ("the contradictions of liberal thought").
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legal theory, "[a]n especially important conclusion is that no coherent the
ory of adjudication is possible within l iberal political though t . "63
Unger is not under the illusion that "a philosopher's trick"64 will suf
fice to overthrow the empire of liberalism. For "liberalism is a ruling con
sciousness as well as a metaphysical theory,"65 and "[e]ach of the theoreti
cal problems wi l l be seen to correspond to a problem in life that only the
transformation of experience through politics can truly resolve. "66 This
interconnection of theory and experience causes Unger to consider a plan
for "the transformation of the conditions of social life, particularly the
circumstances of domination, that produce the experience of the contin
gency and arbitrariness of values. "67
Part Two of Unger's book is his theory of the emerging "vVelfare
Corporate State" and of "its distinctive featu res of consciousness and or
ganization. "6 8 Unger says that "[i ]nsofar as they foreshadow a possi ble
union of transcendence and i mmanence in consciousness and of autonomy
and community in social organization, the welfare-corporate and the so
cialist state change the experience of which the l iberal doctrine is both a
part and a metaphysical representation. " 6 9 B ut the "Theory of the W el
fare- Corporate State" does not "define adequately what the n ew theory
might be";7 0 Unger undertakes this project i n Part Three. There he out
lines a "theory of the self" whose aim is "to define what a u nion of tran
scendence and immanence, autonomy and community, would mean ."71 H e
then tries to show "how the ideal o f the self can b e accompl ished i n soci
ety through a transformation of the welfare-corporate and the socialist
state."7 2 He describes a community whose institutional features are de
rived from the theory of the self, and he calls this community the organic
group or the community of life.13 H e says that organic groups will help
the world to achieve "natural h armony, sympathy, and concrete universal
ity. "74 But he does not believe that organic groups can be easily attained:
"An actualization of the ideal that broke through the logic of the everyday
and the extraordinary would require, if it could be accomplished at all,
the reformation of society. "75
Unger's book ends with a section on religion, and the famous conclud63. !d. at 98.
64. !d. at 1 7 .
65. !d. a t 24-25.
66. !d. a t 1 7.
67. !d. a t 1 03.
68. !d. at 20.
69. !d. at 2 1 .
70. !d.
7 1 . !d.
72. !d. a t 237.
73. !d. a t 260-6 1 .
74. !d. at 23.
7 5 . !d.
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ing paragraph: "But our days pass, and still we do not know you fu lly .
Why then do you remain silent ? Speak, God . m6
Throughout the book, the link between epistemology and social organi
zation-the " knowledge and politics" of his ti tle-plays the central role.
This link is what allows Unger to make the transition from his critique of
liberal metaphysics to his conclusions about liberal politics; as he empha
sizes , this connection will "serve as the key that will allow us to escape
from the prison-house, just as it was the chain with which the gates were
long ago locked by the bui lders. " 7 7
B.

Remarks on Strategy

The boldness of Unger's program is refreshingly unequivocal. H e says
that he will ( 1 ) launch a total assault on a doctrine that (al though its
premises are "forgotten," and although no single thinker held all its ten
ets) forms the "deep structure" both of modern thought and of modern
society. Specifically, he will (2) show that these princi ples are self
contradictory. All this will take three chapters-a little over a hundred
pages. In the remainder of the book he will (3) point the way to a new
kind of thought and a new kind of social life, i ntimated by the theory of
organic groups. These are the three most striking and important elements
of his book; particularly the first two, which amount to a claim to have
refuted the central core of modern thought. I shall discuss these three ele
ments-the methodology, the antinomies, and the theory of orga n i c
groups-later; but first, let me say a few words about Unger's project in
general.
Although I shall have many criticisms of the details, I am entirely sym
pathetic to the kind of enterprise Unger i s engaged in. His work tackles
an impressive range of problems and attempts to solve them by exploiting
a deep connection between epistemology and political organization. The
connection, like the Loch Ness monster, has often been glimpsed. Al
though nobody has ever brought back i rrefutable evidence, I suspect that
it exists and that it is as important as U nger says: If his spectacular claims
are correct, they have implications far beyond the narrow world of legal
theory. I too share Unger's admiration for the tradition of Continental
philosophy; on this issue he is ahead of many Anglo-American philoso
phers. I also feel some sympathy for the enthusiasm his enterprise has
evoked among his followers. Most academic moral philosophy i s dry, diffi
cult, and-superficially, at least-uninspiring. Unger, in contrast, displays
a refreshing willingness to make breathtaking claims that most profes
sional philosophers are too u nimagil!ative or too timid or too prudent to
76.

!d .

at

295.

77.

/d .

at

4.
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make; few works of academi c philosophy begin by announcing the refuta
tion of modern thought or end by saying, "Speak, God . "
Of course, the ability to make breathtaking claims is not e nough: You
also have to su pport them. And here the details matter. It is the details,
after all , that make the difference between the thrills of the astrologer and
the more austere excitement of the astronomer, or between the claims of
The National Enquirer and those of The Washington Post. In particular,
Unger has an obligation to satisfy the basic standards of historical exposi
tion and of philosophical argumentation.78 Everything in his refutation of
l iberalism depends upon these two requirements. For if the history is
wrong, he will have achieved nothing more substantial than victory over a
straw-person; and if the argumentation is careless, his adversary, even if it
be of straw, will survive the battle unscathed.
M y strategy will therefore be straightforward. I shall proceed through
the stages of Unger's argument, and at each stage I shall ask: How accu
rate is his history ? And how sound are his arguments ? I shall then con 
sider h i s theory o f organic groups. I n particular, I shall ask:
(1) JIIIethodology. What is "liberalism" ? Does it have a "deep struc
ture" ? And is the methodology of "total criticism" logically coherent ?
(2) The Antinomies. Do U nger's six principles embody a distinct , his
torically important philosophical theory ? (That is: Do the classical liberal
thinkers generally accept Unger's six principles, and do the non-liberals
reject them ?) And do U nger's arguments show that the principles lead to
contradictions ?
(3) Organic Groups. Does this theory offer a plausible replacement for
modern social life and for modern political theory ?
To the first of these q uestions I now turn.
C.

Unger's Methodology

1.

What Is Liberalism?

Unger says that liberalism took its classical form in the seventeenth cen
tury in the works of Thomas H obbes, who rej ected the Aristotelian m eta
physics and moral psychology .79 A close examination of U nger's book
yields the following list of liberals: Hobbes, Locke, H ume, S pinoza, Rous
seau, Kant, Bentham, M i l l , von H umboldt, T . H . Green, Strawson,
Rawls, Dworkin. 80 The list of post-H obbesian non-liberals is rather
shorter: Although Dewey, James, M arx, D urkheim, Weber, Scheler, and
78. Unger might argue that these standards are themselves a product of liberalism, hence part of
the object of his attack , and thus not a ppl icable to his work. I discuss this argu ment infra notes
94- 1 1 3 and accompanying text.
79. KP, supra note 1 , at 5 .
80. !d. at 9, 88, 298, 303, 306-08.
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Hartmann are mentioned as providing "partial critiques" of liberal
thought, 81 nobody is l isted as a clear opponent of the liberal doctri ne.
I f by "liberal" Unger meant simply "modern" (so that "non-liberal "
would mean "pre-modern " ) , then the two lists would not be so puzzling;
but he explicitly rules out this interpretation.82 He thereby leaves us with
the problem of trying to understand why the list of non-liberals is empty,
and what his "liberals" have in common apart from having l ived and
written after the Peace of Westphalia. The problem is compounded by the
fact that the term "liberal " already exists in ordinary usage and i s ambig
uous enough that Unger's readers may be tempted to read their own in
terpretation of l iberalism into his argument. Even at the level of concrete
pol itical discourse, the term is notoriously vague. Historicall y , the word
dates from the years following the French Revolution; it d esignated a
loose cluster of political principles-on the one hand, opposition to au
thoritarian forms of political organization (such as monarch y) and to the
excessive power of the state; on the other hand, a concern for political
liberties (freedom of speech and of religion) , for democratic political insti
tutions, for the separation of church and state, and for electoral reform.
Even at this concrete l evel, these principles can come into con flict with one
another, and l iberalism soon split into b ranches, such as laissez-faire eco
nomic l iberalism, movements for national self-determination, libertarian
ism, and N ew D eal l iberalism-to mention only a few.83 It is a familiar
observation that a politician can be "liberal" on one issue and not on
another, and that the positions identified as "liberal " change over time. In
addition, there is the sense of "liberal" that can be used to classify mem
bers of the Soviet Politburo or the South African Parli ament as "liberal"
or "conservative."
Once one moves to the more abstract level of political theory and
searches for the philosophical underpinnings of liberalism, matters become
still more confusing. Hobbes, for i nstance, Unger's prime liberal , was an
advocate, not of i ndividual rights, but of monarchy and the absolute power
of the state. On the other hand, his theory of sovereignty, his account of
the social contract, his secularism, his i ndividualism, his empiricism, and
his positivism exerted a profound influence on subsequent political theory,
including that of British liberals like M i l l , Bentham, and Sidgwick. (His
influence on continental liberals like Kant and von H umboldt was mini
mal .) So Hobbes' claim to be called "liberal " is not entirely un
problematic. Even i f we restrict our attention to philosophers who can be
81 .
82.

!d. at 1 0, 1 5 , 30 1 .

"First, what I
is irreconcilable with
original formulation."
83. For a helpful

shall call liberalism is not tantamount to moderni ty. M uch in modern thought
liberal principles; the polemic against them dates back to the time of their
!d. at 8.
account of the history of the word " liberal," see J . RITTER & K . GRUNDER,

HISTORISCHES WORTERBUCH DER PHILOSOPHI E ( 1 980).
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fairly uncontroversially classifi ed as "liberals" -such as Kant, Bentham ,
Mill, von H umboldt, Green, Dewey , 8 4 and Rawls-the amount of meta
physical , epistemological , psychological , and even political diversity is
striking.86 So Unger's use of the vauge and ambiguous term "liberal "
to
designate a single
politico-metaphysical -socio-cultural - psycho
epistemological theory adhered to by all these thinkers needs considerable
histori cal justification.
In the interest of clarity , U nger should have supplied an h istorical ex
position of "li beralism" and disentangled it from his critique; he ought at
the least to have given a clear l ist of modern liberals and non-liberals, and
he ought perhaps to have used a more precise term (like C . B . M acPher
son's "possessive i ndividualism") to describe the doctrine he opposes. To
these objections U nger might reply , first, that he is not so much concerned
to enumerate a set of liberals as to refute a set of ideas that h ave been
infl uential in modern thought; and, second, that his presentation of the
"deep structure" gives a precise account of the philosophy of " l i beralism."
But a brief glance at one of Unger's six " princi ples of l iberalism" -the
"principle of i ndividualism" -illustrates the difficulties with this reply. 86
This princi ple is vague to the point of emptiness. Moreover, as stated, i t
contains a n obvious fallacy , and to the extent that this principle has any
i dentifiable meaning it is explicitly rejected by Rawls (who says he i s fol
lowing von H um boldt on this point) . 87 I can see no justifi cation for attrib
uting it to any i n fluential thinker who actually existed.
Of course, U nger is entitled to call his six principles by w hatever name
he chooses. But it is i mportant to remember that these six princi ples must
be shown to determine an historically important philosophical theory. A
mere redefinition is not enough. A simple example of an argument that
84.
85.

Pace U nger; see J . DEWEY, LIBERALISM AND SOCIAL ACTION ( 1 935).

If Hegel is added to the l ist, as many scholars have argued he should be, then my claim
becomes even stronger. See R. D REIER, Bemerkungen zur Rechtsphilosophie Hegels, i n RECHT

MORAL-lnwwc;n: ( 1 98 1 ) ; j. RITTER, HEGEL UND DIE FRANZOSISCHE REVOLUTION ( 1 9 57); S .
AVI NERI, HEGEL's THEORY O F THE Mom:RN STATE ( 1 972); Pelczynski, The Hegelia n Conception
of the State, in H EGEL's PoLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (Z. Pelczynski ed. 1 97 1 ) .
86.
[ A ] group is simply a collection of i ndividuals; i n other words, the attributes of a group are the
sum of the attributes of i ts individual members. [This is] the principle of individualism, or
simply individualism.
If we take the group as the whole and the members as parts, the principle of i ndividual ism
affirms that the whole is just the sum of its parts. I n this sense, it is formally analogous to the
principle of analysis, which states that all complex knowledge (the whole) can be analyzed
back into the elementary ideas or sensations (the parts) with which it was built. This formal
analogy will later turn out to be the outward sign of a profound connection .
KP, supra note 1 , at 8 1 . Note in passing that the first sentence in the above q uotation contains a
fallacious inference. To say that "a group is simply a collection of individuals" is q u i te different from
saying that "the attributes of a group are the sum of the attribu tes of its i ndividual members." A table
is simply a collection of atoms. A table has the attribute of being a table, but atoms do not have this
attribute. For the point about Rawls, see J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF J usTICE 520-29 ( 1 97 1 ) and infra
text accompanying notes 226-32.
87. J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 523 n.4.
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commits the "redefinitional fal lacy" will clarify this point. " I wish to
prove that tuna fish do not exist. I begin by defining tuna fish to be mer
maids; that is, they are mythological creatures, half human and half pis
cine. But it is physiologically impossible for a single organism to be both
warm-blooded and cold-blooded. This is an anti nomy , from which it fol
lows that tuna fish do not exist."
Professor Unger's usage of the word "liberal " commits precisely this
fallacy. I shall show later that his "six principles of liberalism" do not, in
fact, constitute an historically important theory . His "refutation" of what
he calls "liberalism" refutes, at best, only what he calls "liberalism"; it
refutes historical liberalism only by redefinitional equivocation . For this
reason Unger's usage must be carefully distinguished from the ordinary
political and philosophical usages. In what follows, I shal l write it as LIB
ERALISM in order to keep the senses distinct. My subsequent discussion
will show that much of the plausibility of Unger's argument depends on
confusion-specifically, on confusing LIBERALISM with liberalism.
A further objection addresses the logical form of Unger's argument.
The problem is that his LIBERALISM is meant to serve, not merely as a
rational reconstruction of historical l iberalism, but as a target for refuta
tion. There is an important logical difference between the two enterprises.
If you wish to support a political thesis or to uphold a philosophical tradi
tion, you need only produ ce a single theory that supports that thesis or
that falls within the tradition and then argue for its truth. If other theo
ries in the tradition fall short of the truth, so much the worse for them:
Your theory still stands. But if you wish to refute a philosophical tradi
tion, it is not enough to refute a single theory. For one of the other theo
ries in the tradition might be true, and then so much the worse for your
refutation.
2.

Unger's Logic

Obviously, it would be tedious to examine and refute each separate the
ory in the LIBERAL tradition. If that laborious work is eschewed, as Unger
has eschewed it, there remain three strategies for refuting this collection of
theories. It is important to distinguish the strategies, because one of them
is fallacious, and the other two i mpose different constraints on the form of
the refutation.
The first strategy-call it the ideal strategy-is to ( 1) single out some
one theory T (which may be an idealization or rational reconstruction) ,
(2) show that it is the best of all the theories, and ( 3 ) show that i t never
theless fails. One can then argue, that T's weaker cousins would also fail .
This strategy is rather like establishing your prowess a t fisticuffs by beat
ing up the neighborhood bully; you hope it won' t be n ecessary to fight
everyone else on the block as well. Of course, logically speaking, this sort
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of argument does not prove that y o u would not b e thrashed b y the bully's
little si ster; and, logical ly speaking, it may be that one of the other theo
ries would not succumb q uite so easily as T. But it is not very likely,
provided that T is clearly stronger and more plausible than all the other
candidates , and provided that the other candidates are apt to fail for the
same sort of reason that T failed. The crucial point is that T m ust not be
made of straw ; otherwise the argument shows nothing.
The second strategy-the core strategy is to show that all theories in
the tradition share a common set of assumptions, and that these assump
tions lead to unacceptable conclusions or to a contradiction. This strategy ,
unlike the ideal strategy , does, as a matter of logic, imply that all the
theories fai l.88 And it imposes a different responsibility on the argument:
to show that all theories i n the tradition have these principles i n common.
It is obviously not enough to grab a few theses from here and a few from
there and then show that they lead to a contradiction. The argument must
be directed against the intersection of the theories, not against their union;
for, as a logical matter, the latter strategy shows nothing.
The third strategy-the agglomeration strategy-makes precisely this
mistake. It confuses the sum of a few theses gathered from here and there
with the central core of the theory. It is as though you were to a rgue :
"Jack and Jill share a common theory o f the authorship of Hamlet. Jack
thinks it was written by Shakespeare; Jill thinks it was w ri tten by Bacon.
This is an antinomy; ergo, their theory is untenable." If this argument
shows anything, it is that the supposed "common theory" does not exist.
There are thus three possible strategies, attacking respectively the i deal ,
the common core, or the agglomeration of the theories. Which one does
Unger choose ? Not the i deal strategy, for his six principles are not
presented in anything like the detail that would be req u i red to make them
the best possible version of LIBERALISM. 89 (Indeed, as will appear, his six
-

88. In practice, there will often be some overlap between the ideal and the core strategies, for the
fol lowing reason. i\n ideal-strategy argument shows that all theories "sufficiently similar" to the ideal
will fail; and the notion of "sufficiently similar" w i l l often be detai led enough to mark out a common
core. For example, when Francis Bacon argued against Aristotle's account of science, he was at the
same time attacking assumptions that had been made by all of Aristotle's medieval followers; so he
was simultaneously making a valid core argument and a valid ideal argument. There is clearly noth
i ng wrong with making an argument that is valid on both counts, but the two strategies are logically
distinct, and if you confuse them you risk making an argument that is valid on neither count.
89. To be more precise, the historical facts I discussed earlier suggest that n o u n i tary socio
political-metaphysical ideal-strategy argument could be made to work against l iberalism. The d iver
sity of ways in w hich phi losophers have argued for liberal political views makes it u n l i kely that one
could construct a single theory w hich everybody would agree to be the best version of l iber
alism-there are several strong contenders, and they have di fferent philosophical u nderpi n nings. Just
as a victory over the best boxer in town does not show that one could beat the l ocal black-belt, so a
victory over even the best util itarian-based liberal political theory does not i n i tself refute the best
Kantian-based theory. So if one wishes to pursue the ideal strategy, one has to p u rsue it against each
of the princi pal types of liberal pol itical theory-that is, one has to select the best representative for
each of the three or four principal types of l i beralism and defeat each of these theories separately.
Unger argues against a si ngle, weak t heory rather than against several strong ones, from w hich I i n fer
that he is nut fol lowing the ideal strategy.
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pri nci ples are little more than a straw-person: They are too vague to be
plausi ble, and they do not define an historically important theory . ) Nor
does he follow the core strategy , for he tell s us, not only that his six prin
ciples are not held i n common by all L I B ER A L thi n kers , but that n o L I B 
E R A L holds all six.9 0 I n fact (as a detailed exami nation of his argu ment
will show), he appears to be employing the fallacious agglomeration strat
egy , in which case his argument can show nothing more i nteresting than
that L I BE R A LISM is not a political theory-a concl usion that I have al 
ready given grou nds for bel ieving.91
Unger gives a curious justification for his procedure. H e does not dis
cuss the genuine-indeed fatal-logical difficulties that beset the agglom
eration strategy; instead, he worries (in the section entitled "The Problem
of Language") about a logical matter which he treats as a problem, al 
though in fact he should have welcomed i t . H e says that he intends to
show , fi rst, "that the pri nci ples informing liberalism are related to one
another and, second, that they produce antinomies that can not be resolved
within the system itself. "92 But a worry then strikes him:
Should the antinomies of liberal thought prove to be indeed i n solu
ble, would we not have to abandon the claim that liberal principles
are interdependent ? If we did, however, it would then no longer be
clear in what sense the princi ples constituted a system , even though ,
as a contingent matter, they might coexist in certain minds.93
This sounds as though Unger has noticed the central difficulty with the
agglomeration strategy-that Jill's principles plus Jack's principles do not
constitute a system. B ut in fact what seems to be bothering him here is not
a doubt about the agglomeration strategy, but something q uite different:
"It can not i n fact be demonstrated that the different premi ses of the lib
eral doctrine follow from one another by a strict logical necessity, nor
would such a demonstration be consistent with the discovery that these
premises lead to contradictory conclusions. "94
90. "[T]here is no one thinker who accepts the liberal theory, in the form in which I present it, as
a whole, or whose doctrines are completely defined by its tenets." KP, supra note 1 , at 8.
9 1 . It should be observed that the "redefinitional fallacy" and the agglomeration strategy are
related. They are both examples of equivocation, but they equivocate in different ways. Unger com
mits the agglomeration fallacy when he takes incompatible theses from distinct theories, agglomerates
them into an artificial theory, shows that the artificial theory is inconsistent, and concl udes that he has
refuted the original theories. He commits the fallacy of redefi nition when he dubs the artificial theory
"
"
LI BER ALISM, and concludes that, in refuting it, he has refuied historical liberal ism. These fal lacies
have to be exposed in different ways. The argument against the agglomeration fal lacy is logica l, and
consists in pointing out the gap in Unger's reasoning. The argument against the redefinitional fallacy
is historical, and consists in poi nting out that, because the "six princi ples of LIBER ALISM " do not
constitute a theory that any phi losopher has
' ever held, there is no warrant for cal l ing them
"liberal ism."
92. KP, supra note 1 , at 1 3 .

93.
94.

/d.
!d. at 1 5 .
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On the contrary: If Unger were making a valid core argument (as he
sometimes seems to take himself to be doing) , then such a demonstration is
precisely what he ought to hope for. For it has the consequen ce that all
the premises of LI BERA LISM must be abandoned; otherwise the antinomies
could be resolved by dropping one or another subset of the principles and
keeping the others.95 The logical form of an argument of the sort U nger
proposes is in fact well known and has nothing paradoxical about it.
Here, for instance, is Bertrand Russell arguing against "naive realism" :
"Naive realism leads to physics, and physics , i f true, shows that naive
realism is false. Therefore, naive realism, if true, is false; therefore it is
false. "96 Arguments of this sort are perfectly familiar. They come in many
different forms , and although they are usually more compl icated than
Russell's argument they are just as reconcilable with the laws of logic. So
the "quandary" U nger discusses is merely a pseudo-problem: He need not
have worried.
But his proposed solution lands him in the logical soup. I shall linger
over it, because in a very brief compass it shows the quality of Unger's
scholarship as well as of his reasoning.
Unger begins the defense of his methodology by raising the following
problem: "The methods of proof and argument are part of the theory to
be criticized. I n what form then is total criticism to bring its suit, and by
what law are its claims to be judged ?"97 H e next argues that L I BER
'
ALISM s methods of proof and argument-its "familiar modes of explana
tion" -are engendered by LIBERALISM ' s separation of the "order of ideas"
from the "order of events":
Much of the history of modern philosophy can be understood as a
series of attempts to elucidate the relationship between the order of
ideas and the order of events. First, the order of events was reduced
to that of ideas so that l ogic provided the key to all explanation ( ra
tionalism). Then the order of ideas was reduced to that of events so
that causality served as the basis of a unified science of the world
(empiricism). 98
One wonders what to make of the assertion that empiricism reduced "the
order of ideas . . . to the order of events." I t would have been more accu
rate to say that the empiricists (in particular, Berkeley and B urne) tried
to show precisely the reverse, namely , that physical events and objects
95. This is a straightforward application of what logicians call the "completeness theorem for
propositional logic." The basic idea is this. Consider the simplest case, where there are only two
premises, X and Y. Suppose that premises X and Y taken together lead to a contradiction. Now, if X
impl ies Y, then both X and Y must be abandoned. But i f X does not i mply Y, then you can abandon Y,
retain X, and avoid the contradiction.
96. B. RussELL, AN INQUIRY INTO M EANING AND TRUTH 1 3 ( 1 9 62).
97. KP, supra note 1 , at 1 2.
98. !d. at 1 3- 1 4.
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could be explained in terms of mental events and objects: what H ume
called "impressions and ideas , " and what later empiricists called "sense
data." And as for causal ity, H ume argued, in one of the most famous texts
in the history of philosophy , that there is no such thing as causality "in
the object , " but that the basis of causality is rather to be found i n "the
association of ideas " : that the "power and necessity" involved i n causation
are "qualities of perceptions, not of objects. "99 Ever since Hume, causality
has been a problematic concept for empiricists. Bertrand Russell's opinion
is typical: "The law of causality, I believe , l i ke much that passes muster
among philosophers, is a rel ic of a bygone age, surviving, l i ke the monar
chy , only because it is erroneously su pposed to do no harm. " 1 00
Unger's remarks on the rationalists are equally untenable. I n the first
place, the rationalists were not interested i n the reduction of "events" to
"ideas" so much as in trying to elucidate the connections between the
mental and the physical . This remark is especially true of D escartes, who
was (notoriously) a dualist,1 01 but it also holds for S pi noza and Leibniz.
Second, the rationalists did not take logic to be the key to all explanation.
Spinoza scarcely mentions the word "logic"; D escartes does so only once,
and says that he found the subject useless for his purposes. 10 2 And al
though Leibniz wrote about logic, his ideas were not published until the
present century . Logic, i n fact, had i ts heyday under Aristotle and the
Schoolmen, 103 not under the rationalists. Until the mathematical develop
ments of the nineteenth century , the standard view was that of Kant: that
Aristotle had said the last word on logic, a subject that was all very well
in its place, but of little use for the discovery of new truths. 1 04
So Unger's description of the content of the views of the rationalists and
99. D . H UME, A TREATISE OF HuMAN NATURE bk. 1 , pt. 3 , § § 1 2 , 1 4 ( 1 740) (L. Selby-Bigge
ed. 1 958). For a detailed discussion and a lengthy bibliography, see J. M ACKIE, THE CEMENT OF
THE UN IVERSE ( 1 974).
1 00. B. RussELL, AJysticism and Logic, in MYSTICISM AND LoGIC AND OTHER EssAYS 1 80
( 1 9 1 8)
1 0 I . Descartes was the originator of "Cartesian dualism," the doctrine that mmd and body are
two radically distinct substances.
1 02.
I observed i n respect to Logic that the syl logism and the greater part of the other teaching
served better in explaining to others those things that one knows (or like the art of Lully, in
enabli ng one to speak without judgment of those things of which one is ignorant) than in
learning what is new. And although i n reality Logic contains many precepts w hich are very
true and very good, there are at the same time mingled with them so many others w hich are
h urtful or superfluous, that it is almost as difficult to separate the two as to draw a Diana or a
M inerva out of a block of marble which is not yet roughly hewn.
R. DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON THE M ETHOD OF RIGHTLY CONDUCTING THE REASON pt. Il (E.
H aldane & G. Ross trans. 1 9 1 1 ) .
1 03. I.e., the scholastic philosophers of the middle ages, who were reviled by l ater generations for
their al legedly excessive use of logic. The effects of this revilement can be seen i n the etymology of two
familiar English words. Students in medieval Oxford were expected to study logic, grammar, and
rhetoric, three subjects that were collectively known as the trivium; from this root grew our word
trivial. And onr of the greatest logicians of the middle ages, Duns Scotus, had his name corrupted by
Renaissance anti-logicians into dunce.
1 04. See I. KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON, B viii-ix ( 1 794).
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the empiricists is inaccurate. It is also irrelevant. For he is trying to j ustify
the methodology of his argument, and so he ought to have considered the
methodology that rationali sts and empiricists used to make their argu
ments. Not that thei r methodology would help him. The rationalists do
not argue purely from logic, nor do the empiricists argue purely from
causal ity . 1 05
And, i n fact , the rationalists have no unique claim to logicality. Ratio
nalists and empiricists, Aristotle and the Schoolmen, logical positivists and
their Quinean successors-all (not very surprisingly) accept the basic laws
of logic; and they would reject as invalid any argument that relied on the
agglomeration strategy-the problem that Unger should have discussed,
but didn't.
Unger invokes this history to support the following argument. Recal l
that he is facing "the fundamental problem of method engendered by the
disjunction of the order of i deas and the order of events . " 1 06 H e say s that
he i ntends to solve this methodological problem by developing a different
mode of explanation: "The objective is to work toward a situation in
which the critique of liberalism will i tself forge a method of interpretation
more adequate than logical analysis, a result only to be achieved ful ly
through the construction of a nonliberal system of though t . " 1 07 B u t Un
ger's excursion into the history of philosophy i s not l ikely to persuade
anybody to "embrace that third and yet u ndefined mode of explanation
that stands beyond the boundaries of formal logic and causality. " 1 0 8 S uch
a drastic step ought to be supported by arguments, and the arguments
1 05 . For example, Descartes's !Vleditations begin w i t h Descartes i n his room reflecting on h i s
dreams and o n t h e malleability o f a piece of wax; he is led, v i a universal doubt, to the cogito argument
(which assures him of his own existence) ; then to a causal proof of the existence of God (which
assures him of the existence of an external world, of the truth of mathematics). This argument de
pends heavily upon extra-logical premises, and, in particular, u pon premises about causality; it is not
an exercise in pure logic. Similarly, Berkeley's idealism rests on a logical analysis of the concept of
matter, on an argument that the notion of material substance is logically self-contradictory; it is not an
exercise i n causal explanation.
1 06. KP, supra note 1 , at 1 4.
1 07 . !d. at 1 5. Unger adds: "This procedure w i l l req uire t h e i ntroduction of certain plausibl e but
contingent empirical assumptions at various points of the exposition and the abandonment of strict
demonstration i n favor of suggestive argument." !d. But this does not help him, and would not do so
even i f he were subsequently clear about which "empirical assumptions" he i ntroduces. You can add
as many empirical premises to a logically flawed argument as you l ike, and the fla w remains:
" 1 + 1 = 3, ergo 2 + 2 = 5" is not improved if you change it to, " 1 + 1 = 3 and snow i s w h i te, ergo
2 + 2 = 5 ." In any case, the agglomeration strategy is i n no sense a "suggestive argument"; i t is simply
muddled.
1 08. !d. Compare Unger's argument to the fol lowing: "The natural sciences are subject to a dis
junction between the mathematical sciences and the physical sciences. I wish to construct a new sci
ence which will transcend both. I n the argument for my science, I shall have to resort to equations
that state that 2 + 2 = 7 . This may look odd, but you should remember that the mathematicians do
everything in terms of numbers, and the physicists do everything in terms of physica l objects. Because
I am attempting to find a method of i nterpretation more adequate than mathematical analysis, I
cannot be held to the methodology of the mathematicians." Obviously, the chief fal lacy i n this argu
ment is the assumption that only the mathematicians have an i nterest in the laws of elementary arith
metic; U nger's historical remarks about the rationalists and the empiricists seem to me to make pre
cisely the same mistake, but for logic rather than mathematics.
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ought to be solid as bricks . But Unger's sol itary argument is that, because
his book is not going to adhere to the standards of logic, because he is
going to employ the agglomeration strategy , we need "a method of inter
pretation more adequate than logical analysis": "The need to deviate from
logical analysis compels us to prefigure that other and more complete sort
of explanation to which we have aspired, and which must constitute the
cornerstone of another theo r y . " 10 9 Not only are we to "deviate from logi
cal analysis," we are to do so in the interests of a "mode of explanation"
that will not emerge until L I BERA LISM has been overcome: "If both the
problem [of methodology ] and the disjunction that produces it are them
selves bound up with the fate of the liberal system, it will not be possible
to go from the name of the solution to the solution until we have found an
alternative to liberalism . " 1 1 0 But because the overthrow of L I B E R A LISM
will, as Unger stresses, require "the reformation of society, " 1 1 1 he s pares
himself the necessity of answering any embarrassing questions about how
the new "mode of explanation" will work, or about what life will be like
in a society that has rejected the laws of logic.
Unger is in fact mistaken in his premise that logic is ideologically
tainted. Political attacks on logic and the natural sciences (as being "bour
geois" or "non-Aryan" or "male supremacist") have been tried before,
and they have never had much success. Generally speaking, they are ad
vanced by people whose arguments cannot stand close scrutin y , and whose
abilities at logical argument are not particularly strong. In fact, modern
formal logic is the creation of socialists (Russell) , anti-Semites (Frege) ,
liberals (Hilbert), Jews (Tarski), women ( Rasiowa) , and the non-political
(Godel) . The logicians Jean van H eijenoort (who was Trotsky's private
secretary) and :tviichael D ummett (a passionate campaigner against Brit
ish racism) both agree that Frege was the greatest l ogician since
Aristotle. 1 12
Unger's argument in this passage has little to recommend i t . 1 1 3 H e ap!d. at 1 6.
!d. at 1 4- 1 5.
!d. at 23.
See M . DuMMETT, FREGE: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE xii ( 1 973); J. VAN H EIJENOORT,
FROM FREGE TO G6DEL 1 -5 ( 1 967).
1 1 3 . The argument, "Logic is a product of LIBERAL society; I am trying to reform LIBERAL soci
ety; ergo, I am entitled to deviate from the l aws of logic," is q ui te a muddle, and it certainly does not
1 09.
1 1 0.
111.
1 1 2.

remove the Oaw in the agglomeration strategy. Nor is it particularly new. The literature of pseudo
science is filled with exchanges of the following general form: "Look at these equations' I 've proved
that mathematics is i nconsistent'"-"No you haven't. Look here: You've divided by zero."-"So
what ? I told you mathematics was rotten to the core." M adame Blavatsky, a nineteenth-century spiri
tualist, wrote about vril, a mysterious cosmic energy mastered by the i nhabitants of Atlantis which,
she said, had provided the power for John Keely's perpetual motion machine. I n the 1 920's, a Chi
cago businessman, Robert T. Nelson, Jr., began to sell brass cylinders containing a substance called
vrilium. The cylinders were supposed to emit radiation for 20 feet, thereby repelling bacteria and
killing germs within the body. In 1 9 50, the United States government revealed that the cylinders
contained nothing but a cheap rat poison; furthermore, this rat poison was found to have no effect on
geiger-counters. "I believe," replied Nelson, "that we have an un recognized form of radioactivity."
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pears to have sensed the logical difficulties with his melhodology , but to
have realized neither exactly what they were nor exactly how they were to
be avoided; instead of eradicating the problem , he tries to patch it w ith a
deeply confused discussion of the history of logic. Fortunatel y for Unger,
his practice is better than his theory , and most of his critique of L I B ER 
A L I S M can be read as a coherent argument. But, unfortunately, he is
march ing i nto battle against a theory nobody ever held, a straw-person,
and he is marching without the benefit of any knowledge of elementary
logic. It remains to be seen who will win .

3.

Recapitulation

This will be a convenient place to take stock . I began by observing that
Unger's argument needs to be up to the mark both in its h istorical asser
tions and in its reasoning. I then noted that the details of h is six princi ples
of LI BERA LISM are given in the discussion of the antinomies rather than
being separately presented; I accordingly postponed the examination of
their historical accuracy until later. I then reviewed the uses of the word
"liberal ," and expressed doubt that any interesting "ideal version" could
be constructed for a set of pol itical theories that covers so much ground
and that contains so many sharp internal differences-especially when the
"deep structure" is to be given by principles as broad as the "principle of
analysis." This conclusion was important because it ruled out the possibil
ity that Unger could make successful use of the ideal strategy . H e h imself
rules out the core strategy , and appears to adopt the fallacious agglomera
tion strategy . Since the agglomeration strategy cannot, as a matter of logic,
demonstrate what he wants to prove, I cast a critical eye on his discussion
of logic.
It seems to me that Unger's refutation of L I B E R A L ISM collapses before
he exits from his Introduction. If I merely wished to show that his argu
ment fails, I would end my discussion here. But one might object that
even if Unger's argument is defective in its broad outlines, it is neverthe
less valuable and original in the details: He may have gotten "the big
picture" wrong, but the i ndividual arguments contain profound insights.
And perhaps I have been too quick in ruling out the possibility that he i s
fol lowing t h e ideal strategy. Perhaps t h e s i x principles are the best version
of LIBERALISM; or perhaps U nger, in his separate arguments against the
individual principles, manages to refute at least some historically i mpor
tant political theories.
In order to meet these objections, I must examine Unger's arguments
against the six principles. I shall show that they are as implausible as the
observations on logic that I have just discussed. I must also examine UnSee M . GARDNER, FADS A N D FALLACIES IN T H E N A M E O F

Sci ENCE 2 1 0

( 1 957).

1 98 8 ]

Unger's Phi losophy

69 1

ger's histori cal assertions. This examination is important for three rea
sons. First, I promised to investigate whether "the sheer breadth of Un
ger's knowledge . . . can only be regarded with something approach ing
awe." 1 1 4 Second, and more importantly, I wish to show that his argument
commits the redefinitional fallacy-that is, that the "six pri nciples of LIB
ERALISM " do not correspond to an historically important theory . Third,
recall that the heart of Unger's book is the profound link he claims to
have discovered between knowledge and politics. LIBERAL metaphysics
and LIBERAL society are supposed to be mutually reinforcing, and it is this
link that allows Unger to make the transition from his metaphysical argu
ment to his social and political conclusions. N1 ore specifically, the six
principles of liberalism are supposed to characterize the "deep structure"
of LIBERALISM and to distinguish the LIBERAL from the pre-LIBERAL era.
This historical claim is not mere wi ndow-dressi ng; it is, as U nger says,
"the key that will allow us to escape from the prison-house, just as it was
the chain with which the gates were long ago locked by the builders . " 1 1 5
If the s i x principles do not i n fact characterize a n y theory or set o f theo
ries and distinguish this theory or set from other, non-LIBERAL theories,
then Unger's central thesis cannot stand.
Let us examine more precisely what qualities Unger's argument de
mands of his six princi ples. I f P is any one of the six characterizing prin
ciples of LIBERALISM, then P must satisfy three conditions. First, P must
not be so vague that it states no recognizable principle at all. Second,
LIBERALS (or at least some LIBERALS) must accept P, otherwise the "deep
structure" will not pick out an historically important theory. Third, P
must distinguish LIBERALS from pre-LIBERALS (of whom Plato and Aris
totle are Unger's paradigm examples). For if both LIBERALS and pre
LIBERALS agree that P is true (or false)-that is, if P holds both in the
Greek city-state and in the modern, i ndustrial nation-state-then P is not
doing the classificatory work it is supposed to do. I f Unger's principles do
not satisfy these three conditions, then both his claim to have uncovered
the "deep structure" of LIBERALISM and his claim to have established a
deep connection between metaphysical theories and socio- political struc
tures will coll apse.
I shall show that each of Unger's six principles violates one or more of
these conditions. The principles are not definitive of any movement that
could plausibly bear the name "liberal"; i ndeed, they are so vague that, as
Unger has stated them , it is dubious that they were ever held by anybody
at all.
1 1 4.

1 1 5.

Monahan, supra note 7, at 432.
KP, supra note 1 , at 4.
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The Antinomies of Liberalism

Unger's refutation of LIBERALISM i s presented i n the fi rst three chap
ters. Chapter One-"Liberal Psychology" -discusses LIBERA LISM 's theory
of personality (which, remember, is responsible for the sentiments of res
ignation and disintegration) . Note that by "psychology" Unger does not
mean everyday empirical psychology . He uses the term to embrace ethics,
epistemology , and metaphysics; why he uses the term "psychology " I do
not know. He first discusses something called "the antinomy of theory and
fact" ; this discussion turns out to be the heart of his argument. He then
discusses the three principles of LIBERAL psychology : "the principle of
reason and desire," "the principle of arbitrary desire," and "the principle
of analysis"; he argues that these principles lead to antinomies. In Chap
ter Two-"Liberal Political Theory"-he describes the three principles of
LIBERAL social and pol itical thought: "the principle of rules and values,"
"the principle of subjective value," and "the principle of i ndividualism. "
Again , he urges that these three principles are self-contradictory. C h apter
Three-"The Unity of L iberal Thought"-attempts to show that the
three psychological components of LIBERALISM correspond to the three po
l itical components , and that there is only one way to escape the antino
mies, namely, to construct a new vision of metaphysics and society.
So the "deep structure" of LIBERALISM looks like this:
The Antinomy of Theory and Fact

\

I

Psychological Principles

( 1) Reason and Desire

Political Principles
--

(2) Arbitrary Desire
____.
-(3) Analysis

(4) Rules and Values
(5) Subjective Value

( 6 ) Individualism

The three psychological principles correspond to the three political princi
ples; the "antinomy of theory and fact" i s the taproot of the contradic
tions. Unger himself says that the "antinomy of theory and fact" and
principles (1) and ( 4) are the "fundamental problems of l iberal doc
trine . " 1 1 6 Because the "antinomy of theory and fact" is the philosophical
core of the book, and because it i ntroduces the metaphysical considerations
on which the remainder of his argument rests, I shall pay close attention
to the five-and-a-half pages h e devotes to this subject; then, more b riefly, I
shall discuss the other principles, particularly (1) and ( 4).
1 1 6.

Jd. at 1 33.
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Unger's discussion of "the antinomy of theory and fact"-the central
theoretical passage of his book-commences with a puzzling paragraph
that seems entirely irrelevant to anything else in his book. I discuss its
shortcomings in a footnote. 1 1 7
b.

Intelligible Essences

Unger next i ntroduces a notion that will figure prominently in every
thing that follows: the doctrine of intelligible essences. The denial of this
doctrine not only lies at the root of the "antinomy of fact and value," but
"is the ultimate basis of the principle of subjective value" 1 18-and is thus
responsible for the impossibility of a LIBERAL theory of adjudication , for
the LIBERAL distortion of the self, and so onY9
1 1 7.

The paragraph begins as follows:
Imagine the world as a field of space and a continuum of time that are the scene of facts or
. Objects-events exist i ndependently of our perception of what they are or of
objects-events.
what they should be. Ei ther we assume that everything that happens in nature happens neces
sari ly, or we say that we do not know why things happen. The latter conception, however,
implies uni ntelligible chance, which is also a kind of necessity. So, in either case, the field of
objects-events is given to us as a necessity. We call this necessity experience.
!d. at 3 1 . The paragraph is peculiar because it is not clear whose theory Unger is descri bing-his
own, or the l . l B E R A t.s ' . If it is the latter, and he means to ascribe this argument to some Oesh-and
blood thinker, then he should have provided at least a footnote. For there is quite a lot wrong with
this definition of experience. In the first place, the sentence begin n i ng "either we assume" contains a
glaring logical fallacy. It appears to be an attempt to apply the logical "law of the excluded middle."
(This law says that, for any property X, either everything has property X or something does not have
property X.) But Unger, or whoever he is quoting, seems to have confused this law with something
quite different: "Either everything has property X, or nothing does." This l atter proposi tion is clearly
invalid; it would imply, for instance, that either everything is blue, or nothing is. But if we rewrite
Unger's sentence so that it is logically valid, then we get: "Either everything that happens in nature
happens necessari ly, or something that happens i n nature does not happen necessaril y . " B u t then "the
latter conception" does not i mply that "the field of objects-events" is subject to "unintel l igible chance"
or that "we do not know why things happen." (Ycu can i nsert Unger's words "we assume" or "we
know" or "we say that we know" symmetrically on both sides of the "or" and stil l get a plausible
reinterpretation of Unger's sentence, but not one that is logically valid. For it is not the case that, for
any proposition p, either we know that p or we know that not-p. (Consider, for example, the proposi
tion, "This coin will come up tails.") U nger's sentence is multiply ambiguous; I have tried to i nterpret
it in the most charitable way.) Furthermore, one would l ike to know what philosopher ever held the
view that "unintelligible chance is also a kind of necessity" -which sounds rather like saying that
"black is a kind of white." Finally, if this definition of experience is supposed to be a characterization
of the standard L I B E R A L view, then it suffers from the drawback that it is not couched in terms that
would be accepted by any philosopher of h istorical importance. Traditionally, experience is defined,
not i n terms of the necessity of "the field of objects-events" (whatever those are) , but in terms of the
sensations and ideas of a perceiving subject. It is unclear what this odd definition of experience is
supposed to accomplish; it does not seem to play a role i n anything that fol lows. Perhaps U nger is
stating his own view, but i f so it is hard to see why he chooses to do so here.
1 1 8. Jd. at 79.
1 1 9. Unger defines "intell igible essences". as fol lows:
Something has an i ntell igible essence if it has a feature, capable of bei ng apprehended, by
virtue of which it belongs to one category of things rather than to another category. Accordi ng
to such a view, a stone is di fferent from a plant because it has a quality of stoneness, i f you
like, wh ich we can grasp immediately.
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Later I shall discuss the claim about "subjective value. " For the mo
ment I shall only make an observation about the historical pedigree of
"intelligible essences . " This term is, after LIBERALISM, the most important
theoretical concept in Knowledge and Politics. It plays a crucial rol e in
everything that follows. It is not a standard term in the philosophical vo
cabulary; it needs to be explained. In a long and impressive-looking foot
note (with learned references in Greek, Latin, and G erman ) , Unger
presents the historical scholarship for "intelligible essences," as found in
Aristotle, S pinoza, and Kant. The five sentences he devotes to Aristotle
contain eight major blunders; as for the doctrines he ascribes to Spinoza
and Kant, they are the precise negation of the views those thinkers in fact
held. The errors here are serious-so serious that one almost suspects a
joke; one is left wondering, not only what "intelligible essences" are, but
whether Unger has a firm enough grasp on the hi story of philosophy to be
able to say.12 0
. Now this doctrine is truly a master principle, for its friends have d rawn from it conclu
sions about language, morals, and politics. They have reasoned that because everything has an
essence, everything can be classified u nder the word which names its category. And the sup
porters of the doctrine of intelligi bl e essences have gone on to hold that the standards of right
and wrong must also have essences which thought can comprehend. Plato's ethics and Aqui
nas' theory of natural l aw exemplify this l i ne of argument.
!d. at 3 1 -32 (endnote omitted).
1 20. Unger's endnote begins as follows:
For the authoritative statement of the doctrine of intelligible essences, a doctrine that may be
understood as a revision of Plato's theory of ideas, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 7.
. . The
essence is the form that by becoming embodied in matter lends each being its distinctive iden
tity. For the development of the Aristotelian view, see Christian Wolff, Philosophia Prima sive
Ontologia .
. In this tradi tion, essence is defined by contrast to accident , on the one hand,
and to existence, on the other hand. It is both TO TL fv ELvm and ovaux
. . The classical
doctrine of intelligible essences has been revived in the phenomenology of Brentano and
H usser!.
!d. at 297 (endnote 1 ).
The errors i n Unger's accoun t of Aristotle are as fol lows. First, Aristotle's Book Zeta, to w hich
Unger refers, is perhaps the single most problematic text in the history of philosophy; only Kant's
Transcendental Deduction of the Categories has received comparable scholarly attention. Although it
is only a few pages long, there exist (not cou nting the n um('rous medieval commentaries) many
lengthy exegeses; the latest and most detailed (that of Patzig and Frede, at press) runs to nearly 500
pages. The difficulties of interpretation are formidable; so when Unger cites Zeta as the "authoritative
statement" of the "doctrine of intelligible essences" he leaves us in some perplexity about just what
the doctrine is.
Second, the phrase TO n fv ELvm is one of the most obscure i n the annals of philosophy. Professor
Anscombe's exasperated comment is typical: "I wish Greek grammarians cou l d determine something
about the expre�sions 'to ti en einai, to ti en einai A, to einai A, to A einai' (A being a dative') with
which the Metaphysics is strewn. . . . To translate 'to ti en einai': 'the essence' produces gibberish
. . . . " Anscombe, The Principle of Individuation, in 3 ARTICLES ON ARISTOTLE 88, 92 (J. Barnes,
M. Schofield & R. Sorabji eds. 1 979) (emphasis in original).
Third, the words "intell igible essence" do not occur i n Zeta, nor elsewhere in Aristotle's Metaphys
ics. (I am grateful to Gunther Patzig for this point.) This increases the perplexity, for it is not clear
which Aristotelian doctrine Unger is referring to. The issue here is not a mere terminological quibble.
As I shall show, Unger sometimes treats "intell igible essences" as though they were non-linguistic
universals; sometimes as though they were abstract particulars; and sometimes as though they were
essential properties. But these notions must be kept distinct. Triangularity is a non-linguistic univer
sal; triangles are abstract particulars; being triangular is an essential property of three-sided figures;
the predicate "x is a triangle" is a linguistic universal . Some philosophers contend that the only
universals are l i nguistic universals; some deny the existence of necessary truths and essential proper.
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Quine and the Antimony

U nger next contrasts the ancient "theory of intelligible essences" with
"the modern conception of nature." He describes the modern view in
ties; some do both; some do nei ther. In other words, the concepts are independent. U nger is in confu
sion on these matters, and as soon as the d istinctions are properly drawn, many of h i s arguments will
be seen to be fallacious. See infra text accompanying notes 1 72-79.
Fourth, Aristotle does not draw a disti nction between "essence" and "existence." This disti nction is
a product of the late middle ages; it postdates Aristotle by about 1 800 years. The development of the
essence/existence distinction is chronicled in the article Existen:z., existenzia , i n 2 H I STORISCHES
WiiRTERBUCH DER P H I LOSOPH I E (j . Ri tter ed. 1 972). Owens says of "essence":
The word conveys to modern ears a sort of opposition to "existence." . . In the lv!etaphysics
there is n o trace of any such opposition in the terminology of Being. The Greek has only the
one verb for the English "to be" and "to exist" and their derivative forms. There is noth i ng to
express an opposition of "essence" to "existence."
j. 0 W t:NS, T H E DoCTR I N E OF BEING IN THE ARISTOTELIAN fvfF.TAPH l'SICS 70 ( 1 9 5 1 ).
Fifth, the reference to Wolff and the undocumented references to Brentano and H u sser! add a
further layer of confusion. If the "classical doctrine of intell igible essences" is a theory that is sup
posed to have been "stated" i n Zeta, "exempli fied" in Plato and Aquinas, "developed" i n Wolff, and
"revived" in Brentano and H usser! , then I am at a loss to know what theory Unger has in mind. It is
rather like being told that Adam Smith, Marx, Keynes, and M ilton Friedman share a "classical
doctrine of capital"-except that these economists actually use the word "capital," w h i le Unger's
philosophers do not use the words "intell igible essences."
Sixth, to describe Aristotle's metaphysics as a "revision" of Plato's theory of the Ideas is like
describing The Origin of Species as a "revision" of Genesis. Aristotle attacked the Platonic metaphys
ics so thoroughly that the Platonic doctrines never revived.
Seventh, Unger says that for Aristotle "the essence is the form that by becoming embodied i n matter
lends each being its disti nctive identity." But this is precisely the Platonic picture that Aristotle was
opposing ("here the form; over here t he matter"). U nger should have followed standard usage and
said "being embodied," not "becoming embodied."
Eighth , as we have seen, Unger says of the doctrine of intelligible essences that "this doctrine is
truly a master principle, for its friends have drawn from it conclusions about l anguage, morals, and
pol itics." He gives Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas as examples. He is right about Plato (or, at any rate,
abou t Plato in the period when he wrote the Republic); but he is wrong about Aquinas and Aris
totle-particularly about Aristotle, who, in his ethical w ritings, explicitly (and famously) rejected the
Platonic strategy of basi ng ethics on metaphysics. This matter is discussed i n greater detail infra notes
1 74-79 and accompanying text.
I now proceed to the next paragraph of the endnote. Unger says:
lvlodern metaphysics takes one of two approaches toward the problem of essences. The first is
to reject the classical doctrine outright . . . . The second is to attempt to accommodate some
version of intelligible essences. There are in turn two main variants of this latter tendency. For
some, the essence means w hatever is needed to make something possible and i ntelligible; it
describes nothi ng in the empirical world. See Kant, Metaphysische Anfa ngsgrunde der
Naturwissenschaft, preface, Kants Werke, ed. Prussian Academy (Berlin, G ruyter, 1 968), vol.
IV, p. 467. For the rationalists, however, the essence that makes understanding possible also
makes existence necessary because the orders of ideas and of events are the same. See Spinoza,
r:thica, pt. 2, def. 2, Spinoza Opera, ed. C. Gebhardt ( H eidelberg, Winter, 1 972), vol. I I , p.

84.
KP, supra note 1 , at 279 (endnote 1 ) .
The notion of "essence" (Wesen) plays l ittle role i n Kant; the word appears only twice in the
published writings (once in the footnote to which U nger refers), and the Kantian u sage, w hich Unger
has misunderstood, is radically different from Aristotle's. For a lengthy discussion of the Kantian
usage, see H. GRAUBNER, FORM UNO WESEN 1 -92 ( 1 972). Kant's i nnovation was to distinguish
sharply between the logical essence and the real essence. The former belongs to logic and to the realm
of analytic judgments, the latter to metaphysics and the realm of synthetic judgments; the former
appl ies to concepts, the latter to objects. In the Letter to Reinhold (May 1 2, 1 789), reprinted in I .
KANT, BRIHWECHSH. 377-85 (Schondorffer e d . 1 986), Kant says that w e can have n o knowledge of
the latter. Intelligibility pertains to the log ical essence only, and thus only to concepts; it does not
pertain to the real essence. See also I. KANT, LoGIK § 1 1 6 & I ntro. ( 1 800). Unger h as m isq uoted the
passage to which he refers, which is discussing the real essence, and which reads: " Essence is the first,
in ner pri nci ple of all that belongs to the possibil i ty of a thing." ("Wesen ist das erste innere Prinzip
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terms which he attributes to his H arvard colleague, \V . V . Qui n e . 1 2 1 Bu t
Quine does no t hold the doctrines Unger ascribes to him, and Unger's
brief account contains many errors. 122
alles

\ foglichkeit eines Di nges gehon '') K a m , .\letaphysische .i nfa ngsgru n de d e r
in 4 K.-\:->TS W E R K E 467 ( Prussian :'l.cademy ed. 1 968) U nger has added the
words ''and i ntell igible: it describes nothing i n the empirical \,·orld . " H e has t h u s run together the
disti nction ben,·een the t\,·o ki nds of essence. missing precisely what is original i n Kant's use o f the
h'Ord .
.·\s for the rationalists. the)· did not hold that "the essence that makes u nderstanding possible also
makes ex istence necessary ' ' The problem of n ecessa ry existence is bound up w i t h the "ontological
proof of the existence o f God . " wh ich was first put forward by St. Anselm in the ele\'emh cem ury.
This proof (which. umil Kant, \''as one of the central problems of phi losophy) tried to show that
God's essent i a l propert ies- H i s omn i potence, H i s perfection, and the like-entail H is necessary exis
tence. ( Rough ! \ speaking, the proof runs as follows: 'vVe can conceive of an absol utely perfect bei ng;
but an absol utely perfect being cannot lack the attribute of existence (or else H e would not be per
fect); therefore, an absolutely perfect being necessarily exists.) S pi noza produces a version of the proof,
see SPI :-<OZA , ETHICS pt I , props. 7, I I ( White-Sti rling trans. 1 894), but this proof applies only to
God's essence, not to essences in general. (Indeed , for S pi noza , as for the medievals, God is the only
bei ng whose essence Involves existence, i .e., He is the only being who necessari ly exists. This is why
U n g e r s assertion is so startl i ng. The very first sentence i n the Ethics, i n the Book entitled "On God ,"
is: "By cause of itself, I understand that, whose essence involves existence; or that, w hose nature
cannot be conceived unless existing." I n Spinoza's system, God is the only being w hich is self-caused.
See i d . pt. I , prop 24 ( "The essence of thi ngs produced by God does not i nvolve existence . " ) ; see also
id. pt I , props .'i, 7, 2 0 . I f one looks to the passage of Spinoza cited by U nger, one finds, nearly
enough, the standard defini tion of essence i n terms of necessary p rop e rti es , but Spi noza's defin ition
says nothing about necessary existen ce :
I sa\· that to the essence of anything pertains that, which being given , the t h i ng i tself is
necessari ly posited, and being taken away, the thing is necessarily taken; or, i n other words,
that, without "·hich the thing can neither be nor be conceived, and which in its turn cannot be
nor be conceived without the thing.
!d. pt. 2 , def. 2 . In fact , only a few l i nes further on Spinoza says: "The essence of man does not
involve necessary existence; that is to say, the existence as well as the non-existence of this or that man
may or may not follow from the order of nature." !d. pt. 2, axiom I .
121 .
We cannot decide in the abstract whether a given classification is justified. The only standard
is whether the classification serves the particular purpose we had in mind when we made it.
Every l anguage describes the world completely , though i n its own way. On the modern view of
nature, there is no basis for saying that one language portrays reality more accurately than
another, for the only measure of the 'truth' of language is i ts power to advance the ends of the
commun ities of men who speak it. The theories of science are partial languages because they
classify things i n the world. Their claims to acceptance must therefore rest on their ability to
contribute to particular ends, like the prediction or control of events, rather than on their
fidelity to a true world of essences.
KP, supra note 1 , at 32. Unger's endnote 3 at 298 reads: "See W.V. Qui ne, Two Dogma s of Empiri
cism, in From a Logical Point of View (New York, H arper, 1 963), p. 44."
1 22. For example, Qu ine nowhere endorses the ( i n any case patently false) view that "every
l anguage describes the world completely." (Think of the l anguage of elementary arithmetic.) Nor does
Quine ever talk of a "true world," or about "the 'truth' of l anguage." ( For Qui ne , the things that are
true or false are sentences-or, more precisely, sentence-tokens.) Nor does he anywhere talk about
"partial languages" (whatever those are). Nor does he ever advance an "argument" like that found i n
Unger's last two sentences: "The theories o f science are partial languages because they classify things
i n the world. Their claims to acceptance must therefore rest on their ability to contribute to particul a r
ends, like t h e prediction o r control of events, rather t h a n on their fidelity to a true world of essences."
I find the reasoning here unintell igible, despite the presence of the words "because" and "therefore. "
These errors show that he has read Quine carelessly, a n d the carelessness leads h i m t o a more
serious error, contained in the middle of the paragraph: "On the modern view of nature, there is no
basis for saying that one l anguage portrays reality more accurately than another, for the only measure
of the 'truth' of language is its power to advance the ends of the communities of men who speak i t . "
Had Unger read the passage he cites more carefully, he would have seen t h a t Quine's posi tion is not
skeptical:
dessen.
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Unger, having discussed experience, the pre-LIBERAL metaphysic of in
telligible essences, and the modern view of science, next turns his attention
to the anti nomy of theory and fact-"the riddle posed by the modern idea
o f science and nature . " 1 23 The modern idea, according to Unger, is that
( 1 ) facts are determined by theory, not by the world; and (2) some theories
depict the world more accurately than others. 124 In his opinion, this is a
contrad iction :
In its simplest form, the antinomy of theory and fact i s the conflict
of the two preceding ideas: the mediation of all facts through theory
and the possibility of an i ndependent comparison of theory with fact.
Each of the principles seems plausible in its formulation and absurd
in its conseq uences. They contradict one another, but to q ualify ei
ther of them would seem to require a drastic revision of the view of
nature and thought from which both are drawn. H ere is a conun
drum that appears to imply the incoherence of our idea of science,
indeed of knowledge in general. 125
Something like Unger's "antinomy" is of course an important and well
known puzzle in the philosophy of science. Indeed, i t is a close relative 126
of an older problem , posed by Berkeley's philosophy of perception : If all
our knowledge of external objects-other people, sticks, stones-is derived
by sense-perception, and if there is no independent possibility of compar
ing these sense-perceptions with objects in the external world , then what
Physical objects are conceptually imported i nto the situation as convenient i n termediaries�not
by defi nition in terms of experience, but simpl y as i rreducible posits comparable, epistemologi
cally, to the gods of Homer. For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical objects
and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But i n point
of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only i n degree and not in
kind. Both sorts of entities enter our conception only as cultural posits. The myth of physical

objects is epistemologically superior to most in that it has proved more efjzcacious than other
myths as a device for working a manageable structure into the flux of experience.
W. QuiNE, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in FROM A LoGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 44 ( 1 96 1 ) (em
phasis added, footnote omitted). In the Foreword to this vol ume, Quine notes, "in l ikening the physi
cists' posts to the gods of Homer . . . I was talking epistemology and not metaphysics. Posited objects
can be real. As I wrote elsewhere, to call a posit a posit is not to patronize it." !d. at viii.
1 23 . K P , supra note 1 , a t 1 33.

1 24.
If there are no i ntelligible essences, there is no predetermined classification of the world. We
can distinguish among objects-events only by reference to a standard of distinction implicit i n a
theory. It is the theory that determines what is to count as a fact and how facts are to be
disti nguished from one another. I n other words, a fact becomes what it is for us because of the
way we categorize it. . . .
Yet we also believe that the h istory of science is progressive and that ultimately one can
make a rational choice among conf1icting theories about the world. Some theories describe the
world more accurately than others. . . . The conception that there is a realm of things, i nde
pendent of the mind, and capable at some point of being perceived as it truly is, seems neces
sary to the notion of science. Yet this conception also appears to rely on the doctrine of intelli
gible essences or of plain facts, assumed to be i nconsistent with the modern i dea of science.
Id. at 32-33 (endnote omitted).
1 25. !d. at 33.
1 26. See C. lvfcGINN, THE CHARACTER OF MIND 37-58 ( 1 982).
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basis do we have for believing that the external world exis t s ? If all we can
ever know is sensations, how can we j ustify a belief in things that are not
sensations ? This problem (the problem of the "vei l of ideas") h as been the
starting poi nt of all modern epistemology , and one could fi l l many
volumes with an account of the attempts that have been m ade to state it
precisely and to obtain clarity about the exact nature of the issues in
volved . The repl ies to Berkeley-from D r. Johnson 's kicking the stone 1 27
to Kant's Critique of Pure R eason -are too well known to n eed recount
ing here; suffice it to note that no philosopher thinks that m erely stating
this problem is sufficient to show that knowledge of the external world is
impossible.
The modern problem of the "theory-ladenness" of observational terms
can be stated in a way that parallels the old problem of the external
world: If all our evidence for a scientific theory comes from observation,
and if observation is inherently theory-laden (so that there i s no possibility
of obtaining pure observations uncontaminated by theory) , then what be
comes of the notion of scientific truth ? This well-known problem (or fam
ily of problems) in the philosophy of science is related to a host of other
topics in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. L ike
Berkeley's idealism, it has provoked many different analyses and solu
tions. The most celebrated, Quine's, is worth mentioning here.
In Two Dogmas of Empiricism, Quine argues for what is known as the
"thesis of holism" or the "Duhem-Quine thesis," namely, that our state
ments about the external world do not correspond to experiences in a one
to-one fashion . 128 F rom this thesis, Quine draws the conclusions, first,
that it is "folly to seek a boundary between [ the analytic and the syn
thetic]"/29 second, that "it i s nonsense, and the root of much nonsense, to
speak of a l inguistic component and a factual component in the truth of
any i ndividual statement."130 The second conclusion raises the general
problem of the theory-ladenness of observation (or, in Unger's terminol
ogy , of the "mediation of all facts t hrough theory"); i ndeed, Quine's text
is the starting point of the modern discussion.
But Quine does not rest with these conclusions. He goes on to argue
that the collapse of the analytic/synthetic distinction entail s epistemologi
cal naturalism. Epistemology is to be pursued as a part of n atural sci1 27 .
1 28.

j . BoswELL, THE LIFE o r SAMUEL joHNSON, ANNo 1 7 63 ( 1 799).

[T]he total field [of science] is so u nderdetermined by its boundary conditions, experience, that
there is much latitude of choice as to what statements to reevaluate in the light of any single
contrary experience. No particular experiences are l inked with any particular statements i n the
interior of the field, except indirectly through considerations of equil ibrium affecting the field
as a whole.
W. QUINE, supra note 1 22, at 42-43.
1 29. !d. at 43.
1 30. !d. at 42.
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on a par with chemistry or empirical psychology . 1 31 Far from infer
ring "the incoherence of our idea of science, i ndeed of knowledge i n
general," Quine infers that we are to use science-the best science o f the
day-to answer philosophical questions about the foundations of natural
science. The old epistemology goes by the board, but the enterprise of
science remains. 1 3 2
This sketch of Quine's argument will suffice to bring out the salient
point: Precisely the same considerations that militate against the separa
bility of theory and observation can also be marshalled in favor of a robust
scientific realism. Unger appears to be unaware of this possibility, for he
jumps straight from the contention that facts are theory-laden to the con
clusion that the modern view of science i s incoherent. He seems not to
realize that he needs an argument to support this rash leap. U nger has, in
fact, simply presented a crude variant of a familiar problem, labelled it an
antinomy, and congratulated himself for having b rought down the edifice
of modern thought . The few remarks he supplies i n support of his conclu
sion are so vague and equivocal that they can be used to prove the impos
sibility of just about anything. It is strange that U nger should have based
his refutation of modern thought on the works of Quine and taken so l ittle
care to verify his arguments. A simple walk across the H arvard Yard
would have sufficed to set him straight.
From this unpromising start, Unger goes on to give us his views on
mathematics and physics. He pauses to praise Kant for his "alleged solu
tion to the antinomy ,"133 then presents an analysis of the ultimate source
of the antinomy, and finally describes a solution .
ence,

d.

The Diagnosis and the Solution

Unger's traces the antinomy to the "radical separation of form and sub
stance."134 He does not explain why this "radical separation" and its
1 3 1 . See W. QUINE, Epistemology Naturalized, i n ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER Es
SAYS ( 1 969). In this essay, Qui ne l inks these various considerations together i n the way I have tried to
do here. /d. at 82.
1 32. For instance:
Our talk of external things, our very notion of t hi ngs, is just a conceptual apparatus that helps
us to foresee and control the triggering of our sensory receptors i n the l ight of previous trigger
ing of our sensory receptors. The triggering, first and last, is all we have to go on.
I n sayi ng this I too am talking of external t h i ngs, namely, people and their nerve endings.
Thus what I am saying applies in particular to what I am saying, and is not meant as skepti
cal. There is nothi ng we can be more confident of than external things-some of them, any
way-other people, sticks, stones. But there remains the fact-a fact of science i tself-that
science is a conceptual bridge of our own making, l i nking sensory stimulation to sensory stimu
lation; there is no extrasensory perception.
W. QUI NE, THEORIES AND THINGS 1 -2 ( 1 98 1 ). These ideas are explored at greater length i n his
ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AND OTHER ESSAYS,
supra note 1 3 1 , especially in the essay Epistemol'

ogy Naturalized.
1 33. KP, supra note

I , at 34.
1 34.
The true source of the anti nomy of theory and fact is the radical separation of form and
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harmful effects are peculiar t o L I B E R A L thought. One thinks immedi ately
of Plato, whom Unger takes to be the originator of the doctrine of "intelli
gible essences," and who drew a radical distinction between the Forms
and particulars. One wonders how he managed to escape the antinomy.
Aristotle, too, repeatedly stresses that we cannot know the particular, only
the universal; so the same question applies to him.13r; Unger continues
with some remarks about the senses and about the anatomy of horses. 1 36
These remarks are mistaken in laying the responsibility for "the ineffabil
ity of the i ndividual" at the door of modern science. The view that we can
know only universals, not particulars, was in fact promulgated by the sup
porters of the doctrine of "intell igible essences"-most notably, Plato and
Aristotle. 137
Unger, having stated the antinomy, commented on K ant's failure to
solve it, and traced its origins to the relationship of the universal to the
particular, now dips into the philosophy of mathematics for a solution.
H ere it is:
A different conception of the relation of the universal and the par
ticular would not produce the antinomy of theory and fact . Take, for
example, our understanding of geometrical truths. As Euclidean gesubstance, of the universal and the particular .
The view that i t is necessary to attain u niversality through abstraction from particul arity
rather than through the direct elucidation of the particular, as we do i n art, is the core of the
antinomy of theory and fact.
!d. at 35-36.
1 35 . Plato, i n the Theatetetus, in the Republic, and elsewhere, contends that knowledge is of the
Forms, and not of particulars. See ARISTOTLE, PoSTERIOR ANALYTICS bk. I , chs. 1 -5 , at 7 1 a-74b5
[ hereinafter POSTERIOR ANALYTICS ] ; ARISTOTLE, M ETAPHYSICS bk. 3 , ch. 4 , at 999a26 [ hereinafter
M ETAPHYSICS ] ; ARISTOTLE, N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. 6, ch. 3, at 1 1 39 b 1 6-35 [hereinafter
N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS ] . (The last n umbers in each citation refer to the page, colu m n , and l i n e num
bers of the Prussian Academy edition of Aristotle; they are reproduced in the margins of most
translations.)
1 36.
[ P]recisely because science has become more formal, i t can never fully describe what the senses
see. It cannot replace their kind of knowledge. On the contrary, science must constantly go
from substance to form, and from the particular to the universal.
. Physics may have l ittle to say about the anatomy of horses, but even zoology w i l l be
i ncapable of accounting for everything that is peculiar to an i ndividual horse. The ineffability
of the individual is the necessary consequence of the modern view of science. To attribute the
l imitation simply to a stage in the development of scientific knowledge is to misunderstand the
way science develops.
KP, supra note 1 , at 35.
1 37. Just as U nger fails to link the "true source" of the antimony to LIBERA L thinkers, he neglects
to tie the alleged downgrading of the senses by modern science to LIBERALISM. The idea that sensory
observation cannot yield knowledge of universals has an ancient pedigree. Plato, for example, argued
that the man who seeks truth ought to "cut himself off as much as possible from h i s eyes and ears and
virtually all the rest of his body, as an impediment which by i ts presence prevents the soul from
attaining to truth and clear thinking." See PLATO, PHAEDO 65e-67a. Aristotle does not regard the
senses so harshly; he points out that they can lead us to the universal. But he too says that "it is
impossible by perceiving to understand anything demonstrable," PosTERIOR ANALYTICS, supra note
1 35 , bk. I , ch. 3 1 , at 88a9 (Barnes trans. 1 97 5 ) ; and for him as for Plato scientific k nowledge is of
necessary, universal, eternal connections, not of particu lars. !d. bk. I, chs. 1 - 5 , at 7 l a-74b5;
N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note ! 3 5 , bk. 6, ch. 3 , at J J 39b! 6-35.
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ometers , w e know both perfectly and completely because the subject
matter of our thought is pure form without substance and pure
universality without particularity . Each particular example of a cir
cle is ful ly defined by the geometrical idea of a circle. N othing can
be known about any particular circle, except the dimension of its
radius, that is not part of the knowledge of the theorem of its con
struction . * Such a geometry knows nothi ng of the issue of classifica
tion of particulars under general categories, and therefore it never
need face the antinomy of theory and fact.
* [Unger's E ndnote : ] The example of the circle is taken from Lask,
Fichtes Idealismus, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. I, p. 4 5 . 138
This paragraph is open to at least four objections. First, recall that
Unger began by accusing science of separating universal and particular;
he told us that the contradictions of l iberal thought arise because modern
science pursues abstraction rather than the "direct elucidation of the par
ticular. " His discussion of geometry is supposed to solve these problems
by providing us with a new way of conceiving the relationship of univer
sals to particulars. But his geometrical paradigm offers us "pure form
without substance and pure universality without particularity" -which
sounds rather like the elimination of the particular. It is unclear how to
fit these various propositions together in such a way as to provide a solu
tion to the "contradictions" of modern thought.
Second, Unger' s remarks about the philosophy of mathematics make it
clear that he is ill-equipped to discuss the subject. Apart from his peculiar
terminology ("dimension of its radius"; "theorem of its construction" ) , the
fact is that, ever since the days of Klein and H il bert, geometry (including
Euclidean geometry) has been intertwined with the theory of groups, and,
like the rest of mathematics, is inextricably bound up with abstract alge
bra-a subject whose very purpose is to classify particular mathematical
entities under abstract structural laws . 1 39
Third, Unger's solitary footnote i n this paragraph is to Emil Lask's
book on Fichte. Fichtes Idealismus und die Geschichte is an obscure
work, written at the turn of the century, now dated even as a work on the
history of German Idealism, and in any case having nothing to do with
KP, supra note 1 , at 35-36; endnote at 299.
Felix Klein and David H i l bert were two eminent mathematicians of the l ate nineteenth and
early twentieth century. Klein is responsible for the " Erlangen Program" ( 1 872) of classify i ng geome
tries in group-theoretic terms; H ilbert is responsible for the first strict axiomatization of Euclidean
geometry. See D. H ILBERT, GRUNDLACEN DER GEOMETRIE ( 1 899). The field is vast, but the follow
ing writings give an overview of the philosophical issues raised by the growth of abstract algebra and
formal axiomatic systems: 0. BECKER, GRUNDLACEN DER MATHEMATIK 1 85-370 ( 1 954); F. K LEIN,
VORLESUNGEN VBER DIE ENTWICKLUNG DER MATHEMATIK IM 1 9. jAHRHUNDERT ( 1 926); D. H I L
BERT, Axiomatisches Denken, Naturerkennen und Logik & Neubegrundung der Mathematik, re
printed in GESAMMELTE ABHANDLUNCEN ( 1 935). Some of the relevant articles are translated in W.
EWALD, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MATHEMATICS: BASIC TEXTS (forthcoming 1 988); a general account
can be found in M. KLINE, MATHEMATICAL THOUGHT FROM ANCIENT TO MODERN TIMES chs. 26,

1 38.
1 39.

32, 36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 49 ( 1 972)
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the developments i n mathematics and logic that have taken place in the
past century and a half. It is irrelevant to the matter under d iscussion.140
Fourth , even i f Unger's description of geometry were correct, the gen
eral consequences he seeks to draw would not follow without a considera
ble amount of further argument. If some feature of empirical science is
causing you trouble (say, to take Unger's example, the anatomy of hor
ses), it is an inadequate solution to point out that that feature is absent in
mathematics. M athematicians are able to carry out their research without
the use of telescopes, but this does not prove that astronomers can do the
same. If Unger wants to generalize his mathematical specul ations i nto a
new foundation for the sciences , he has a great deal of work ahead of him.
e.

Recapitulation

I have been discussing the section entitled "The Antinomy of Theory
and Fact" for a long while. I have done so because this short passage is
the core of Unger's book. As the crucial step in his attempt to refute the
"dominant elements of modern thought," it deserves close attention.
This brief, self-contained passage deals with the familiar problem of
how scientific theories relate to the world-a problem that i s commonly
discussed in freshman courses on the philosophy of science. In these five
and-a-half pages, Unger makes some sweeping remarks about the defini
tion of experience, about Book Zeta, about S pinoza's views o n "intelligible
essences," about the modern view of science, about Quine. He states the
"antinomy," which in fact is a well-k nown problem whose complexities
he has not understood. He compliments Kant for his "all eged solution ,"
then goes on to talk about zoology , about the anatomy of horses, about the
relationship between universals and particulars, and about Euclidean ge
ometry; these l ast remarks he backs up with learned footnotes to the ob
scure and irrelevant Lask. For all the parade of learning, for all the huf
fing and puffing, Unger i s in control neither of the literature h e cites, nor
of his own arguments. 1 4 1
1 40. Incidentally, Unger misunderstands Lask's argument; but to go into the details would take us
too far afield.
1 4 1 . I should l i ke i n this footnote t o discuss a n issue that i s raised by U nger's reference t o the
book by Lask. U nger cites many works in foreign l anguages; in particular, he cites m a n y works from
or about the classical period of German philosophy (say, Kant to Nietzsche), and he cites them i n
German. B y m y count, there are in Knowledge and Politics 79 citations o f this sort; i n only three are
the sources not readily available in English translation. One of these footnotes is to a paragraph i n
Kant's Nachlass; t h e other two, both of w hich appear i n t h e passage I have just d i scussed, a r e to the
work by Lask.
The only example I have been able to find in Knowledge and Politics where U nger d irectly quotes
a work written in a foreign language is this:
Shall we not be forced to adopt the view that "the owl of M inerva spreads its wings only at
the full of dusk,"* and that theory must therefore serve as the witness of history, w a i t i ng i f i t
is modest, prophesying if i t is rash , b u t denied t h e power t o rebuild?
• [ Unger's endnote:] Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, preface, Samtliche
Werke, val. VII, p. 37 .
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The Antinomy of Reason and Desire

According to Unger, LIBER ALISM ' s denial of intelligible essences is di
rectly linked to its psychological and political shortcomings. For by reKP, supra note 1 , at 1 7 ; endnote at 297. Unger has not i n fact been worki ng with the German text
but with the standard English translation, H EGEL's PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 1 3 (Knox trans. 1 942).
The German is: "die Eule der Minerva beginnt erst mit der einbrechenden Diimmerung ihren
Flug" -i.e., "the owl of M inerva begi ns its O ight only at the fal l of dusk." The phrase "spreads i ts
wings" is not in Hegel ; it is Knox's i nvention. Apparently, U nger's habitual citation to works i n
foreign languages, even when translations are available, stems from neither a real need to work from
the original nor his own fami liarity with it.
Unger's argument rests upon his i nterpretation of the historical development of Western thought,
and the plausi bility of his work depends on what his fol lowers have cal led "the sheer breadth of his
knowledge." We have, i n the five-page section under discussion, seen what he says about Book Zeta,
about Spinoza's view of "intelligible essences," and about Quine. Earl ier we saw some extremely
q uest ionable remarks about the rationalists and the empiricists; and there is more to come. But if
Unger has only a superficial understanding of the G reeks, the rationalists, the empiricists, and the
modern philosophers, all that remain are the classical German metaphysicians and the scholastics.
To judge from his footnotes, Unger's knowledge of German philosophy is not, in fact, very deep.
He makes no mention of the important continental legal philosophers of the n ineteenth century, many
of whose works have never been translated; and I see no evidence that he is acquainted with the mass
of secondary literature that Hegel or Kant scholars-including Anglo-Americans-are expected to
have mastered. If he were versed in modern Kant scholarship, for i nstance, he woul d not have made
the mistakes that I d iscuss i n note 1 20 supra.
As for the Scholastics, Unger says, in the letter q uoted in note 1 5 3 infra, that "the primary source
of the conception of universals I defend is the Aristotelian doctrine that the priests who taught me as a
boy used to cal l 'hylemorfism' " [sicj. So perhaps he has a sol i d knowledge of medieval philosophy.
We shall have to wait and see. See infra text accompanying notes 1 80-83.
Unger's habit of citing obscure works i n foreign l anguages has led to his reputation for knowledge
"that can only be regarded with somethi ng approaching awe"; and this reputation h as given CLS one
of i ts characteristic defenses against cri ticism-namely, the contention, "You are not able to under
stand the tradition of philosophy in w hich we are work i ng." For example:
One CLS member who asked not to be identified speculated that Dean Carrington's views
were the fruit of frustration. "Carrington read U nger and doesn't get it," the professor said.
"He freaked out because of his i nability to deal with Roberto. Unger is the least appropriate to
be attacked as a nihi list. He's an affirmative Catholic radical social activist."
Kaplan, A Scholarly War of Words, Nat'! L.J . , Feb. I I , 1 98 5 , at 28. Unger is not, of course, respon
sible for the anonymous comments of his supporters; but he has said similar things himself. See infra
note 1 53.
I should like to emphasize that my criticisms of C LS are not directed agai nst "Continental" (as
contrasted with "Anglo-American") philosophy. These labels do not make much sense (most of the
great "Anglo-American" phi losophers-Frege, Carnap, Wittgenstein, Reichenbach, and the Vienna
Circle-were i n fact Austrians or Germans), and I a m incli ned to think that Unger exaggerates the
cleavage i n his remarks i n note 1 53 infra . More importantly, most of the best writing on the philoso
phy of law comes from Continental Europe, and has done so ever since Kant; Germany in particular
has perhaps the most i mpressive body of jurisprudential li terature in any l anguage, with the possible
exception of Latin. Very few of the leading texts have been translated. An introductory readi ng list
would include: J . KANT, ANFANGSGRUNOE DER RECHTSI.EHRE ( 1 797); P. FEUERBACH, UBER
PH!l.OSOPHIE UNO EMPIRIE IN IHREM VERHALTNIS ZUR I'OSITIYEN RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ( 1 804);
F. v. SAYIGNY, U sER DEN BERUF UNSERER Zur FUR GrsETZCERUNG UND RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
( 1 8 1 4) and SYSTEM DES HEUTIGEN ROMISCHEN RECHTS ( 1 840); G. PUCHTA, CURSUS DER INSTITU
TIONEN ( 1 84 1 ) ; R. v.j HERING, ScHERZ UNO ERNST IN DER j uRISPRUDENZ ( 1 88 5 ) , D ER ZwECK IM
RECHT ( 1 904), and Unsere Aufgabe, i n 1 j AHRBUCHER FUR DIE DoGMATIK DES HEUTIGEN ROMI
SCHEN UNO OEUTSCHEN PRIVATRECHTS I ( 1 857); B. WINDSCHEID, GESAM MELTE REDEN UNO
ABHAN OLUNGEN ( 1 904); E. EHRLICH, FREIE RECHTSFINOUNG UNO FREIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
( 1 903); H . KANTOROWICZ, DER KAMPF UM DIE RECHTSWISSENSCHAFT ( 1 906); L. NELSON,
PHIL.OSOPHISCHE RECHTSLEHRE ( 1 920). Nineteenth-century German legal philosophy is rarely dis
cussed in American legal periodicals, although it had a great i nOuence on such scholars as Karl
Llewel lyn, Roscoe Pound, and Lon Fuller. An exception is the fi ne recent paper by J ames Q. Whit
man, Note, Commercial Law and the American Yolk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for the
Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 1 5 6 ( 1 987), which contains further references.
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jecting intelligible essences, LIBERALISM is led t o the "principle of arbi
trary desire" and to the "principle of rules and values . " But the
impossibility of reconciling these principles with the denial of i ntelligible
essences is precisely what causes the antinomies; and the antinomies are
what doom LIBERAL adjudication and legislation. 142 To show that L I B E R 
ALISM is sturdier than Unger says, I shall now consider his psychological
and political arguments in turn. My treatment will be brisker than before.
U nger accuses LIBERALISM of separating reason from desire, the under
standing from the appetites. 143 H e says that this separation compels L I B
ERAL theorists to adopt one or the other of two moralities: the morality of
reason or the morality of desire. But " both these theories are caught in a
paradox, the antinomy of reason and desire . " 144 The morality of desire
fails because every time a desire is satisfied , a new desire springs u p to
take its place; the morality of reason fails because it is merely an empty
formalism, devoid of moral content.145
Modern German legal phi losophy is w e l l represented by R. At.EXY, THEOR IE m�R JUR ISTISCHEN
ARGUMENTATION ( 1 978) and THEORIE DER GRUNDRECHT£ ( 1 985); and by R. D R E I ER , supra note
85. All three works contain extensive bibliographies. Alexy's THEORI £ (which w i l l shortly appear i n
English translation) is an elaboration of t h e work of Jiirgen Habermas, who is often cited b y CLS.
Unfortunately, the use of H abermas by CLS has led to popu lar misunderstanding o f his work. For
example, Time lVIagazine reported that "the crits have borrowed from philosoph ical realms outside
legal thought, including structuralism, semiotics and the 'Frankfurt school' of such nco - Marxist theo
rists as Jiirgen H abermas and Theodor Adorno. They propose that law is no more than a means by
which unjust power relations are dressed in the costume of eternal truths." Lacayo, supra note 23, at
87. The Habermas-Alexy theory is not in fact "nihilistic," and the bulk of Alexy's work is devoted to
the presentation of a set of rules for rational normative argumentation. All of this " Continental"
philosophy seems to me to be of very high qual ity. I should not l i ke my criticisms of U nger or CLS to
be misinterpreted as criticisms of a tradition with which CLS has l ittk to do, and whi ch i t has taken
l ittle trouble to understand.
1 42.
There can be no coherent, adequate doctrine of legislation or adjudication on l i beral premises.
'A'hen viewed together, as a set of related answers to questions of rulemaking and rule applica
tion, liberal political and legal doctrines are like a spider's web with a hole. I f one pushes over
a thread of the web to cover the hole, another hole opens up someplace else. In the end, one
may conclude that something is wrong w ith the spider.
KP, supra note 1 , at 83; see id. at 4 1 , 77, 79, 92-93.
1 43. !d. at 39.
1 44. !d. at 49.
1 45 .
The morality o f desire is paradoxical. It canonizes contentment a s the good, and defines con
tentment as the satisfaction of desire. But contentment cannot be achieved so long as we lack
criteria with which to judge and to order our ends. Once a desire is satisfied, another must
come to take its place, for according to l i beral psychology we are striving beings who covet as
long as we live. There is no reason to think that the number of dissatisfied desi res d i m in ishes
over time.
!d. at 52-53. The morality of reason is in equally bad shape:
Coherence demands that the universal principles of the morality of reason be, like the golden
rule, neutral toward the purposes of specific i ndividuals. Given the postulate of arbitrary de
sire, there is no basis on which to prefer some ends to others. But as long as this formal
neutrality is strictly maintained, the standards i t produces w i l l be, like the golden rule itself,
empty shells. Until the shells are fil led up by more concrete princi ples, they are capable of
accommodating almost any pattern of conduct and i ncapable of determining precisely what is
commanded or prohibited i n particular situations of choice. Do unto others as we would have
them do unto us, but what is it that we ought to want them to do unto us:>
!d. at 5 3-54.
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There are several objections to this analysis. First, a separation of rea
son from desire is hardly unique to L I B E R A L ISM . It is a central idea in
Greek phi losophy,146 and although there are important d ifferences be
tween Greek and modern moral psychology , Unger does not state them
very clearly. H is "principle of reason and desire" is so vaguely worded
that it blurs the differences between the G reeks and the modern philoso
phers as well as the differences between such modern thinkers as, say ,
Hume and Kant.147
Second, U nger does not show-he simply assumes-that LIBERAL
moral theories must adopt one or the other of his two moralities. But
many moral theories do not fall into either camp-for example, the ac
count of morali ty given in H . L.A. H art's Concept of Law, which is based
on a theory of h uman conventions. 148
Third, the arguments Unger advances against the morali ties of desire
and reason are, like his arguments against "the antinomy of theory and
fact," merely restatements of old controversies. The argument against the
morality of desire is a commonplace. It is referred to in the phi losophi cal
literature as "the paradox of hedonism";149 it was well-known to Socrates,
and was discussed at length by the classical utilitarians. But U nger's ver
sion of this old argument 1 60 is no threat to a utilitarian. S pecifically: ( 1 )
Contentment, conceived of as a state i n which all desires, of w h atever sort,
have been satisfied, is not the summum bonum for this tradition-in con
trast to the activity of satisfying rational desires, which is a different mat1 46.
"Of our unnecessary pleasures and appetites there are some l awless ones, I think, w h ich
probably are to be found i n us all, but w hich, when controlled by the laws and the better
desires in alliance w ith reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that
only a few weak ones remain, while i n others the remnant is stronger and more n umerous."
"What desires do you mean '" he said.
"Those," said I, "that are awakened in sleep when the rest of the soul, the rationa l , gentle
and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine,
gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts. You are
aware that in such case there is nothi ng i t will not venture to undertake as being released from
all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother i n
fancy o r with anyone else, man, god o r brute. I t i s ready for a n y foul deed o f blood; i t abstains
from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly and shamelessness."
PLATO, R EPUBLIC bk. 9, at 57 1 c (P. Shorey trans. 1 930).
1 47. Unger formulates this principle as follows:
The first principle of liberal psychology states that the self consists of understanding and de
sire, that the two are distinct from one another, and that desire is the moving, active, or pri
mary part of the self. The mind machine, by itself, wants nothing; desire, unaided by under
standing, can see nothing. This might be called the principle of reason and desire.
KP, supra nott I , at 39. I note i n passing that one of the most inOuential liberal pol itical theo
rists-Kant-rejects the idea that desire is the primary part of the self.
1 48. H . L.A. H ART, THE CoNCEPT OF LAW ( 1 9 6 1 ) , especially chs. 5, 6, & 8. Other moral theo
ries that seem to me to fit uneasily i nto either camp are those of Burke, H ume, and T . H . Green.
1 49. The term originates with Sidgwick.-See H. SIOGWICK, TH£ METHODS OF ETHICS 48 ( 1 907)
("Here comes into view what we may call the fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the i mpulse
towards pleasure, if too predominant, defeats its own aim."). Sidgwick describes this paradox as "al
most a commonplace," id. at 46; for his lengthy discussion of it, see id. at 1 1 9-6 1 .
1 50. See supra note 1 45.
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ter altogether."' (2) Even if the utilitarian concedes that "there is no reason to think that the number of dissatisfied [sic] desires diminishes over
time," it remains true that the number of satisfied desires increases. This
is both the more reasonable quantity to measure and the one that utilitarians have in fact adopted. (3) There are some fairly obvious and plausible
devices whereby a utilitarian can avoid Unger's paradox (for example, by
saying that, on pain of perpetual disappointment, a successful utilitarian
life requires the cultivation of a particular second-order desire, namely,
the desire to become the sort of person who is not governed by unsatisfiable first-order desires-such as an insatiable greed for money or the
like). I do not myself believe that classical utilitarianism is a tenable moral
theory, and I am sympathetic to Unger's criticisms. But he does not mention the serious objections to utilitarianism that have been discussed in the
recent literature;152 the one problem he does mention is minor.
Unger's argument against the morality of reason is equally familiar. It
was advanced against Kant by the German Romantics, by Hegel, by John
Stuart Mill, by Bradley, and by Sidgwick. As a consequence, every important study of Kant's ethical writings discusses the problem; 53 and as in
the case of utilitarianism, there are many well-known and plausible
replies.
151. See H. SIDGWICK, supra note 149, at 23-26.
152. See, e.g., the contribution of Williams to B. WILLIAMS & J.

SMART, UTILITARIANISM: FOR

AND AGAINST (1973).

153. H. PATON, THE MORAL LAW 74-77 (1948); 0. NELL, ACTING ON PRINCIPLE (1975).
There are further references and a helpful discussion in Professor Kronman's impressive and devastating review of Knowledge and Politics. See Kronman, Book Review, 61 MINN. L. REV. 167, 183,
197-98 (1976). Kronman points out that Unger's criticisms of the two LIBERAL moralities are to be
found in Hegel. Unger replied: "The suggestion that my view is Hegelian has been made by various
people in the United States and England. Frankly, I think it is mistaken .... People interested in
philosophy who have read the book in Brazil, France, and Italy don't find it especially Hegelian at
all." Id. at 200. But this is irrelevant. Kronman is quite specific in his charge of unoriginality. He
confines it to Unger's critique of Kantian ethics and to his "vision of humanity," of which Kronman
says: "To be honest, I find very little in Unger's 'vision of humanity' which isn't already there-and
for the most part explicitly so-in Hegel's philosophy." This assertion Kronman supports with a long
string of citations to Hegel's works. See id. at 182-83. Unger ignores this documentation; instead, he
tells us:
The effort to participate in the dialogue between Christianity and modernism is one of the
ruling ambitions of the work. And the primary source of the conception of universals I defend
is the Aristotelian doctrine that the priests who taught me as a boy used to call "hylemorfism"
[sic] and which, despite what you say, is utterly alien to the dominant strands in modern
philosophy.
I write this not merely to defend myself against an unfairness which I think you have done
me, and to reject a misinterpretation of my thought, but also to make two points about the
politics of philosophical culture in the Anglo-American world .... I believe that the resources
available for the critique of liberalism have been enormously impoverished by the widespread
ignorance of Christian tradition among contemporary Anglo-American academics. One of the
consequences is to subsume under some familiar category-like Hegelianism-or some even
more general rubric-like collectivism-whatever seeks to break with liberalism and
capitalism.
Id. at 200-01. I find this reply unpersuasive. It simply ignores Kronman's citations. In view of the
facts I discussed in note 141 and that I shall discuss in text accompanying notes 180-83, the remarks
about "Anglo-American" academics ought to be taken with a considerable dose of salt.
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I do not wish to exaggerate my criticisms of this section. It does not
contain any major historical errors, and the objections Unger raises are
not pseudo-problems. But this philosophical ground is already welltrodden, and if one wishes to show that modern moral philosophy
culminates in self-contradiction, it is not enough merely to gesture towards
two familiar and well-explored lines of attack, neither of which, despite
much effort, has succeeded.
3.

The Political Antinomies

I now come to the part of Unger's argument most directly occupied
with problems of legal theory. He is going to unfold his argument that the
denial of "intelligible essences" is the source of the antinomies of liberal
political theory. Unger's argument, which I quote at length in the footnote, can be split into three propositions. 5
154. "[Tjhe intelligible essence of each thing in the world is its ideal. So, for example, according
to this view, there is a universally valid ideal of perfected human life. We call this ideal humanity
because it distinguishes man from all other kinds of beings. It is his intelligible essence." KP, supra
note 1, at 41.
From the start, liberal political thought has been in revolt against the conception of objective
value. [Here Unger cites to Hobbes' Leviathan.] If we were able to perceive such values, they
would become the true foundation of the social order. Public rules would be relegated to a
subsidiary role, as devices for the specification of the objective standards. . . . Even the premises of liberal psychology would be affected by an objective theory of value. Ends would be at
least as intelligible as facts. They would be things that exist in the world, like triangles, if not
like tables.
Id. at 76-77.
The doctrine that there are no intelligible essences is the ultimate basis of the principle of
subjective value. The theory of intelligible essences states that there are a limited number of
classes of things in the world, that each thing has characteristics that determine the class to
which it belongs, and that these characteristics can be known directly by the mind.
Id. at 79.
Now, however, a difficulty arises. If there are no intelligible essences, how do we go about
classifying facts and situations, especially social facts and social situations? Because facts have
no intrinsic identity, everything depends on the names we give them. The conventions of naming rather than any perceived quality of "tableness" will determine whether an object is to
count as a table. In the same way, convention rather than nature will dictate whether a particular bargain is to be treated as a contract.
Properly understood, the system of public rules is itself a language. Every rule is addressed
to a category of persons and acts, and marks its addressees off from others. To mark off is to
name. To apply the rules to particular cases is to subsume individual persons and acts under
the general names of which the rules consist. Hence, the theory of law is a special branch of
the general theory of naming.
At last, I can state the great political problem toward which I have been winding my way.
The resort to a set of public rules as the foundation of order and freedom is a consequence of
the subjective conception of value. The subjective conception of value in turn presupposes the
abandonment of the doctrine of intelligible essences. In the absence of intelligible essences,
however, there are no obvious criteria for defining general categories of acts and persons when
we make the rules. (The making of rules is legislation.) Nor are there clear standards by
which to classify the particular instances under rules when we come to the stage of applying
the rules we have made. (The application of rules is adjudication.)
Id. at 80.
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The Role of Rules

The first proposition is that "the resort to a set of public rules as the
foundation of order and freedom is a consequence of the subjective concep
tion of value . " 1511 One way to refute this contention is to notice that public
rules in this sense are not unique to political orders where LIBERALISM
prevails. One need only reOect on the n ature of adjudication in any actual
non-LIBERAL legal system. Roman law, C anon law, and Islamic law all
resort to public rules, and all encounter familiar problems of jurispru
dence. The resort to public rules is not a consequence of a belief in the
subjectivity of values, but of the fact that, even in the most theocratic of
legal systems, people ( 1 ) disagree about how the val ues are to be applied;
(2) need guidelines to help them decide hard cases ; and (3) need conven
tions to settle the issues that are not resolved by objective values. (In the
terminology of Aquinas, we need human law to particularize m atters that
are left open by the natural l aw . 1 56)
It is furthermore not clear what sort of metaphysical features one would
have to add to the world i n order for people to be able to dis pense with
public rules. In particular, it is not clear that "intelligible essences" would
help solve the problem. H ow are they supposed to decide a hard case or
interpret a clause in a contract ? What would the universe look like i f it
did contain objective values ? These are old questions; I shall h ave more to
say about them later . 1 57
Moreover, nobody-least of all the Greeks-has ever believed that we
are in possession of a standard of objective goodness so self-evident that it
would eliminate all moral disagreements and settle all legal questions
without controversy. The Medea is not the work of a man who believes i n
a realm of "intelligible essences" that tidily and unproblematically "clas
sify social facts and situations"; and, like Plato and Aristotle , Euripides is
well aware that nature and convention-physis and nomos-are i nextrica
bly intertangled with q uestions of morality.
I t is therefore perplexing to be told that ( 1 ) LIBERALISM's rejection of
the "Aristotelian theory of intelligible essences" is the reason why (2)
"convention rather than n ature will dictate whether a particular b argain
is to be treated as a contract. " I n fact, the argument for (2) is straightfor
ward, and does not depend on ( 1 ) : The world contains many diverse legal
systems, and what is a contract in Persia is not necessarily a contract in
Athens; nature can perhaps determine that promises ought i n general to
be kept/58 but only convention can dictate whether a bargain that has
been signed at the top of the page is to be treated the same as one that has
1 5 5. /d.
1 56. T. AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE prima secundae, Question 95, Article 2 (ca. 1 265-73)
[ hereinafter cited in the form: S.T. 1 a2ae, Q.95, A . 2 . ] .
1 57. See infra text accompanying notes 1 7 3-79.
1 58. As Hume believed. D . H uME , supra note 99, bk. 3 , pt. 2, § 1 , at 484.
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been signed at the bottom, or whether a youth of seventeen is competent to
make a legally binding agreement. The idea that nature might be able to
resolve such ambiguities borders on the unintelligible, and the fact of cul
tural diversity shows that, although some aspects of justice may be deter
mined by nature, others must be purely conventional. This argument is
not particularly LIBER A L Although it occurs in writers such as H ume/69
the classical statement is in Aristotle160 and Aquinas.161
b.

The Source of Subjective Values

The second step in Unger's argument is his claim that "[ t ]he doctrine
that there are no intelligible essences is the ultimate basis of the principle
of subjective value."162 Unger says:
From the start, liberal political thought has been

m

revolt against

1 59 ld.
1 60.
Now of political justice. There are two forms of it, the natural and the conventional. It is
natural when it has the same validity everywhere and is unaffected by any view we may take
about the justice of it. It is conventional when there is no original reason why it should take
one form rather than another and the rule it i m poses is reached by agreement, after which it
holds good. It might, for instance, be agreed that the ransom of a prisoner of war shall be fixed
at one pound, that the sacri fice in a certain ritual be one goat and not two sheep. Such are the
rules prescribed by law in particular cases . . . Some philosophers are of the opinion that
justice is conventional i n all i ts branches, arguing that a law of nature admits of no variation
and operates in exactly the same way everywhere-thus fire burns here and in Persia-wh ile
rules of justice keep changing before our eyes. This last statement, however, needs qualifica
t ion. (It can hardly be true of justice among the gods.) But in this world of ours, w h i le natural
justice undoubtedly exists, the rules under which justice is administered are everywhere being
modified.
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 3 5 , bk. 5, ch. 7, at 1 1 43b1 9-30 (j. Thomson trans. 1 953).
1 6 1 . "To pass judgement is, as we have said, to define or determine what is just. The just arises
in two ways. First, from the very nature of things, and this is called natural righ t ; second, from some
agreement among men, and this, as we have seen, is called positive right." S.T., supra note 1 56, at
2a2ae, Q.60, A.5. (T. Gilby trans. 1 969).
It should be noted that Karl Llewellyn, the drafter of Article I I of the Uniform Commercial Code,
accepted a theory that is, if anything, even more "essentialist" than Aristotle's. In what Richard
Danzig calls "perhaps the key passage in The Common Law Tradition," Llewellyn quotes and en
dorses the view of the nineteenth-century German jurist Levin Goldschmidt:
Every fact-pattern of common l i fe, so far as the legal order can take i t in, carries within i tself
i ts appropriate, natural rules, its right law. This is a natural law which is real , not imaginary;
i t is not a creature of mere reason, but rests on the solid foundation of what reason can recog
nize in the nature of man and of the l i fe conditions of the time and place; it is thus not eternal
or changeless nor everywhere the same, but is i ndwell ing in the very circumstances of l i fe. The
highest task of law-giving consists i n uncovering and impl ementing this i mmanent law.
For accounts of the influence of Llewelyn's essentialism on the UCC, see Danzig, A Comment on the
Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REv. 62 1 , 625-26 ( 1 975); Note, supra
note 1 4 1 . Even Goldschmidt and the Natur der Sache tradition he represents follow Aristotle in
allowing that some aspects of the law are determined by nature and others by convention: That is the
point of the remark that the immanent l aw is "not eternal or changeless nor everywhere the same."
See generally Dreier, Natur der Sache, i n 6 H ISTORISCHES W6RTERBUCH DER PHILOSOPHIE 478 (j .
Ritter & K. Grunder eds. 1 984). As a general matter, any given act of legislation w i l l contain a blend
of the natural and the conventional. Thus, i t is a matter of natural law (even in H ume's restricted
sense) that motorists should drive at a reasonable speed; but it is a matter of convention (even for
Aristotle or Goldschmidt) that the speed limit should be precisely 5 5 .
1 62. K P , supra note 1 , a t 79.
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the conception of objective value. * I f we were able to perceive such
values, they would become the true foundation of the social or
der. . . . Ends would be at least as intelligible as facts. They would
be things that exist in the world, like triangles, if not like tables. The
distinction between the objective understanding of facts and the arbi
trary choice of goals would therefore collapse.
* [ Unger's Endnote: ] See Hobbes, Leviathan ch. 6 ("good and evill
apparent"), p. 48. See note 1 8 to my ch. 1 . 163
Note 1 8 to chapter 1 in turn informs us: " Perhaps the most cogent
statement of the principle of arbitrary desire is to be found in H ume, [AJ
Treatise [of Human Nature], bk. 3 , pt. 1 , § 1 pp. 455-47 0 . " Unger's
argument assumes that, in the absence of intelligible essences, values must
be subjective, desires arbitrary , and rules impossi ble. But he arrives at
these conclusions by confusing the notions of subjectivity and

arbitrariness.
The two notions are not at all the same. To say that some prop
erty-for instance, the pain I feel when jabbed with a pin-is subjective is
to say that it belongs to me, a particular perceiving subject, in contrast to
other subjects who have other experiences. To say that something is a rbi
trary is to say that it is in some sense lawless, unpredictable, capricious,
up for grabs. Consider a few examples. The motion of the wind is arbi
trary; it is not subjective. M y pain on being jabbed with a pin is subjec
tive; it is not arbitrary. l'vfy decision, based on the fli p of a coin, to wear
this particular necktie is both subjective and arbitrary; the fact that
2 + 2 = 4 is neither.
These examples bring out a further point, namely, that these two words
are not only semantically independent, but that their use varies according
to context and background interest as well. So, for instance , the outcome
of the flip of a coin is arbitrary from the point of view of the fli pper, but
not from the point of view of the laws of physics. A similar observation
holds for subjectivity. That the sky on a cloudless day is blue is an objec
tive fact if our implicit background class of perceiving subj ects is normal
members of the human species; but i f we take the background class to be
all mammals, then the blue appearance of the sky is a subjective (but not
arbitrary) feature of human visual perception. In other words, a property
that is inter-species subjective can at the same time be i ntra-species
objective.
Now, even the most superficial i nspection of the writings of H obbes
and Hume reveals them to have been concerned to show that the existence
of principles of justice is inter-species subjective; but this does not imply
that the principles of justice are arbitrary. H obbes and H um e were mak
ing arguments relative to the human species as it actually exists; they did
1 63.

!d. at 7 6-77; endnote at 306.
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not attempt to lay down principles of justice for the angels. They conceive
of justice as an institution that arises among humans in conditions of lim
ited benevolence and moderate scarcity: " [ I ] f men were supplied with
every thing in the same abundance , or i f every one had the same affection
and tender regard for every one as for himself; justice and i njustice would
be equally unknown among mankind." 164
But none of this makes the principles of justice intra-species subjective;
nor does it make them arbitrary. This point is particularly clear in Hob
bes. Although he defines good and evil in terms of appetites and
desires ,16r> he assumes that some desires are so universal and powerful that
they provide a solid foundation for the principles of justice. H e grounds
his entire argument on the assumption that in a state of nature all men
will be driven by the desire for gai n , for safety, and for reputation into a
war of all agai nst all; that their physical powers are so nearly equal that
no single victor will emerge; but that their fear of death and desire for
security will "incline men to peace" and that " reason suggesteth conven
ient articles of peace, upon which men may be drawn to agreement . "166
Hobbes not only assumes that these impulses are universal among
humans, but he also assumes that the "articles of peace" are so explicit
that they require absolute power to be lodged in the person of a single
sovereign . 1 67 Int ra species, Hobbes i s one of the most objectivist political
philosophers who ever lived, for on his view human nature requires that
political sovereignty be absolute, perpetual, and undivided. A ristotle, with
his collection of constitutions and his taxonomic interest in the different
forms of government, is much less strict about what human nature de
mands, and he places a much greater emphasis on the multi plici ty of
human conventions.
Hume, like Hobbes, also assumes a more-or-less constant human na
ture as the basis of his moral theory; and it is odd that Unger should have
missed this point, because a familiar criticism of H ume accuses him of
treating human nature as absolutely the same in all circumstances. 1 68 Re-

1 64. D. HuME, supra note 99, bk. 3, pt. 2, § 2 , at 495.
1 65 . T. HoBBES, LEVIATHAN p t . I , ch . 6, at 5 5 ( M . Oakeshott ed. 1 962). I ncidentally, H obbes
never says "good and evil apparent." These words do not occur in the text; they are a marginal gloss,
which Unger has misunderstood. In the accompanying text Hobbes is not saying that goodness is an
illusion; he is giving a definition of what it is for something to appear to be good or evil: " B u t for so
far as a man seeth, if the good in those consequences be greater than the evi l , the whole chain is that
which writers call apparent, or seeming good. And contrarily, when the evil exceedeth the good, the
whole is apparent, or seeming evil . . . . " Jd.
1 66. Jd. pt. I , ch. 1 3, at 1 02 .
1 67. !d. pt. I I , ch. 17, at 1 32 ("And i n h i m consisteth the essence of the commonwealth; which, to
define it, is one Person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have

made themselves every one the author, to the end he may use the strength and means of them all, as
he shall think expedient, for their peace 'and common defence." ( Emphasis i n original. Incidentally,
Hobbes used the word "person" to refer to assemblies of men as well as to i ndividuals.)
1 68. In D. FoRBES, H u M E s PHILOSOPHICAL POLITICS 1 1 3 n. 1 ( 1 975), Forbes correctly observes
that the following passage "has been quoted ad nauseam" :
Would you know the sentiments, i nclinations, a n d course of l i fe of t h e G reeks a n d Roman s )
'
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gardless of the truth of this cnt1c1sm, the fact remams that Hume 1s ex
plicit about what his argument entails:
To avoid giving offence, I must here observe, that when I deny
justice to be a natural virtue, I make use of the word , natural, only
as oppos'd to artificial. In another sense of the word; as no principle
of the human mind is more natural than a sense of virtue; so no
virtue is more natural than justice. Mankind is an inventive species;
and where an invention is obvious and absolutely necessary , it may
as properly be said to be natural as any thing that proceeds immedi
ately from original principles, without the intervention of thought or
reflexion . Tho' the rules of justice be artificial, they are not a rbi
trary. Nor is the expression improper to call them Laws of Nature;
if by natural we understand what is common to any species, or even
if we confine it to mean what is inseparable from the species.1 6 9
This passage is one of the most famous i n H ume; since Unger takes
Hume to have furnished "the most cogent statement of the principle of
arbitrary desire,"170 he ought perhaps to have mentioned it.
Unger ' s fail ure to notice these distinctions-in particular B urne's re
mark that "tho' the rules of justice be a rtificial, they are not a rbi
trary" -is likewise fatal to his third proposition:
c.

No Essences Means No Standards

According to Unger, i n the absence of intelligible essences t here are no
standards for making or applying rules and, therefore, no standards for
legislation or adjudication.
With this contention we are getting close to the heart o f the matter.
C harles Fried perceptively remarks that the reason Unger cries "subjectiv
ism" is that he is "a disappointed super-objectivist."171 Unger's idea seems
to be that if values do not exist out in the world as something you can
break your leg on, then the legal system is entirely arbitrary. One reply to
this line of reasoning is H ume's remark on arbitrariness; another reply
proceeds by reflecting on the notion of "intelligible essences . "
I said earlier that the phrase "intelligible essences" does n o t name any
Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much m istaken
i n transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the
latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all t imes and places, that history i n forms us of
nothing new or strange i n this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and
universal princi ples of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and
situations, and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and
become acquai nted with the regular springs of h uman action and behaviour.
D. H UME, ENQUIRY CONCERNING H UMAN UNDERSTANDING, § 8, pt. 1 ( 1 777).
1 69. D . H U M E, supra note 99, bk. 3 , pt. 2, § l , at 484.
1 70. KP, supra note 1 , at 300.
1 7 1 . Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J .
LEGAl. STUO. 335, 343 ( 1 980).
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"classical doctrine" which was "rejected " by Hobbes and his fellow LIB
ERALS, and that Unger uses the term to stand ambiguously for notions
that the philosophers agree must be sharply distinguished, to wit, essential
properties, universals, and abst-ract pa-rticulars. 172 Depending on what
sense we give to "intelligible essences," Unger's third proposition is either
trivial or false.
If Unger contends that rules require either universals or essential
properties, then his position is true. It is also uninteresting and has no
force against a nominalist like H obbes. For the Hobbesian contention is
not that there are no universals; rather, he contends that the only univer
sals are linguistic universals. 173 But this is a different matter altogether. I f
it is accepted that there are linguistic universals, then there is no diffi
culty in establishing the possibility of linguistic rules. One need only
make the following empirical assumption : that human beings are enough
alike in their subjective judgments of similarity so that, in most cases (per
haps after a considerable amount of training) , they can agree about the
scope of a particular term. So long as they can agree about w hat to call a
"hawk" and what a "handsaw," it makes no difference whether an "intel
ligible essence of hawkishness" exists-the fact of agreement is enough.
To be sure, the categories they apply will be in some sense subj ective; but,
as we just saw, this does not make them arbit-ra1y.
On the other hand, Unger sometimes seems to take an "intelligible es
sence" to be some sort of abstract object ("existing," he says, "like a tri
angle"). But then we run up against a classical problem: that of explain
ing how an object can provide a fou ndation for the application of a rule or
for the classification of other objects. Here is a bird, and over here is an
abstract object-the intelligible essence of hawkishness. Now, what ties
the latter object to the former in such a way as to make the bird a hawk ?
A rule ? But if that is the answer, then you might as well accept the
Hobbesian theory. Hobbes's theory is that the bird is related to its name
by the application of human standards of perceptual similarity; the "intel
ligible essences" theory merely replaces "name" with "intelligible essence"
and the psychological mechanism with some occult force. O r perhaps the
two objects are related by a third object-say, "the intelligible essence of a
hawk's being related to the intelligible essence of hawkishness. " But if
that is the theory, then we are h eaded i nto an infinite regress.
These problems are not new. Plato discusses them in the Parmenides,
1 72. See supra notes 1 1 9, 1 20, 1 54.
1 7 3.
Of Names, some are proper, and singular to one only thing; as Peter, john, this man, this tree;
and some are common t o many thi ng� man, horse, tree; every one of which, though but one
name, is nevertheless the name of di vers particular things; i n respect of all which together, i t is
called an universal; there being nothing in the world universal but names; for the things
named, are every one of them i ndividual and singular."
T. HoBBES, supra note 1 65 , pt. I, ch. 4, at 3 5 .

714

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 9 7 : 6 6 5

Aristotle i n the Metaphysics. I n consequence, every philosopher since an
tiquity has been carefu l to distinguish universals (like triangularity) from
abstract objects (like triangles) . And even if the "intelligi b l e essence of
goodness" existed as a sort of s pooky object, we would still be able to
disagree about how to apply it, and we would still need rules to settle
hard cases . So not only are the intelligible essences ontologically mysteri
ous-they are explanatorily superfluous as well. There is a deep con fu
sion involved i n the idea that moral values could be objects ; and, inciden
tally, the locus classicus for this criticism is not in H obbes, but in
Aristotle. 1 7 4
Aristotle draws a sharp distinction between two kinds of knowledge: the
kind of universal , necessary knowledge we can obtain i n mathematics,
metaphysics, and the exact sciences, and the kind of rough general ization
we can obtain i n ethics. m• Aquinas makes similar observations. 17 6 The
contrast with Plato could hardly be more extreme. Plato had taken mathe1 74. Speaking of the Platonic theory that ethics is based on the Form of the good, Aristotle says:
To examine this opinion thoroughly belongs to an investigation at once different from the
present one, and in many ways, inevitably, approximating more to logic. . . To speak in a
summary fashion, we may say first that the thesis that there is a Form either of good or indeed
of anything else is verbal and vacuous . .
Again, even i f the Forms, i ncluding a Form of good exist, they are not of the least help
either for a good l i fe or for actions.
ARISTOTLE, EuoEMIAN ETHICS bk. 1 , ch. 8 at 1 2 1 7b 1 7 -25 (M. Woods trans. 1 982). Aristotle developed the point more concretely in the Nicomachean Ethics:
Even if the good which is predicated of a number of different things exists only in one element
common to them all, or has a separate existence of its own, clearly it cannot be realized in
action or acquired by man. Yet it is just a good of that kind that is the subject of our present
inquiry.
. And there is another puzzle. What advantage in his art w i l l a weaver or a joiner
get from a knowledge of the absolute good ? Or how shall a doctor or a general who has had a
vision of Very Form become thereby a better doctor or genera l � As a matter of fact, it does not
appear that the doctor makes a study even of health in the abstract. What he studies i s the
health of the human subject or rather of a particular patient. For i t is on such a patient that he
exercises his ski l l .
NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 , b k . 1 , c h . 6, at 1 096b30- 1 0 9 7 a 1 3 (j . Thomson trans. 1 953).
1 7 5.
Such being the nature of our subject and such our way of arguing in our discussions of it, we
must be satisfied with a rough outline of the truth, and for the same reason we m ust be content
with broad concl usions. Indeed we must preserve this attitude when it comes to a more detailed
statement of the views that are held. I t is a mark of the educated man and a proof of his
culture that in every subject he looks for only so much precision as its nature permits. For
example, it is absurd to demand logical demonstrations from a professional speaker; we might
as well accept mere probabilities from a mathematician.
NI<:OMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 , bk. I , ch. 3 , at 1 094b 1 9-28 (j . Thomson trans. 1 953). For
discussion of this passage and the previous one, see W. HARDIE, ARISTOTLE's ETHICAL THEORY chs.
3, 4 ( 1 9 68); H. J oACHIM, ARISTOTLE: THE N ICOMACHEAN ETHICS 23-27 ( 1 9 5 1 ) ; G. LLOYD , ARIS
TOTLE: THE GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF HIS THOUGHT 204-24 ( 1 968); M . WooDS, COMMEN
TARY TO ARISTOTLE'S EUDEMIAN ETHICS 66-92 ( 1 982).
1 76.
The practical reason is concerned with practical matters, which are singu l a r and contingent:
but not with necessary things, with which the specul ative reason is concerned. Wherefore
human laws cannot have that i nerrancy that belongs to the demonstrated conclusions of sci
ences. Nor is it necessary for every measure to be altogether unerring and certai n , but accord
ing as it is possible in its own particular genus.
S.T., supra note 1 56, at l a2ae, Q.9 1 , A.3 (Dominica n Fathers trans. 1 9 1 2-36); see a lso id. at Q.9 5 ,
A.2.
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matical and metaphysical knowledge to be the ideal towards which the
statesman ought to strive; his ethics is inseparable from his metaphysics.
Aristotle not only rejects Plato's metaphysics, but denies that metaphysics
can be the basis of ethics. H is ethical arguments do not a ppeal to meta
physical considerations, and one can accept his ethics without accepting
his metaphysics.
Although Aristotle, unlike Plato, does not "base" his ethics on other
parts of his philosophy, he does, of course, make it fit in. Aristotle's ethics
starts from a theory of human nature; his theory of human nature is, in
turn, connected to his views on biology; his views on biology are connected
to his views on teleology; and his views on teleology are connected to more
general physical and metaphysical doctrines. These metaphysical doctrines
unquestionably exert an i ndirect influence on his ethical system , but not
as great an influence as Unger's argument requires. Indeed, despite the
differences in their views of metaphysics and final causation, the manner
in which Hume and Aristotle approach ethics is similar. They have more
in common with each other than either does with, say, Kant or H egel .
Both assume that ethics aims at attaining "the good for man"; both as
sume that h uman nature, in its broad features, is uniform; both reject any
appeal to supra-human moral principles. They disagree about what hap
piness is, about the nature of the virtues, about the proper form of the
state, and about many of the details of their ethical theories, but these
disagreements are not attributable to their disagreement about
metaphysics.
I dwell on these facts because of their importance for U nger's argu
ment. Recall that Unger says of the doctrine of "intelligible essences,"
first, that this doctrine's "authoritative statement" is i n Aristotle's Book
Zeta/77 and, second, that "this doctrine is truly a master principle, for its
friends have drawn from i t conclusions about language, morals, and polit
ics."178 This contention is the heart of his argument; but historically it is
without foundation. 179
Whether Unger's contention applies any better to the Scholastics is a
question I shall not attempt to answer. The M iddle Ages were the h eyday
of Aristotelian metaphysics; they were also a great era for political theory.
Unger claims that " [ t ] he effort to participate i n the dialogue between
C hristianity and modernism is one of the ruling ambitions of the work.
And the primary source of the conception of universals I defend i s the
Aristotelian doctrine that the priests who taught me as a boy used to call
'hylemorfism' . . . . "18 0 ; so one would expect him to say something about
1 77 .
to Book
1 7 8.
1 79.
1 80.

KP, supra note I , at 297; see supra note 1 20 (discussing the d i fficulties of Unger's reference
Zeta).
KP, supra note 1 , at 3 1 .
See supra notes 1 1 8-20 and accompanying text.
See Kronman, supm note 1 53, at 200-01 (letter from Unger to Kronman).
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the medieval Schoolmen. His work depends heavily on a contrast between
the Aristotelian tradition and the new philosophy of the seventeenth cen
tury; so he ought to have discussed the developments that took place i n the
2200 years that separate Aristotle from Hobbes. In fact, the development
of medieval philosophy does show a gradual movement from realism to
nominalism, and from moral rationalism to voluntarism/81 but this devel
opment is not uniform. Scotus, the first major voluntarist, w as also the
champion of realism; and Occam's political tracts are largely i ndependent
of his nominalism. 182 Nonetheless, I do not doubt that there are i m portant
connections between medieval metaphysics and medieval moral theory . I
do doubt, however, that these connections are sufficient to save Unger's
theory . In any event, Scholasticism is not a subject he discusses. 1 8 3
E.

Organic Groups

I have now come to the end of my discussion of Unger's refutation of
LIB ERALISM . I have concentrated on this section because of its i mportance
for C L S / 84 because it is the philosophical heart of his book, and because a
detailed examination of a lengthy passage seemed the fairest w ay of estab
lishing Unger's quality as a philosopher. But before drawing my ultimate
conclusions on Knowledge and Politics, I shall briefly consider the rela
tionship between Unger's critique of L I B E R A L I S M and the rest of his book.
The remaining chapters contain ( 1 ) a "Theory of the Welfare-Corporate
State"1811 and (2) a positive doctrine, consisting of a "Theory of the
Self"1 86 and a "Theory of Organic Groups . " 1 8 7 The positive doctrine
"aims to define what a union of transcendence and immanence, autonomy
and community, would mean. " 1 88 The book ends with a section entitled
"God. " 1 8 9 I shall not discuss the section on God or U nger's theory of the
social organization of the liberal state; these issues have more to do with
theology or sociology than with philosophy. I nstead , I shall concentrate on
his theory of "organic groups."
Unger says that the solution to the antinomies of L I B E R A L thought re
q uires two revolutions, one political, the other theoretical . Politically,
1 8 1 . I . e . , from the view that morality is based o n reason (which is binding even on G o d ) to the
view that morality is an expression of the divine w i l l . The best i ntroductory account of medieval
philosophy is 2, 3 F. CoPLESTON, A H ISTORY OF PHI LOSOPHY ( 1 950 & 1 953); for further details,
see G. LEFF, WILl.IAM OF OcKHAM 6 1 4-43 ( 1 975); A. WoLTER, DuNs ScoTUS ON THE WILL AND
MoRAl.ITY ( 1 986).
1 82. F. CoPLESTON , supra note 1 8 1 , provides a useful account of the development of the views of
Scotus and Occam.
1 83. H is most extensive treatmen t is a passing reference that comes in the middle of a discussion
of Baroque art . KP, supra note 1 , at 1 22.
1 84. See supra text accompanying notes 1 4-37.
1 85 . KP, supra note 1 , at 1 45-90.
1 86. !d. at 1 9 1 -235.
1 87 . ! d . at 236-95.
1 88. !d. at 2 1 .

1 89.

!d.

at

290-95.
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there must be a "transformation o f the conditions of social l i fe, particu
larly the circumstances of domination, that produce the experience of the
contingency and arbitrariness of values." 190 It is i mportant to stress that
one of the principle aims of Unger's theory is to describe a kind of social
life that will not be based u pon "domination" or "the hegemony of class
and role."191 As he says: "Until the central problem of the inner circle,
the problem of domination, i s resolved, the search for community is con
demned to be idolatrous, or utopian, or both at once. " 1 9 2 H is attack on
LIBERA LISM should thus not be misunderstood as an attack on liberty . 1 93
As for the theoretical revolution, the world needs a system of thought
based on the " flourishing of human nature. " 1 94
Unger's positive theory of the good divides into two parts. The first is
his "Theory of the Self. " This theory leads to "the notion that the good
consists in the development of the species nature in the lives of particular
persons." 1911 The second part is his "Theory of Organic G roups." This
theory includes a description of "the community of life," in which individ
uals can "discover the organic unity of each other's personalities."196 I n
his "Theory o f t h e Self," Unger attempts t o show "that both human na
ture and our understanding of it can progress through a spiral of increas
ing community and diminishing domination. " 197 As Unger says:
The previous course of the argument has justified the conclusion that
the good is properly viewed as an actualization of human nature and
that, when so interpreted, it can be pictured in two complementary
ways. If we consider the good as the ideal to which human striving is
addressed and from which it receives its meaning, i t can b e charac
terized as the relationship to nature, to others, and to oneself de
scribed by the concepts of natural harmony, sympathy, and concrete
universality. '' 19 8
1 90. !d. at 1 03.
1 9 1 . !d. at 25 1 .
1 92 . /d. at 252.
1 93.
M any of the liberal thinkers were devoted to freedom, though their false metaphysical princi
ple almost always kept them from grasping its true character. I f for no other reason than for
this devotion, they will rank forever as heroes and teachers of the human race, and all the sins
of England will be forgiven because of her services to liberty.
/d. at 277.
1 94.
The theoretical advance consists in the development of a system of thought that would enable
us to deny the contrast of description and evaluation by taking the ends men share in their
groups as indications of the good or right. The intuitive idea from which one might start is that
a man's choices express his nature; that common choices maintained over time and capable of
winning ever greater adherence reOect a common human nature; and that the nourishing of
human nature is the true basis of moral and political judgment.
/d. at 1 03.
1 95. /d. at 239.
1 96. /d. at 262.
1 97. /d. at 239.
1 98. /d.
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This sounds very promtsmg, and "concrete universality" has a splendid
and familiar ring199-but at this point one would like a bit of detail .
What (one wonders) about t h e good considered a s a source of more con
crete standards of right conduct ? Unger has an answer:
When we think of the good primarily as a source of more concrete
standards of right conduct, it may be useful to distinguish a u niversal
and a particular good .
Personality has two aspects: one universal, represented by sociabil
ity and the abstract self; the other particular, expressed by i ndividu
ality and the concrete self. Therefore, everyone must have both a
universal and a particular good. The u niversal good is the perfection
of the species nature in which he participates by virtue of h i s socia
bility and of his abstract selfhood. The particular good is the devel
opment of the unique set of talents and capacities through which the
species nature of mankind takes a concrete form in him.200
This "Theory of the Self" is all very well, as far as it goes; u n fortu
nately, it contains nothing that would be of the slightest help in solving
any difficult moral problem. To say that moral ity is to be fou nded on the
"flourishing of h uman nature" is nothing new: Aristotle, H ume, and
Rawls are of the same opinion.201 But the idea is to describe human na
ture with enough precision so that it i s possi ble to see what the resulting
moral theory amounts to in practice. A morality that says nothing more
than " Develop your species nature!" says nothing at all. (What, one won
ders, would it be like not to develop our species nature ? )
This problem becomes particularly acute when one turns to l egal and
poli tical theory. Human nature might plausibly be argued to i nclude
bipedalism, say , or cannibalism, or male dominance, but not the Rule i n
Shelley's Case o r the Traffic Regulations of N ew York C ity. Professor
Unger's discussion of the political implications of his view of the good
1 99 . It comes from H egel. H ere is Bertrand Russell's discussion:
H egel's argument in this portion of his " Logic" depends throughout upon con fusing the "is" of
predication, as i n "Socrates is mortal , " with the "is" of identity, as i n "Socrates is the philoso
pher who drank the hemlock." Owing to this confusion, he thinks that "Socrates" and "mor
tal" must be identical. Seeing that they are d i fferent, he does not i n fer, as others woul d , that
there is a mistake somewhere, but that they exhibit "identity in difference." Aga i n , Socrates is
particular, "mortal" is universal. Therefore, he says, since Socrates is mortal, it fol lows that
the particular is the universal-taking the "is" to be throughout expressive of iden tity. But to
say "the particular is the universal" is self-contradictory. Again, H egel does not suspect a
mistake but proceeds to synthesize particular and universal i n the individual , or concrete uni
versal. This is an example of how, for want of care at the start, vast and i mposing systems of
philosophy are built upon stupid and trivial confusions, which, but for the almost i ncredible
fact that they are unintentional, one would be tempted to characterize as puns.
B. RussELL, OuR KNOWLEDGE or THE ExTERNAL WoRLD 48 n . l ( 1 926).
200. KP, supra note 1 , at 239.
20 1 . See NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 3 5, bk. I , ch. 7 ; D . H uME , supra note 1 68 , § 8 ,
pt. 1 (observe that h i s chief contribution t o moral philosophy is entitled A Treatise of Human Na
ture); J. R A W LS , supra note 86, at 424-33.
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does little to dispel the problem. H e says that his doctrine of human na
ture leads to the "ideal of community . " 202 This ideal is, according to Un
ger, a regulative ideal that can never be completely realized in history ; 2 03
but it gives rise to a set of institutional princi ples that characterize the
organic group. These institutional principles (the "community of life,"
the "democracy of ends," and the "division of labor") are supposed to
"translate . . . [ the] message [of the ideal of universal community] i nto
the language of political possibilities" 204 and to "suggest how the situation
of modern society can be used to promote the good . "20r>
Organic groups are characterized by the following requi rements. First,
"[ e ]ach member of the group must have face-to-face dealings with all the
other members. " 2 06 Second, the groups must exemplify "multi purpose or
ganization ," for "[ u ] nless individuals deal with one another in a multi plic
ity of different ways, they cannot discover the organic unity of each other's
personalities." 2 07 These two requirements, Unger notes, sharply limit the
size of any community of life. Third, the groups must exemplify the "de
mocracy of ends. "208
Professor Unger does not go into very great detail about his organic
groups. (He does not, for i nstance , tell us whether those people , l ike
Thoreau or St. Jerome, who wish to live apart from organized human
society are violating human nature . ) This lack of detail is regrettable, par
ticularly when one considers that his theory is supposed to serve as a basis
for the political transformation of modern society. But let us try as best we
can to imagine what a social world of organic groups would look like . One
of the chief advantages of organic groups is that they are supposed to help
mankind to overcome "systems of domination . " But if absence of domina
tion is the goal, then the members of one organic group ought not to be
able to dominate the members of another; and this suggests that the or
ganic groups ought to exhibit a high degree of economic and political self202.
When we translate natural harmony, sympathy, and concrete universality into the concepts of
the universal and the particular good, we find once again that they can only be realized fully
by a u niversal community. The species nature is revealed and developed in history through the
spiral of diminishing domination and increasing community. Thanks to that spiral i ndividuals
can hope to become more secure in the sense and in the expression of personality.
KP, supra note 1 , at 260.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207 .
208.

!d.
!d. at 260-6 1 .
/d. at 259.
/d. at 262.
!d.

The democracy of ends in the organic group consists in the progressive replacement of mer
itocratic by democratic power in the ordinary institutions of society and, above all, in its occu
pational groups. Decisions about what to produce (whether the products be commodities, ser
vices, or knowledge) , for which objectives to produce, and how to produce are increasingly
defined as political and submitted to collective decision.
/d. at 268.
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sufficiency. So one kind of soci ety based on organ ic groups might l ook like
this: many small social units, each one practicing collective, non
meri tocratic decisionmaking, and all living in independence of one an
other. Each small group would be responsible for providing its own food,
shelter and cloth ing; for the education of its ch ildren; for its own medical
needs; for its own steel and mining industries; for its automobile produc
tion (if any) ; and so on. Obviously such a society is possible (hunter
gatherer bands, isolated jungle societies , and the Eskimos are all exam
ples) , but I doubt that many people would be eager to make the transi
tion , or would regard life in such a society as "more expressive of human
nature. " And the anthropological evidence hardly supports the hope that
such a society could di spense with "all systems of domination . "
I presume that Professor U nger does not have this sort o f simple social
organ ization in mind , for after admitting that " [ b ]oth decentralization and
multipurpose activity may exact a high price in the production of goods
and services," 2 09 he says that this problem is to be dealt with by organiz
ing society into, of all things, a "hierarchy" of organic groups,210 and he
would allow individuals to belong to several of these groups simultane
ously .211 But this concession to economic real ity brings with it two
problems for his theory. The first concerns the internal structure of the
organic groups. The second concerns the external relations of the groups
to each other.
In describing the internal structure of the groups, Unger says that "the
occupational group, exemplified by the bureaucratic institution,"212 is a
"promising starting point for the realization of a community of l ife. "213
To take a concrete example, let us consider the staff of a l arge hospital.
This is a group sufficiently small for face-to-face encounters and suffi
ciently diverse for "multipurpose activity."
Now, there are obvious difficulties with administering a hospital i n the
non-meritocratic way U nger says organic groups ought to be run. C learly,
a collective decision by the entire staff about brain surgery is not desira
ble: However such a procedure might help the staff "to u nderstand , to
develop, and to manifest human nature,"214 it is as likely as not to kill the
patient. If one wishes to retain the theory of organic groups, there are
three possible responses to this problem. First, one can pursue a levelling
policy (in the name of "eradicating domination"); this course would elimi
nate the brain surgeon. Second, one could resign oneself to a h igh degree
of structure and "meritocratic hierarchy" in the hospital; b u t this would
209.
2 1 0.
21 I .
2 1 2.
213
2 1 4.

!d.
!d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
/d.

at
at

265.
283.

at

264.

at

243.
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mean renou ncing the "democracy o f ends . " Th ird, one could deny that the
hospita l is capable of being run as an organic groups; instead , the " real"
organic group would be smaller collectives-say, the doctors, the nurses,
and the maintenance staff-such that, within each smal ler collective, dem
ocratic decisionmaking coul d prevai l. But this sol ution simply solves the
problem by defi ning it away. I am unable to see that it has any radical
implications. I nstead of talking about "trade unions," one v;ould talk
about "organic groups," and everything else could go on as before. I do
not see how i t would solve the problem of domination; presumably the
"organic doctors' group" would still make the major decisions.
One might think that Unger's "princi ple of the division of labor" could
be invoked at this point. 2 1 �'> But unfortunately his remarks on this subject
are vague to the point of emptiness. Unger wisely concedes the necessity
for hierarchies and for the division of labor. But he does not indicate how
these principles are to be reconciled with his advocacy of non-meritocratic
decisionmaking and face-to-face encoun ters-except to say that the solu
tion to the problem is "straightforward . " 216 Unger i nsists that his theory
of organic groups is non-utopian, 2 1 7 and assures us that "the more com
munitarian the group becomes, the less do differentiation and community
operate as antagonistic forces." 2 1 8 And his most concrete suggestions2 1 9 are
hardly earth-shattering. They sound like l i fe on a kibbutz. I f all U nger
wants is for the doctors to sweep the halls once a week, and if he believes
21 S . Unger describes this principle as follows:
The community of life and the democracy of ends describe the attributes of sympathetic as
sociations whose practices manifest the species nature. But these institutional princi ples fai l to
define the significance to the group of the individual's particular good: the perfection of his
talents and the affirmation of his sense of self. To do this is the aim of the principle of the
division of labor.
The ideal of concrete universality establishes the general form of the achievement of the
particular good. The principle of the division of labor is the political embodiment o f that ideal.
It holds that the allocation of tasks should allow each individual to develop his unique disposi
tions so as to serve and to express values or practices whose legitimacy as signs of the species
nature he can recognize.
/d. at 274.
2 1 6.
[O]ne has to determine how far to carry the change from meritocratic to democratic proce
dures. In a sense, the answer is straightforward. The ultimate foundation of all power in the
organic group must be democratic decision. The mere possession of skills can never i n i tself
justify material advantages or the exercise of power. Nevertheless, a relentless insistence on
deciding collectively all significant matters wot..ld make work Oounder in a morass of political
argument. I t would strike at the group's capacity to produce anything but complaints, exhorta
tions, and eloquence. And it would undermine the possibility of a division of labor in w h ich
the talents of each could be brought to frui tion, for specialization allocates meritorious power.
ld. at 273.
2 1 7 . /d. at 237 .
2 1 8 . /d. at 276.
2 1 9. Unger recommends that in organic groups ( 1 ) "[i ]ndividuals who exercise power in one re
spect should be subject to power in another"; (2) "[t]he rotation of tasks can be used as a moderating
device"; and (3) "there may be jobs in the grou p whose performance is indispensable, but are gener
ally abhorred . . or stand at too great a distance from the ideals they serve to satisfy the aspirations
of the abstract self. The group must assume these tasks as a common burden until technical progress
makes them unnecessary. " Id. at 2 7 5 .
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that this procedure will help their abstract selves attain concrete universal
ity, then there seems little harm or difficulty in attempting the experi
ment. But Unger also stresses the impossibility of achieving his goals at
any time in the history of the universe:
[T]here is a crucial flaw in the principle of the division of l abor that
reflects the unresolved tension in the idea of concrete universality
. . . . To be perfect, the division of labor wou ld have to express the
universal ends of a universal community, for only then could it sat
isfy man's longing to overcome his finitude by living for the univer
sal . But anything on earth that could be universal would also be
remote from the concerns an individual has as a particular being.
Only God , if He exists, would combine universality with immediate
presence. 220
The trouble w ith all this is that it is unclear just what Unger is advocat
ing: The picture he paints is little more than a blur.
Similar problems beset the external relations of organic groups to one
another. These external problems with Unger's proposal will arise in any
society that is composed of a multitude of interdependent, interacting or
ganic groups-that is, in any society not entirely composed of hunter
gatherers. To keep one group from dominating another, and to coordi nate
the activities of the various groups, there will have to be a state; indeed,
Unger says it would be best to have a world-state. 22 1 This world-state will
be charged with the task of "foster[ing] concrete universality by helping
make the allocation of tasks within each community more expressive of
the species nature."222 Presumably for this task the world-state will need
coercive power over the individual organic groups; presumably also the
coordination of a world-state and an industrial world-economy will re
quire special training and skills. Again, it is hard to see how Unger can
preserve his ideal of col lective participation in all decisions, or how he will
avoid dominance. Unger is not u naware of this problem. He says:
The achievement of a democracy of ends in the sphere of group rela
tions builds upon the idea of a hierarchy of communities. Each
higher step or organization must reflect the same preeminence of
democratic over meritocratic power that prevails within the organic
group. Otherwise, the activities of these overarching institutions
themselves will represent a kind of dominance. 22 3
"Must reflect" is undoubtedly true, but U nger says nothing about how
220. !d. at 276; see also id. at 23-24 (discussing "the impossibi lity of resol ving these problems
within history").
22 1 . !d. at 284.
222. !d.
223. !d. at 283.
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this feat i s to b e carried out. H i s remarks sound more like a statement o r
evasion o f the problem than a solution. This problem afflicts h i s theory
generally. He is in favor of "organi c unity" and "concrete universality";
he is opposed to "hierarchy," "meritocracy , " and "dominance"; organic
groups should be arranged i n "hierarchies"; labor should be divided, giv
ing rise to "meritorious power"; communities of life should allow face-to
face encounters; meetings should not go on too long; decisionmaking
should be collective; people should not relentlessly insist on col lective deci
sions; jobs should be rotated; and the solution to the tension b etween the
division of labor and the democracy of ends is "straightforward . " More
over, this theory is not utopian, and only God can fully resolve the ten
sions in concrete universality. It's quite a j umble. In the end, what we are
left with is a host of obvious problems, and the recommendation that we
try to "appreciate the organic unity in each others' personalities" and to
"develop the species nature in concrete universality."
Professor Unger is aware that his theory of organic groups i s not very
preci se, and he has an explanation for this shortcoming. As he says:
"Though our conception of thought becomes practical and evaluative, we
can never fully bridge the gap between abstract and concrete knowledge,
theory and prudence, science and art. That is why the doctrin e of organic
groups remains indeterminate. "224
I do not wish to deny the i m portance of speculative sociology to politi cal
theory: Unger is entirely correct to take utopianism seriously. Ever since
Plato's Republic, philosophers have tried to describe the ideal society , and
many people-including political leaders ranging from Thomas Jefferson
to C hairman Mao-have urged a "return to human nature" or a social
organization based on small groups. B ut such theories, if they are to be of
any use, and i f they are to p resent a genuine alternative to L I B E R A L soci
ety, must attempt to deal with the obvious objections; and they ought not
to take refuge in empty flu ff about our inability to "bridge the gap be
tween abstract and concrete k nowledge, theory and prudence, science and
art."
I wish expli citly to note that nothing i n my criticisms of U nger i s di
rected against the "leftism" of his theory. My concern is with s cholarship
and arguments, not with politics. Indeed, I do not find Unger's theory of
organi c groups particularly leftist: with a few modifications , a few shifts
in terminology, i t would serve conservatives j ust as well. If you were to
rewrite Knowledge and Politics, replacing the words "liberalism" and
"organic groups" with the words "liberal secular humanism" and "or
ganic Christian communities," you would be well on the way to a tract for
the religious right. The philosophical critique of liberal secular h umanism
would scarcely have to be touched; the themes of tight-knit communities,
224.

!d.

at

23.
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freedom from government bureaucracy , and populist democracy are al
ready present; and the concluding sentence, "Speak, God , " might well
have been written by the Reverend Pat Robertson .
Unger is not, of course, a spokesman for the born-again , and Robertson
would not cite M arx and Adorno. But my point is that Unger's leftism is
more a matter of terminology than of philosophical argument. That his
work can be read in a conservative way is not surprising. O nce you have
made "developing the species nature in concrete universality" the acme of
political life, you face the problem of defining these fine p hrases-and
conservatives can play that game at least as well as leftists. Many reac
tionaries woul d argue that racial prejudice, male dominance, militarism,
heterosexuality, class distinctions, and the eating of animals belong to the
"concrete universality" of human nature-and this argument i s not en
tirely without anthropological plausibility.
These reflections i llustrate a general point: The left i s not well-served
by political theories that rest on emptily organic terminology. What it
needs is solid, rigorous arguments, stated with clarity and supported by
scrupulous research. And it needs these virtues primarily for its own sake.
There is not much poin t in building a house without a bluepri n t , or i n
marching t o a map that nobody can read : You are a s l ikely a s not to set
out in precisely the wrong direction, and to accomplish the opposite of
what you had intended. Fortunately for the left, logic and good scholar
ship are not the ideologically tainted product of L I B E R A L I S M , and many
leftist philosophers exhibit both virtues i n high measure. 22 �
Professor Unger's theory of the "community of life" and his declaration
that the good consists in "developing our species nature in concrete
universality" look silly if they are placed beside the work of a trained
philosopher-if, say, one compares them to the concluding chapters of
John Rawls's Theory of Justice. And this remark raises an i mportant is
sue. Unger says: "In liberal political theory, the absence o f a view o f the
good makes i t i mpossible to j ustify any exercise of power at all, an i mpos
sibility underlined by the incoherence of all doctrines of legislation and
adjudication in that system of thought. "22 6 He also tells us that many of
the fai lings of LIBERALISM are the result of its abandonment of the tradi
tional Aristotelian moral psychology. But the final third o f A Theory of
justice, the most celebrated work of liberal political t heory to h ave ap225. This is conspicuously true of the "analytical Marxists." See G . CoHEN, KARL M ARX's
THEORY OF H ISTORY: A D EFENCE ( 1 978); J ELSTER, M AKING SENSE OF MARX ( 1 985). See gener
ally ANALYTICAL M ARXISM (J Roemer ed. 1 986). There exist many well-reasoned critiques of liber
alism. E.g. , A. M AciNTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE ( 1 98 1 ) ; C.B. M ACPHERSON, THE PoLITICAL THEORY
OF PoSSf:SSIVE lNDIVIOUALISM ( 1 962); M. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIM ITS OF jUSTICE
( 1 982); C. TAYLOR, 2 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS ( 1 985); R. WoLFF, THE PovERTY oF LIBERALISM
( 1 968). CLS would do a service to the cause of leftist political thought if it were to emulate the clarity
and care of these writers.
226. KP, supra note 1 , at 238.
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peared in this century, begins with a section entitled "The N eed for a
Theory of the Good" -and the next 1 50 pages attempt to sketch the de
tails of a moral psychology for l iberalism. And the primary principle of
motivation in Rawls's moral psychology is derived , not from H obbes or
from Kant, but from Aristotle ; Rawls even calls it "the Aristotelian
Princi pie. " 227
Moreover, Rawls, like Aristotle and many liberal political thinkers,
speaks in favor of a conception of society as a "union of social u nions. " 228
H e too emphasizes the good of community. 2 29 H e expli citly denies2 30 that
communities have only instrumental value, i.e., that their value is mea
sured solely by the extent to which they satisfy the aims of individuals. 2 31
H e has a much more clear-sighted realization than Unger that, because
no individual can realize in a finite lifetime all of his or her potentialities,
the full development of an individual personality can take pl ace only in a
political community that contains a diversity of groups pursuing a diver
sity of activities and a diversity of conceptions of the good. Rawls also
realizes that some of these groups will have to be smal l , while others will
be too large for face-to-face encounters with every other member. But,
unlike Unger, he focuses his attention on the critical problem: how these
groups are to be coordinated with each other. The principles of justice are
the key to the solution. The various members of the society are free to live
i n a commune in N ew 1v1exico, or to dwell alone in the desert , or to join
some more conventional sort of community, but the same princi ples of
justice are to govern them all . Rawls devotes the main part of h i s book to
227. J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 424.
228. /d. at 520-29.
229.
Thus we may say following H umboldt that it is through social u nion founded upon the needs
and potentialities of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the real
ized natural assets of the others. We are l ed to the notion of the community of humankind the
members of which enjoy one another's excellences and individuality el ici ted by free i nstitutions,
and they recognize the good of each as an elemen t in the complete activity the whole scheme of
which is consented to and gives pleasure to all.
/d. at 523. I t is important to emphasize these facts about Rawls's theory, because many "communitar
ian" critics have assumed that, when he describes the parties in the "original position," Rawls is
advancing a theory of human nature, and that his project is to show how rational egoists could be led
by self-interest to the principles of justice. But this is not in fact the structure of his argument. The
ful l justification for the constraints on the parties in the "original position" comes only after Rawls
has given his account of human nature i n Part I I I . The end of the book elucidates many of the
presuppositions about moral psychology, h uman nature, and the good that underlie Part I; for this
reason, A Theory ofjustice can profitably be studied from back to front. No careful reading of the text
can support the "self-interest" interpretation, which seems to be the interpretation Unger favors. See
infra note 232. For more on these matters, see Rawls justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,
1 4 PHIL. & Pus. AFF. 223 ( 1 985); R. DwoRKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 440 n. 1 9 ( 1 986); B. WILLIAMS,
ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 7 8 ( 1 98 5 ).
2 30. J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 520-29.
2 3 1 . Compare Unger's " Principle of Individualism," supra note 8 6 and accompanying text
(wh ich he takes to be part of the "deep structure" of LIBERALISM) , with Rawls's discussion of "The
Idea of Social Union" in J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 520-29. Rawls emphatically rejects this
principle.
,
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the elucidation of a suitable set of principles, and devotes considerable
energy to the problems of social stability and of a well-ordered society. In
contrast to Unger, he sees what is at stake and comes to grips with the
central problem .
I do not know why Unger does not mention these facts, or why he
asserts that LIBERALISM has no "view of the good ." A Theory of justice
would seem to be an obvious target for him to attack i n detai l . But al
though Unger is very free with his references to ancient and early modern
philosophy, his critique of L I B E R A L I S M says little about the work of mod
ern liberal political theorists. He devotes a mere paragraph to "[ t ]he work
of J. Rawls, the American moralist. "232
I have been discussing Knowledge and Politics for many pages. Al
though this is Unger's first book, it is the most philosophically sophisti
cated of his writings, it has had the most infl uence on C LS , and it con
tains his most complete critique of LIBERALISM. H ere, if anywhere, is the
evidence for his claim to have "undermined the central i deas of modern
legal thought . " My discussion concentrated on the most i n fl uential p art of
his book, particularly on "the epistemological analysis for which
. .
Knowledge and Politics, is so justly famous"23\ but I also discussed his
theory of "organic groups . "
.

The failings I have identified are o f a magnitude and a profusion that
would never be accepted from a graduate student in philosophy, whether
in America or in Europe. S o i t is perhaps not surprising that professional
philosophers have failed to take Unger's work seriously . Despite his claim
to have found "the context of i deas and sentiments within w hich philoso
phy and politics must now be practiced," despite the fact that his follow
ers compare him to Marx, D urkheim , Weber, and Spinoza, the philoso
phy journals contain scarcely a mention of Knowledge and Politics.
This fact may leave us in some perplexity , however, as to the source of
Unger's stature within C L S . Perhaps his weaknesses as a philosopher are
outweighed by his strengths as a legal scholar. To explore this possibility,
I now turn to his work that most directly concerns legal theory, The Criti

cal Legal Studies Movement.
232.
The utilitarian and social contract versions of the substantive theory of freedom can be col
lapsed into a third. It appeals to the conception of an ideal system of procedures for l awmaking
that all men might accept in self-interest and the operation of which can be shown to lead to
certain specific conclusions about the distribution of wealth and power. The work of J. Rawls,
the American moral ist, i l lustrates this view.
KP, supra note 1 , at 86. Compare my remarks on the "self-interest" i nterpretation of Rawls, supra
note 229.
233.

Boyle, supra note 8 , at I 082.
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T H E C RITICAL LEGAL STUDI ES MovEM ENT

Professor Unger's slim book, The Critical Legal Studies iVIovement,
contains a statement of the goal s and methodology of C LS . It has been an
influential work, and was well-received by the critical legal public:
Shortly after i t appeared , two of his admirers compared him to D ante and
Virgil.234
In this book, Unger briefly discusses the broad implications of critical
legal thought for "normative commitment"23" and for "freedom and struc
ture in modernist experience"236 as well as for social theory. Just as
Know ledge and Politics claimed to have found "the context of ideas and
sentiments within which philosophy and pol itics must now be prac
ticed,"237 the new work claims that C L S has discovered "the axis around
which the most basic controversies of social theory must revolve."238
But the bulk of his essay is devoted to critical legal theory. According to
Unger, traditional leftist legal t heory had two ambitions, one theoreti cal,
the other practical : ( 1 ) to criticize the central ideas of modern legal
thought; and (2) "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal
doctrine to advance leftist aims. "239 Previous leftist movements connected
these two activities only loosely and sporadically. The "critical legal schol234.
His work is a unique contribution to modern ju risprudence. His writings are evocative of the
. Virgil , the embodi ment of
heroic style and structure of Dante Alighieri's Divine Comedy.
human reason, guides Dante through the h ideous depth of Hell and up the treacherous slopes
of Purgatory. Yet Virgil himself cannot enter Paradise; Beatrice, the personification of divine
faith, accompanies Dante on the celestial climax of his odyssey. I n a sense, Unger aims to fuse
the roles of Virgil and Beatrice and thus to transcend the l imitations each bears in D ante's
account.
H u tchinson & Monahan, supra note 8 , at 1 49 1 .
235. CLSM, supra note 2, at 648-54.
236. !d. at 660-62.
237. KP, supra note 1 , at v.
238. CLSM, supra note 2 , at 665. U nger describes the central theoretical result of critica l social
thought as follows:
The relation of these two sets of i deas-the recogni tion of the shaped character of social l i fe
and the denial of a metastructure-has now become the axis around which the most basic
controversies of social theory must revolve.
This shift in the starting points of social theory may seem on our part an act of i ntellectual
self-destruction. After all, the major theoretical traditions that have served the left until now,
like M arxism and structuralism, have leaned heavily on the idea of a metaorder i n either its
compulsive-sequence or its possible-worlds variant. Nevertheless, the theoretical result can best
be seen as the victory of the fundamental intention and method of critical social thought over
sets of propositions that only imperfectly applied the method and expressed the i ntention.
From the beginning the i ntention has been to u nderstand society as made and imagined rather
than as merely given in a self-generating process that would u n fold i ndependently of the w i l l
a n d t h e imagination a n d that would condemn people constantly to reenact a drama they were
unable to stop or even to u nderstand. The method of critical social thought mirrors this i nten
tion. It is the method that, interpreting the formative institutional and imaginative contexts of
social life as frozen pol itics, traces each of their elements to the particular history and measure
of constraint upon transformative conflict that the element represents.
ld. I confess that I am unable to understand much of this passage or to detect in it any similarity to
the l iterary style of Dante and Virgil .
2 3 9 . !d. a t 567.

The Y ale Law Journal

728

[ Vol. 97 : 665

ars ," however, have reformulated both activities and "drawn [ them ] into a
larger body of ideas. "24 0 S peci fically , they have sharpened the leftist cri
tique of formalism and objectivism and carried this critique "to an un
precedented extreme. "24 1 This critique leads to thei r constructive pro
gram-to what Unger calls deviationist doctrine. 242 As in his theory of
organic grou ps, Unger is not very explicit about what "deviationist doc
trine" amounts to ("We agree neither on whether this expanded or devia
tionist doctrine can in fact be constructed nor on what exactly its methods
and boundaries should be. ") ,243 but the general drift is clear:
[T]he crucial feature of deviationist doctrine is the willingness to rec
ognize and develop the disharmonies of the law: the con fl icts be
tween princi ples and counterprinciples that can be found in any
body of law. Critical doctrine does this by finding in these disharmo
nies the elements of broader contests among prescriptive conceptions
of society. 244
Unger sees that task of C LS as one of "working from within [the] legal
tradition ,"24 � of using existing " legal materials" to further radical aims.24 6
The critique of objectivism and formalism and the expansion of doc
trine have broader implications for social theory and for "the terms of
ideological controversy. "247 Unger calls his new vision "su perli beral
ism. "248 In Unger's "radicalized version of the social ideal,"
the contrast between what a social world incorporates and what it
excludes, between routine and revolution, should be broken down as
much as possible; the active power to remake and reimagine the
structure of social l i fe should enter i nto the character o f everyday
existence. 249
240. /d.
24 1 . /d.
242. /d. at 576.
243. Unger claims that the traditional sort of doctrinal argument is too narrow:
The implication of our critique of formalism is to turn the d i lemma of doctrine upside dow n . It
is to say that, i f any conceptual practice similar to what lawyers now call doctrine can be
justified, the class of legitimate doctrinal activities must be sharply enlarged. The received style
of doctrine must be redefined as an arbitrarily restricted subset of this larger class.

/d.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

249.

/d.

at 578; see id. at 646-47.
at 577.
at 580.
at 655.
He describes i t as follows:
It pushes the liberal premises about state and society, about freedom from dependence and
governance of social relations by the w i l l , to the point at which they merge i nto a larger
ambition: the building of a social world less alien to a self that can always violate the genera
tive rules of i ts own mental or social constructs and put other rules and other constructs i n
their place.
/d. at 602.
at

584.
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This social ideal entails a program for "political and cultural revolu
tion ' : -for the "reconstruction of the state ," for the growth of "negative
capability," and for a "vision of transformed personal relations. " 2 50
Professor Unger's argument builds upon his earl ier work, and cannot
be understood without it. The basic formula-complaint about the state of
modern man , criticism of traditional legal theory, delineation of a "vision"
of transformed personal relations-is the same as in Know ledge and
Politics. The newer work is a sketch of the view of "our movement" and
does not pu rport to contain a detailed argument of the sort offered i n his
earlier writings; it contains l ittle mention of philosophy or philosophers.
The newer piece is vulnerable nonetheless to the same objections as the
old. For example, let us examine U nger's critique of objectivism and for
malism. Unger defines formalism as:
[A] commitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility of, a
method of legal justification that can be clearly contrasted to open
ended disputes about the basic terms of social life, disputes that peo
ple call ideological , philosophical, or visionary.251
This definition is, l ike his earlier defi nitions of L I BER ALISM and "intelligi
ble essences ," so sloshy that he can do with it whatever he wants. For
example, in a passage directed against Ronald Dworkin, he says that "the
rights and principles school . . . can best be understood as [an effort ] to
recover the objectivist and formalist position. "252 In Unger's view, "this
school alternates con fusedly between two options, both of w hich it finds
unacceptable as a basis for legal theory. "253 One option is to base the legal
system on moral consensus; the other, to base it on a transcendent moral
order. Unger depicts "[t]he third, mediating position for which the school
grasps" as resting on
the deployment of a specifi c method to reveal the content and impli
cations of [ the moral] order: generalize from particular doctrines and
intuitions, then hypostasize the generalizations into moral truth, and
finally use the hypostasis to justify and correct the original material.
The intended result of all this hocus-pocus i s far clearer than the
means used to achieve it.254
250.

!d. at 586. Unger gives the practice of law as a n example:
For us, law practice should be, and to some extent always is, the legal defense of i ndividual or
group interests by methods that reveal the specificity of the underlying institutional and imagi
native order, that subject it to a series of petty disturbances capable of escalating at any mo
ment, and that suggest alternative ways of defining collective i nterests, collective identities, and
assumptions about the possible.
ld. at 667
25 1 . !d. at 564.
252. !d. at 574 (characterizing both "rights and principles" and "law and economics" schools).
253. !d. at 575.
254. !d.
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As a descri ption of Dworkin's theory , this account is so vague and am
biguous as to be unrecognizable. To begin with , Dworkin cannot be clas
sified as a "formalist" in Unger's sense, fo r Dworkin believes that legal
argument is a species of philosophical argument.2:s5 More importantly,
Unger's sketchy argument begs all the important questi ons. I n effect , he
reasons as he did in Knowledge and Politics: In order to engage in legal
reasoning, you need some background normative theory to tell you how to
interpret the statutes and to evaluate the precedents. But, Unger notes,
"This is where the trouble ari ses . No matter what the content of this
background theory , it is, if taken seriously and pursued to its ultimate
conclusions, unlikely to prove compatible with a broad range of the re
ceived understandings . "256 This argument is fal lacious. U nger assumes
that if people take their political theories seriously and " pu rsue them to
their ultimate conclusions," stri fe will inevitably result. H e ignores the
possibility that people might, as a matter of background political morality ,
agree on a principle of tolerance. They might choose, for example, to ar
gue their views on abortion in the public arena, but, whatever the out
come, to abide by the results of the political and judicial process . As soon
as one realizes that political theories can be self-limiting in this way, Un
ger's argument collapses.
Similar considerations undermine Unger's discussion of the Anglo
American law of contracts .257 Unger argues that the "counterprinciple" of
fairness is incapable of regulating the regime of contract.258 Agai n , he says
that the only way of preventing considerations of fairness " from running
wild and from correcting almost everything is to draw unstable, u njusti
fied, and unjustifiable l ines between the contracts that are voidable and
those that are not. "259 One might as well argue that the only way of
preventing considerations of efficien cy from running wild i s to draw un
stable, unjustifiable, and unj ustified lines between children of sixteen
(who are allowed to drive a car) and their slightly younger siblings (who
are not)-or condemn a yardstick because it is not a micrometer. Unger
seems not to have noticed that fai rness itself might require the construc
tion of a regime of clear and precise rules. Exactly which system i s set u p
may be morally indifferent-the important thing is that there be some
system on which people can rely. Morally speaking , it is a m atter of comSee R. DwoRKIN, A M ATTER OF PRINCIPLE 9-7 1 ( 1 985).
CLSM, supra note 2 , at 571.
!d. at 6 1 6-48. This part of U nger's work has recently been the subject of a careful and
detailed critique. See Finnis, supra note 27.
258.
255.

256.
257.

The fairness correction must be focused and sporadic rather than pervasive i f the regime of
contract is not to be superseded by an overriding method of allocation. Yet i n its limited and
contract-preserving form, the correction becomes arbitrarily selective: for every situation cor
rected, there seems to exist another similar to it that is left u ntouched.
CLSM, supra note 2, at 632-33.
259. !d. at 629.
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plete indifference whether people drive on the left or the right; but the
state needs to make an "arbitrary" decision about which it is to be. (And
after that decision has been made, it is no longer a morally arbitrary mat
ter which side of the road you drive on-not because rules make morality,
but because morality requires you to abide by rules that have been en
acted to protect life and limb _ ) 2 60
As for Unger' s critique of "objectivism," it too suffers from excessive
vagueness. Unger does not , in fact, argue against objectivism; i nstead he
appeals to the work of other scholars:
[T]he insight required to l aunch the attack against objectivism-the
discovery of the i ndeterminate content of abstract i nstitutional cate
gories like democracy or the market-with its far-reaching subver
sive implications, was partly authored by a cadre of seemingly harm
less and even toadying juri sts. Those who live in the temple may
delight in the thought that the priests occasionally outdo the
prophets.2 6 1
He informs us further that "[h]istorical study has repeatedly shown that
every attempt to find the universal legal language of the democracy and
the market revealed the falsehood of the origi nal idea. An i ncreasing part
of doctrinal analysis and legal theory has been devoted to containing the
subversive implications of this discovery."2 6 2
Unfortunately , The Critical Legal Studies Movement contains no foot
notes. Unger mentions the names neither of his opponents, nor of the
"toadying jurists" on whose works he relies. He does not say who at
tempted to find "the universal legal language of the democracy and the
market"; still less does he attempt to explain what this sonorous phrase
means.
Unger's critique of objectivism and formalism, then, does not amount to
much-vague arguments backed by sweeping and undocumented asser
tions about what "historical study has repeatedly shown." As for his posi
tive program for "political and cultural revolution," it succumbs to the
same objections as his theory of organic groups. His account of "negative
capability" contains a heavy dose of purple prose,2 6 3 but i t i s no more
260. These points were made long ago by Aristotle. See supra note 1 60. They are also in
Aquinas:
By mutual agreement the human will can establ ish that which is just in matters which of
themselves do not conflict with natural justice. It is here that positive right has its place. Hence
Aristotle says that the legally just is that which is morally neutral in principle and can be
decided in one way or the other, though once decided it remains no longer neutral.
S.T. , supra note 1 56, at 2a2ae, Q.5 7 , A.2 (T. G ilby trans. 1 97 5). The passage of Aristotle referred to
is most likely NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, supra note 1 35 , bk. V, ch. 7, at 1 1 34b20.
2 6 1 . C LS M , supra note 2, at 570.
262. /d. at 568.
263.
Negative capabi lity is the practical and spiritua l , individual and collective empowerment made
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meaningful than his talk about "natural harmony and concrete universal
ity" in Knowledge and Politics. 264 The same is true of his "vision" of a
new society, 2 8�'� a vision which is su pposed to provide the basis for the
"reconstruction of the state . " 2 88 Naturall y, one wonders how these im
provements are to be carried out. Unger is ready with a t hree- poi nt pro
gram for reforming the organization of government:
First, the branches of government should be multiplied. To every
crucial feature of the social order there should correspond �.; orne form
and arena of potentially destabi lizing and broadly based con flict over
the uses of state power . . . . Second, the conflicts among t hese more
numerous branches of government should be settled by princi ples of
priority among branches and of devolution to the electorate. These
principles must resolve impasses cleanly and quickly . . . . Third,
the programmatic center of government-the party i n o ffice-should
have a real chance to try out its programs. 2 87
This is a disappointing conclusion. Unger's theoretical work started out
with the bold claim that his discoveries place philosophy , sociology , and
legal theory on a new foundation. The intellectual daring o f his enterprise
is admirable, and his writing is occasionally inspired . He is eloquent in
deploring the "loss of sel f" in modern society and effusive in depicting the
joys of a more "organic" world; but when you ask how he plans to get
from the one state to the other, all he has to offer is lame statements like
"the party i n office should h ave a real chance to try out its p rograms. "
So far, I h ave avoided discussing Unger's politics: M y critique has fo
cused on his philosophy and on his scholarship. His concrete recommen
dations for achieving transcendental wholeness in a community of organic
groups have been utopian and silly, but h armless. However, t here i s evipossible by the disentrenchment of formative structures. Disentrenchment means not perma
nent instability, but the making of structures that turn the occasions for their reproduction into
opportunities for their correction. Disentrenchment therefore promises to liberate societies from
their blind lurching between protracted stagnation and rare and risky revolution.
/d. at 650.
264. See supra text accompanying notes 1 95-200.
265.
[Our theoretical] ideas generate the animating vision: the conception of a society in w hich the
effacement of the contrast between revolutionary struggles over the established order and rou
tine deals within it has more fully liberated exchange, production, and personal attachments
from the vitiating force of dominance and dependence and from the compulsions of an unex
amined sense of possibility.
CLSM, supra note 2, at 673.
266. This reconstruction is supposed to help achieve what he describes as:
the cumulative emancipation of personal relations from the constraints of some background
plan of social division and h ierarchy, as the recombination of qualities and experiences associ
ated with different social roles, and as the development of an ideal of community no longer
reduced to merely the obsessional and stifling counterimage to the quality of practical social
life.
/d. at 598.
267. /d. at 592-93.
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dence that this sty le o f thinking about politics can go sour. There i s a
certain kind of high-flown, P romethean philosophy that yearns for the
"transcendent" and the "organic," that pays little attention to practical
details, that writes in bombastic prose, and that has on occasion developed
embarrassing political links. One thinks of Martin Heidegger, the great
German philosopher who publicly supported the N azis during the Thir
ties,268 or of Paul DeMan, the Yale deconstructionist who spent the war
in Belgium writing anti-Semitic polemics.
Not that all high- flown phi losophers have these links: There are nu
merous exceptions. But, as we shall soon see, Unger calls H eidegger one
of the central influences on his theory of "cultural revolution" ;269 and his
philosophical style has more in common with the oracular philosophers
than it does with the logical positivists and Anglo-American philosophers
whom he deplores.27 0 So it is at least worth inquiring about the details of
his political recommendations. To this topic I now turn .
IV.

UNGER ' s PoLITICs

Unger's three latest books are collectively entitled Politics: A Work in
Constructive Social Theory .271 In discussing these massive volumes, I shall
confine my attention to the passages that are most relevant to his politics.
I shall attempt to indicate both why I think his theory is mistaken and
why I am uneasy about its political drift.
Politics is supposed to provide a new theoretical vision for the left. It is
opposed at every level to rigidity , structure, hierarchies, n ecessity, and
roles. I t argues that the "liquefaction of established social structures is
needed to develop the richness of our subjective life and to advance our
attempts to reconcile more fully the enabling conditions of self
assertion. "272 I nstead of rigidity, U nger's work "seeks the individual and
collective empowerment that can result from the creation of institutional
arrangements that undermine the forms of dependence and domination,
and that do so i n part by effacing the contrast between routine and
revolution. "273
His theory is i ntensely practical , and his writings are aimed not only at
the world of speculative academia, but at the world of concrete political
struggle. In several illuminating passages of autobiography,274 U nger says
268. For a popular account of the recent debate in France and Germany about Heidegger's Nazi
past and its impl ications for modern "Continental" philosophy, see Pasquier, Le cas Heidegger: entre
Hitler et l 'humanisme, L 'ExPRESS 46 ( Feb. 5 , 1 988); see also V. FARIAS, H EJDEn;ER ET LE N Az
ISME ( 1 987).
269. See infra note 3 1 9.
270. See supra notes 1 4 1 , 1 53.
27 1 . See supra note 1 0.
272. FN, supra note 4, at 586.
273. !d. at 25.
27 4. See ST, supra note 1 0, at 67 -79; FN, supra note 4, at 604-05.
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that his book was inspired by his experience as a political act I v1st in the
"murky but hopeful politics of B razi l , " 2 7 � where he "took up partisan
propaganda and intrigue, believing that grassroots popular movements
were helpless unless they gained the means with which to participate i n
the struggle over governmental power. " 2 76 While acknow !edging that
" [ n]obody could reasonably hope to ride to power on the crest of a wave of
books or to reverse in the l ibrary defeats sustained in practical politics ,"
he nevertheless found that " [ i ] deas had spoiled the contest for power," and
says that he "began to feel toward the inherited radical theories a little as
Machiavelli had felt toward C hristianity" -with the result that he
"wanted to write a book to set things straight." 2 77 H e notes that " [ m ] uch
i n this work can be understood as the consequence of an attempt to enlist
the intellectual resources of the North Atlantic world i n the service of
concerns and commitments more keenly felt elsewhere. " 2 7 8 A rguing that,
i n a radical sense, "everything is politics," 2 79 he dreams of a new kind of
society, to be born of a combination of the pop culture 28 0 of "the rich ,
polished, critical and self-critical but also self-consciously disintegrated
and Alexandrian culture of social and historical thought that now flour
i shes in the North Atlantic democracies" and the radical politics of places
l ike Brazi l , "a country at the forward edge of the third world, where, at
the time of writing, at least some people took seriously the idea that basic
i nstitutions, practices, and preconceptions might be reconstructed in ways
that did not conform to any established model of social organization. " 28 1
As he says, "If only the unsettled nations could achieve the institutional
forms that might transform a temporary struggle into a lasting structure
they would become the testing ground on which society would be more
thoroughly cracked open to politics." 282
One of the central notions of U nger's theory is "negative capabil
ity"-which he defines as " al l the varieties of individual and collective
empowerment [that are] connected in one way or another w i th the mas
tery the concept of disentrenchment or denaturalization describes." 28 3
FN, supra note 4, at 604.
ST, supra note 1 0, at 75. This quotation, like the quotation infra note 3 1 9 , is wri tten i n the
second person, but the reference to U nger is clear.
277. !d. at 78-79.
278. FN, supra note 4, at 604.
279. !d. at 3; ST, supra note 1 0, at 1 5 1 -65.
280. See infra note 3 1 9 .
28 1 . FN, supra note 4, at 604.
282. ST, supra note 1 0, at 66.
283. FN, supra note 4, at 279. " D i sentrenchment" is defined as follows:
One aspect of disentrenchment is the degree to which a formative context can be challenged in
the midst of ordinary social life. A structure is entrenched or naturalized to the extent that it
prevents such challenge, and it is disentrenched or denaturalized insofar as it facil itates the
challenge. On an equivalent defi n i tion, disentrenchment implies a shortening of the distance to
traverse before our context-preserving activities can become context-transforming activities. I t
is the relative facility w i t h which we can i nterrupt t h e oscil lation between the narcoleptic
routines and the revolutionary interludes of h istory and achieve conscious mastery in the midst

275.
276.
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Unger's main thesis about "negative capability" is that "[d] isentrenchment
of formative contexts provides societies with a range of material and in
tangible advantages, all the way from the encouragement of the develop
ment of productive capabilities to the exercise of a more conscious mastery
over social circumstance. "284
A considerable part of Unger's work is devoted to illustrating the mili
tary advantages of his theory28�>-to showing that "negative capability"
can help to develop "the destructive powers of society . "286 He delves i nto
history to establish his thesis (one of his chapters is entitled " Plasticity or
Death : Mamluk, Norman , and A frican Examples"287) and he displays an
impressive grasp of late medieval military strategy, as well as of the deci
sive battles of Chinese and J apanese history.288 But Unger's interest in
warfare is not merely antiquarian, and he stresses that his mili tary theory
applies even in an age of nuclear weapons: "In the atmosphere created by
such a conflict, the shock of mass destruction must be followed-if any
thing can follow it at all-by efforts to impose the rudiments of order and
to disarm the remnants of resistance, in an atmosphere in which all estab
lished bonds have been torn violently apart."289 Ungerian " pl asticity" is
supposed to help a society cope with such tasks.
Given the practical orientation of U nger ' s theory, it is legitimate that he
should discuss military theory, but this part of his argument proves less
than he claims. It is uncontroversial that a flexible, i nnovative military
machine will have the edge over an army commanded by the ossified and
the unimaginative. But i t i s also u ncontroversial that military success de
pends u pon strict discipline, a clear chain of command, and obedience to
orders-in short, u pon hierarchy . Too much flexibility can be as fatal as
too little; and Unger's arguments, while they convincingly establish the
first platitude, do not refute the second.
o f civic peace.
The other aspect of disentrenchment is the relative disengagement of our practical and pas
sionate dealings from a preexisting structure of roles and hierarchies. . . It is the l ifting of
the grid of social division and ranking from our practical and passsionate relations to one
another.
/d. at 278-79.
284. /d. at 279. The passage continues:
In fact, all the varieties of i ndividual and collective empowerment seem to be connected in one
way or another with the mastery the concept of disentrenchment or denaturalization describes.
I cal l these varieties of empowerment "negative capabil ity" when considering them in relation
to the context change that makes them possible. Thus, we may use the poet's turn of phrase to
label the empowerment that arises from the denial of whatever i n our contexts delivers us over
to a fixed scheme of division and h ierarchy and to an enforced choice between routine and
rebellion.

/d.
285.

See, e.g. , id. at 282-85 . As the ful l title suggests, half of the volume PP is devoted to the
"conditions of military success"; in particular, see PP, supra note 1 0, at 1 5 3-2 1 3.
286. FN, supra note 4, at 282. The phrase recurs id. at 586, and in PP, supra note I 0, at 1 54.
287. PP, supra note 1 0, at 1 62.
288. See id. at 1 92-206.
289. /d. at 1 56.
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Unger provides a practical set of guidelines describing how a poli tical
movement devoted to "context-transformation" could come to power, ei
ther at the ballot box or in "the violent seizure of the state against a
background of revolutionary action . "290 He discusses the necessity for
"linking grassroots mobilization with the contest for governmental
power,"291 for "encourag[ing] militant collective self organization,"29 2 and
for not losing the goodwill of the mass of the population. He gives instruc
tions for the recruitment and management of the "cadres, activists, or
militants [who] are the people whose relatively privileged social circum
stances and intimate psychological identification with the movemen t en
able them to devote themselves to its work." H e adds that " [ t]hese mili
tants make the movement, and they can break i t . "293 As for the revolution
itself, the cadres are i nstructed to draw u pon "the i rrepressible ability of
context-preserving activities to escalate into context-transforming strug
gle. "294 They "must master the practice of the disturbance-maximizing
response."295 And, as in much previous revolutionary theory , " [ t ]he goal
of the transformative movement is . . . to exploit the controversies that
will inevitably take place: to expand and intensify them and to meet them
in ways that also represent steps in the direction of the transformative
program. "296
This discussion is undoubtedly important from the point of view of rev
olutionary praxis, and it does contain elements that cannot be found in the
writings of Lenin or Gramsci or Trotsky or Mao Zedong, but the i nnova
tions lack the precision and plausibility of the earlier theorists. Too often ,
Unger's ideas take t h e form of vague directives that, i n practical terms,
are almost unintelligible.2 97
290.
29 1 .
292.
293
294.
295 .
296.
297.

FN, supra note 4, at 432.
/d. at 407.
Jd.
Jd. at 4 1 6.
Jd. at 424.
Jd. at 425 .
/d. a t 427.

For example, one of Unger's recommendations is preceded by the fol lowing reasoning:
At the extreme of escalation of conflict all rigid social relations collapse into the twofold
circumstance earlier described. On the one hand, society passes into the H obbesian confl ict of
all against all. Each person grabs w hatever he can and gives himself to the relentless search for
preemptive security. On the other hand, the contest of class and communal i nterests dissolves
into a struggle of parties of opinion, animated by alternative programmatic visions. On the one
hand, the man in tooth and claw steps outside the social station: all are eq ualized by the brutal
struggle for defense and self-defense. On the other hand, the successor to the interest
determined agent is the individual as a context-transcendent being whose com m i tment to cer
tain ideals and opinions is not determined by his membership in particular classes and commu
nities. The strongest assertions of spiritual independence resemble the most brutish contests for
material advantage in their power to weaken the constraints that social stations impose u pon
the will and imagination of the individual. In this circumstance of maximum conflict the per
spective of the transformative militant becomes, in part, the standpoint of the theorist and the
prophet.
Then comes the practical conclusion:
Thus, at each stage of escalation, the transformative activist must change his attitude toward
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H aving discussed "The Nfovement i n Quest of Power," Unger turns to
a discussion of "The rvfovement i n Power" -of the institutional structure
of a society that has been "cracked open to politics." H e calls the result a
"constitutionalism of permanent mobilization" or an "empowered democ
racy . "298 The "constitutionalism of permanent mobilization" is supposed
to keep the entire society liquid and permanently open to the "disen
trenchment of formative contexts." Unger says that the traditional separa
tion of powers will have to be abolished (it gets in the way of change);299
and that a variety of political and economic reforms will have to be intro
duced, of which the most novel and i nteresting is a system of "destabiliza
tion rights"-rights which " protect the citizen's i nterest in breaking open
the large-scale organizations or the extended areas of social practice that
remain closed to the destabilizing effects of ordinary conflict and thereby
sustain insulated hierarchies of power and advantage."3 00 These
destabilization rights are to be supported by the state, perhaps even a spe
cial branch of government. Governmental action to disrupt and recon
struct the overprotected and subjugation-producing arrangements may be
needed not only because the people in charge of the organizations or prac
tices at issue may be the biggest beneficiaries of the insulated h ierarchies
but because there may be no people visibly i n charge. Such a situation is
especially l ikely to occur when the claimant seeks to disrupt an area of
social practice rather than a discrete organization. 3 0 1
Unger's new theory seems to me to suffer from precisely the same af
flictions as his old theory of "organic groups. " That is to say, i t is exces
sively vague, and it does not convincingly answer any of the obvious ques
tions about life under a "constitutionalism of permanent mobilization."
For instance, Unger does not give any clear indication of which "social
practices" are open to destabilization, of which roles are "up for grabs."
H e talks about the "collective interest in ensuring that all institutions and
practices can be criticized and revised";30 2 but this clearly goes too far. He
cannot mean to destabilize the practice of discouraging rape, the practice
of preserving works of art from destruction, or even the practice of relia
bly delivering the mail. But he gives no standard for deciding w hich prac
tices ought to be left intact and which are subject to "role defiance and
role jumbling."30 3 Nor does h e say how far "trashing the script"304 is to
the established system of group interests: first finding his allies within the constraints this
system imposes and then helping to overthrow such constraints.
!d. at 422-23. It is hard to see what this vague directive means or what guidance it could offer to the
m il itant i n the field of combat.
298. !d. at 462.
299. /d. at 455.
300. /d. at 5 30.
30 1 . !d. at 53 1 .
302. !d. at 530 (emphasis added).
303. See infra text accompanying note 3 1 5 .
304. FN, supra note 4, at 3 1 9 .
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proceed. These problems are not trivial: It makes a difference whether the
roles you envision "jumbling" are merely those of halfoack and
quarterback or those of halfback and mathematician.
N1oreover, Unger's moral psychology seems based on faulty observation,
on the assumption that people function best in times of chaos . It is far
from clear that "jumbling" and "destabilizing" and "liquefaction" and
"disturbance-maximizing" are attractive ideals, either for the i ndividual
or for society . Life is unstable enough as it is. We already have A I D S ,
nuclear weapons, atomic power plants, political terrorists, auto wrecks,
and airline crashes-not to mention cancer and heart attacks. Do we re
ally need a Department of D estabilization as wel l ? Unger wants "some
thing of the quality of the hot moments of social life-the periods of accel
erated collective mobilization-to pass into the cold moments-the
ordinary experience of institutionalized social existence."3 0 1) Those who
long for the hot experience of "accelerated collective mobil ization" ought
to contemplate what warfare and revolution have done for the quality of
life in the jumbled city of Beirut.
The problem here affects every part of Unger's theory. Just as a series
of one-night stands does not add up to a worthwhile personal relationship,
just as a series of part-time jobs does not add u p to a worthwhile career,
so a series of disruptions by the Bureau of Liquefaction does not add up
to a worthwhile scheme of h uman association. Unger does not realize that
human society and human l ives have to be patiently constructed, and for
all his emphasis on creativity, he has not noticed that the great creative
intellects have taken stability w here they could get it. 3 06 This point is not
confined to Einstein or Kant or M il ton. An ordinary human being who
wants to live a tolerable and productive life has no more reason to em
brace Unger's i deals than an architect has to join the Society for the Prop
agation of Earthquakes.
What is attractive i n Unger's theory-the idea of self-development and
of the individual's power to create new roles-seems to me already well
catered for in traditional l iberalism, and with far greater realism in its
!d. at 433.
Schopenhauer made the fol lowing observation on this subject:
Kant wrote an essay on the living forces; but I would like to write a dirge and threnode
thereon, for their excessively frequent use in knocking, hammering, and banging has been
throughout my l i fe a daily torment to me. There are certainly those, q uite a number in fact,
who smile at such things because they are not sensitive to noise. Yet they are the very people
who are also not sensitive to arguments, ideas, poetry, and works of art, in short, to mental
impressions of every kind; for this is due to the toughness and solid texture of their brain
substance. On the other hand, in the biographies or other accounts of the persona! statements
of almost all great authors, such as Kant, Goethe, Lichtenberg, Jean Pau l , I find complaints
about the torture which thinkers have to endure from noise.
. [ E ]minent minds have al
ways thoroughly disliked every kind of disturbance, interruption and diversion, but above all
the violent disturbance caused by din and noise.
2 A. SCHOPENHAUER, PARERGA AND PARALIPOMENA 642 (E. Payne trans. 1 974).
305.

306.
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psychological underpinnings-in Mill, say, or von H umboldt, or in the
final third of A Theory of Justice.307
Moreover, Unger has no plausible institutional account of how his pro
fessional destabilizers are to be kept under control . If they are to make
radical changes in people's lives, they will need a considerable degree of
coercive power, especially if they have as large a charter as U nger seems
prepared to give them. But what is to keep them from gross invasions of
personal l iberties-particularly if, like Unger, you want to do away with
the separation of powers ? To be sure, U nger does allow for a set of "im
munity rights" to personal security and to welfare entitlements. H e does
not, however, allow property rights, and he says that the immunity rights
are to "impose a minimal rigi dity upon the organization of society."308
But merely expressing the pious hope that rights will be respected is not
enough-not, that is, for a theory that claims to be about practical politics.
Mao's constitution , like Stalin's, guaranteed freedom of speech, freedom of
religion, freedom of the press; but there were no institutional arrange
ments to back up the guarantees, and i n practice the government could do
as it pleased.3 0 9
Unger's answer to this problem is i n effect to say that the citizens will
get used to the new system, and that they (or their children ) will eventu
ally revise their conception of personal security:
[ I ] f the ideals and u nderstanding underlying this institutional pro
gram hold up, people will have reason to change their views of what
essential security consists in. They and, if not they, their children
will discover that the security that matters does not require the
maintenance of a narrowly defined mode of life. They reach this
conclusion in part by finding senses and varieties of security compat
ible with an ever greater jumbling up of distinct styles of life and i n
part b y awakening t o a conception of the personality a s both depen
dent upon context and strengthened through context smashing.31 0
I do not find this answer even remotely plausible. As i n his earlier theory
that we could "develop the species nature in concrete universality" if we
were to live in "communities of life" and attempt "to discover the organic
unity in each others' personalities,"3 1 1 Unger, rather than con fronting the
difficulties that beset his theory, takes refuge in pious hopes and empty
phrases.
307. See J. RAWLS, supra note 86, at 520-29. I note i n passing that, once again , Unger has
nothing to say about "the American moralist, J. Rawls." See supra notes 226-32 and accompanying
text.
308. FN, supra note 4, at 527.
309. See, e.g. , R. EDWARDS, L. H ENKIN & A . NATHAN , H UMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINA 1 02-09 ( 1 986).
3 1 0. FN, supra note 4, at 5 1 4- 1 5 .
3 1 1 . See supra notes 1 84-232 and accompanying text.
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I now come to the most revealing part o f Unger's new work, his "pro
gram for the transformation of personal relations."31 2 He explains that:
The authority of the radical project lies in its vision of the i ndividual
and collective empowerment we may achieve by cumulatively loosen
ing the grip of rigid roles, hierarchies, and conventions u pon our
experiments in practical or passionate association. We can l i ft the
burden of dependence and depersonalization, in part by changing the
character of our relations, as individuals and as collectivities, to the
institutional and imaginative frameworks of social life.313
Unger then says-this after twelve years and seven books totall i ng 2 , 1 3 3
pages-that h e i s going to "suggest the outline o f a vision that needs to be
worked out later. "314 (One might think that it is a bit late in the day for
this sort of thing-that if Unger intends his theories to be used in practi
cal grassroots revolutionary politics, he ought first to supply some details
about the society he envisions. But we have seen this problem before . )
Unger's "vision" is o f a "cultural- revolutionary attack o n rigid roles";
he calls it "role defiance and role j umbling."315 H e explains:
The roles that deserve to be targets of this cultural- revolutionary
subversion are, above all , those that mark a place within a preestab
lished scheme of class, communal , or gender divisions . . . . S pecial
ized work roles are neither i nherently suitable nor intri nsically un
suitable as subjects for role defiance and role jumbling. The more the
technical and the social divisions of labor present themselves i n eve
ryday life as a rigid grid of functional allocations, the more they
deserve to be smashed u p at the microlevel of cultural-revolutionary
defiance and i ncongruity as well as at the macrolevel of institutional
innovation. 31 6
Having thus described his "cultural-revolutionary program ," Unger pro
ceeds to list "some of the truncated but rich materials that lie at hand,
ready to assist us in our efforts to develop this part of our programmatic
ideas and of our transformative practice."317 These materials are an eclec
tic blend of two elements: i nternational pop culture and the writings of
"third world ultra-leftists."318 The first element is typified by Unger's ap
parently serious endnote (the last in his book) to the TV Guide.319 As for
3 1 2. FN, supra note 4, at 556.
3 1 3. Jd. at 558.
3 1 4. Jd. at 560.
3 1 5. !d. at 563.
3 1 6. !d. at 564.
3 1 7 . Jd. at 560.
3 1 8. !d. at 630-3 1 .
3 1 9. Unger says that a major i nspiration for his theory of cultural revolution
is the worldwide pop culture. One way to u nderstand its cultu ral-revolutionary message is to
watch and compare television soap operas in different countries. These melodramas ex press the
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the element o f ultra-leftism, one i s not surprised, after all the talk o f revo
lutionary struggle and of the "constitutionalism of permanent mobiliza
tion ," to learn that one of the "truncated but rich materials" for Unger's
theory is the Chinese Cultural Revolution. He particularly admires the
Maoist technique of "cri ticism and self-cri ticism": "In the hands of its
most radical practitioners, it became part of an attempt to chasten and, i f
possible, to destroy the established beaureaucracies o f party a n d state and
to produce a new man or woman , new above all in their attitude toward
authority . "320 This technique, one gathers, was designed to loosen the grip
of rigid hierarchies and to encourage new styles of "practical or passionate
association . " It worked as follows:
The victim now appeared often as the mere pretext for the reenact
ment of a collective denunciation of every t race that the i nherited
contrast of masses and elites had imprinted u pon the style of direct
personal relations. Because that contrast had amounted to a hierar
chy of value as well as to a system of control , its subversion had all
the seductive and liberating force of an attack u pon the distinction
between the pure and the impure.321
It is very important to keep in view what U nger is talking about and
not to be swept away by his jargon-not to think that he is being "philo
sophical" or "deep" when he is merely being vague. (As Wittgenstein
used to say, "Don't treat your commonsense like an umbrella. When you
come into a room to philosophize, don't l eave it outside, but bring it in
with you ."322).
The Cultural Revolution began as a campaign against the " four olds"
(old ideas, old culture, old customs, old habits) .323 Let us consider first its
contributions to culture. I n Tibet, the Red Guards began by demolishing
the Buddhist monasteries; of the several thousand temples that existed
anxieties and longings of panicular classes and communities i n panicu lar societies. They also
rehearse the ancienL, sentimentalized formulas of the Christian and pagan romance. But both
the disti nctive. local concerns and the familiar romantic tropes come out transformed by their
combi nation with role jumbling and role defiance. See TV Guide.
!d. at 63 1 . Other "inspirations" mentioned in the endnote are the middle works of H eidegger and
Sartre, H egel's Phenomenology of Mind, and Kierkegaard's Either/ Or. !d. at 630. U nger adds that
"[o]nly i n the effons of contemporary femi nist theorists and in the occasional writings of third world
ultra-leftists have I found a shared discourse that develops the speculative themes of these n ineteenth
and twentieth cemury philosophers i nto the beginnings of a cultural-revolutionary program." !d. at
63 1 . H e also lists Proust, Joyce, Musil, Virginia Woolf, C larice L ispector, and C h u ng-shu C h'ien as
i nOuences on his thought. !d. And i n the text he mentions Gandhi's "method of pedagogic defilement"
as an example of a cultural-revolutionary attack on the "contrast . . between the pure and the
impure." !d. at 568-69.

320. !d.
321 . !d.
322. L. WITTGENSTEIN , LECTURES ON THE fOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 68 ( D iamond ed.
1 975).
323. Y. DAIYUN , To THE STORM 394 ( 1 985). I have relied on the books by Daiyun and Terzani,
see infra note 324, because, as a Chinese Communist and a former M aoist, respectively, their works
seem less likely to be ideologically biased.
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before the Cultural Revolution , approximately a dozen sti ll stan d . 324 The
situation in China was little better. Most of the architecture of I mperial
Peking was razed; little of the ancient city now remains. 3u; As for per
sonal relations, religion was proscribed; B uddhist nuns and monks were
forced to marry or to parti ci pate in the destruction of their tern ples. 32 6
The keeping of pets was considered a "bourgeois" habit, and the pets
themselves were denounced as parasites and killed.327
The Maoist practice of "criticism and self-criticism" seems to h ave
amounted to l ittle more than the mindless repetition of standardized "con
fessions" of class crimes. 328 :tv1any "enemies of the people" commi tted sui
cide, or perished in concentration camps, or were simply k i lled.329
324. There are many accounts of these events. The sources disagree about the exact n u m bers,
largely because there was no accurate count of the Tibetan monastaries that existed before the Cul
tural Revolution. H arrer puts the number at 3,800, of which 1 3 survive, H . H ARRER, RETURN TO
TIBET 46 ( 1 984 ) ; Terzani, at 2,464, of which 10 survive, T. TERZANI, B EH I N D THE FoRBIDDEN
D ooR 1 45 ( 1 985); van Praag at 6,000, of which two dozen survive, M. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, THE
STATUS OF TIBET xv ( 1 987). For more eyewitness accounts, see D . N ORBU , RED STAR OvER TIBET
( 1 987 ) ; R. TARING, DAUGHTER OF T m ET ( 1 970). I t is not plausible to argue that t h i s destruction
was undertaken for the benefit of the Tibetan masses. Many of the treasures could have been sold on
the i nternational art market, and the proceeds used to feed the populace. Nor is i t plausible to claim
that China was threatened by the Tibetans-a society of devout Buddhists, whom the C h i nese out
numbered by more than a hundred to one.
325. For an account of the destruction of Peking, see T. TERZANI, supra note 324, a t 22-59.
Terzani, an Italian journal ist and a former M aoist, spent several years i n China:
[ M ]any [ i n my generation] were caught i n the i l l usion projected by Mao's C h i n a. If our world
was old and i mperfect, if past hopes had turned i nto great delusions, here was a new
chance . .
Looking for the unique form of socialism that had allegedly been built there, I found only
the ruins of an utterly failed experiment. Looking for the new culture that had supposedly
sprung out of the revolution, I came across only the stumps of the old cul tu re that had been
methodically, systematically destroyed in the process.
Among the many doors Deng Xiaoping had opened were those of the concentration camps
and reeducation schools to which some 20 m i l l i on i n tellectuals had been sent. . . .
It had been i nspiring, within the protected atmosphere of Columbia U niversity i n New
York, to read Mao's slogans, such as "Do not cut off people's heads for, u n l i ke cabbages, they
do not grow again." But it was a different matter to discover that, behind the facade of propa
ganda, heads had rol led , people had been tortured, and that, at the end of the G reat Proleta
rian Cultural Revolution, China was like a barren desert ful l of dispirited, disoriented people.
!d. at 1 0.
326. See, e.g. , id. at 1 47.
327. /d. at 49-50. Terzani records that "people i n Peki ng thought that dogs were elimin ated
because the secret police did not want to be bothered by their barking while going around at night to
arrest spies, landlords and counter-revolutionaries. " In Tibet, the Red Guards began the C u l tural
Revolution by killing all the dogs-by electrocution, by hanging, or by forci ng Tibetans to stone them
to death. (This last method had a special twist. Devout Buddhists believe i n reincarnation and are
forbidden from k i l l i ng any l iving t h i ng, so this method had the subtle advantage of attacking their
religion as well as their pets.) Accounts of the killing of the dogs occur repeatedly in the Tibetan
literature. See id. at 1 46; H. H ARRER, supra note 324, at 46.
328. Y. DAIYUN, supra note 323, at 1 84; see T. TERZANI, supra note 324, at 248-62.
329. Daiyun has this account:
F i l led with passion for the new movement and eager to conduct the struggle against their own
enemies, they had forced the president of their school, famous as one of the first Chi nese
women to be educated, to climb through a narrow underground cement dra i npipe. W hen she
fi nally emerged, they had brutal ly beaten her to death. Most of the girls at this middle school
were from h igh-ranking intellectuals' fam il ies and thus, I guessed sadly, fel t compelled to
demonstrate their commitment to revolutionary goals.
Y. DAIYUN, supra note 323, at 1 83. Nor was the suffering confined to China proper. The fol lowing
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tv'laoist ideas did not work any better outside of China and Ti bet.
M ao's ally and disciple Pol Pot returned to Cambodia from Peking in
1 9 66, the year of the outbreak of the Cultural Revol ution . 330 H i s Khmer
Rouge attempted to reform the personal relations of the Cambodians
along Maoist lines .331 A third of the population died in the pro
cess-somewhere between one and two million people. 332 In Tibet, with a
population of six million, more than one million people died under the
Chinese occupation. 333 The number of deaths in China proper is impossi
ble to determine: Reliable figures do not exist.
It may be objected that i t is unfair to Unger to bring u p the detail s of
the Cultural Revolution-that I should try to see his theory and this pe
riod of Chinese history in the best possible light. But this objection is
unsound. In the fi rst place, it would insulate any theory from criticism,
for almost anything can be labeled a detail-as when Jean - M arie LePen,
the leader of the French N ational Front, brushed aside the use of the gas
chambers in H itler's Germany as a "detail of World War I I . " Second,
Unger himself offers the activities of the Red Guards as a "truncated but
rich" precedent for his "constitutionalism of permanent mobil i zation";3 34
account by a Tibetan refugee is typical:
I went to see the village close to Kambum where I was born. I t was very sad; more than
twenty of my relatives were dead. Only one cousin was still l iving, and I visited her home and
met her child. When I asked her what happened to her father, she replied, "He is dead. "
When I asked her how and where, she d i d n o t know. Their farm had been taken a n d their
house torn down. Many of the people I talked with had such sad stories. When I asked them
about their life now, they would just cry; they had no words. Others told me how their famil ies
and friends were ki lled, im prisoned, sent to labor camps, maimed and crippled. Some were
beaten so severely over and over again with clubs and boards that they lost their hearing or
sight. Others had bodies that were bent or twisted from being forced to pull heavy carts, like
animals. Many were compelled to stand in public places while people were forced to pull their
hair in "struggle" (thamzing) sessions. Thousands died from exposure and starvation , u nable
to survive on the worms, garbage, dead dog bones, pig food etc. which hunger drove them to
eat.
T. NoRBU, TIBET Is M Y CouNTRY 273-74 ( 1 986).
330. See B. KIERNAN , H ow PoL PoT CAME TO POWER viii-xii, 222-24 ( 1 985). Shapley notes
Pol Pot's sympathy for Ch inese Communism and suggests that M ao's "Great Leap Forward" was the
model for Pol Pot's social reforms. R. SHAPLEY, BITTER VICTORY 222-24 ( 1 986). The influence on
the Cambodian Communists of Maoist ideology is well attested i n , e.g., H. NGoR, SuRVIVING TH�:

KILl.ING FIELDS 20 1 ( 1 988):
[ E ]verything about the Khmer Rouge was alien, from China. The borrowed their ideology
from Mao Tse-tung, l ike the concept of the great leap forward. Sending the i ntellectuals to the
countryside to learn from the peasants was an idea of the Chinese Cultural Revolution. Their
AK-47s and their olive green caps and their trucks were Chinese. Even the music they played
from the loudspeakers was Chinese, with Khmer words.
This account is corroborated by Shawcross, The Terrible Story that Nobody Wanted to Hear, Times
(London) , M ar. 27, 1 988, at G-5.
33 1 . Pol Pot's revolution aimed to sever family relations, B . KIERNAN, supra note 330, at 338, to
abolish property, id. at 368-7 1 , to abol ish markets, and to compel communal eating, id. at 4 1 5- 1 6.
332. Kiernan puts the figure at 1 . 5 million, id. at v; Shapley at somewhere between one million
and two million, R. SHA PLEY, supra note 330, at 1 98.
333. See Rosenthal, Selling Out Tibet, N .Y . Times, Jan. 8, 1 988, at A 3 1 , col . 6 (citing report of
U.S. Congress); the same figure is given by M. VAN WALT VAN PRAAG, supra note 324, at xv. It
should be noted that these figures apply to the entire period since the Chinese i nvasion i n 1 950, and
not to the Cul tural Revolution alone.
334. FN, supra note 4, at 462.
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he thereby invites inspection of their conduct. Unfortunately, even the
most sympathetic reading of the behavior of the Red Guards-a reading
that ignores the bludgeonings and concentrates entirely on the aspect of
"criticism and self-criticism"-will fin d it hard to distinguish between the
forced confessions of the Cultural Revolution and the forced confessions of
the Stalin show trials,335 or between the destruction of B uddhist monas
teries and the destruction of Jewish synagogues. It is hard to detect in the
eyewitness accounts anything of "the seductive and liberating force of an
attack upon the distinction between the pure and the impure . " 336
My general unease about the poli tical drift of U nger's political roman
ticism should now be apparent. The twentieth century h as suffered a
great deal of destructiveness in the name of i ncoherent philosophical "vi
sions." Various l eaders have sought to bring about the Kingdom of
Heaven on Earth-after first destroyi ng the obstacles that stood in the
way. They have told their followers to crush : the counter-revolutionary
Ukrainian peasan ts; the Jews; the monasteries of Tibet; the "four olds";
or the urban population of Cambodia. I n each case, a glorious future-a
"new man or woman"-was to be the result.337 In each case, the o ffend
ing objects were removed, but the expected glories fai led to appear.
These political experiments share certain similarities. Let u s begin with
the least important. All were militant. All w ere preoccupied with q ues
tions of military effectiveness. All thought earnestly about the strategy of
political revolution . All
were
determined to seize
political
power-peaceful ly if possible, violently i f need be. All had a demonology
and used colorfu l epithets (vampires, running dogs, beetles, C I A spies,
toads, vipers) to describe their enemies.
It is unfortunate but not in itself worrying that Unger's work should
share these characteristics. His vocabulary of abuse (toadying j urists, spi
ders, slavery, prison guards, poison, groveling subj ects) may be exagger
ated, but it is no worse than the rhetoric of the American revolutionar335.
Violence, brutality, tragedy became commonplace at Beida that August. Every day and every
night small groups of four or five would be picked up to be criticized in their departments arid
then paraded through the campus to "accept struggle from the masses." The targets of these
"mass ground struggle sessions" would always be forced to balance on one of the high, n arrow
dining hall benches and told to answer questions. lf the answers were considered u nsatisfac
tory, the person's head would be pushed down or he would be instructed to bend low or he
would be held in the agonizing jet plane position, continually begging the people's pardon for
his past offenses.
Y. DAIYUN, supra note 323, a t 1 80-8 1 .
336. FN, supra note 4, at 569.
337. J . NoRBU, WARRIORS OF TI BET 1 03 ( 1 979). One sceptical Tibetan was assured by a Chi
nese M aoist, "It is only common sense to realize that after the Third World War, the whole world
will embrace socialism. After that there will be no more wars and no more governments. Even the
Communist Party will be disbanded and we will live in a world of peace and plenty." !d.

1 988]

Unger's Philosophy

745

ies;338 as for military strategy and revolutionary subversion , they can be
put to good uses as well as bad .
But the movements I mentioned share a second set of characteristics,
all , broadly speaking, involving the lack of a sense of reality. All the
movements were based on grandiose theories. All were messianic. All ap
pealed to the emotions rather than to reason . All offered a "vi sion" of an
ideal new society. All believed that the "new man" was just around the
historical corner-at most a generation or two away. All claimed to be
"scientific," but all were based upon t heories that can only be regarded as
the work of crackpots: Stalin rejected relativity theory and orthodox genet
ics because of their "bourgeois" origins,339 and Hitler did not care in the
least that his theory of Aryan racial superiority was without anthropologi
cal foundation. There was nothing particularly profound about their theo
ries, nothing particularly worthy of philosophical refutation. The i ntellec
tual work was based on faulty scholarship and shoddy arguments, and the
practi cal disasters are directly attributable to this source.340 The utopian
plans were straightforwardly unworkable. For the most part, the
problems should have been obvious to common sense.
The combination of these two elements-militancy and the lack of a
sense of reality-is an unpromising foundation for practical politics. Silly
theories can be forgiven; so can a fascination with military strategy . But
when a political leader asks his followers to kill for nonsense, he i s un
likely to better the lot of humanity at large. There are many examples,
and the logic behind them is not difficult to follow. The leader will never
get his "new man and woman," but he will certainly get resistance, real
or imaginary, from the "parasites" and "class enemies. " And in his rage
against reality, he is more likely to attempt to exterminate the opposition
than to question the premises of his own theory. I t may perhaps be logi
cally possible to combine these two elements without courting disaster; but
history offers no example.
If Unger is to avoi d this trap, if he is to build a plausible political
theory on the dubious precedent of the Chin ese Cultural Revolution, he
ought to proceed with a certain degree of scholarly care, both towards the
events of the past and towards his hopes for the future. In particular, he
ought explicitly to acknowledge the destructiveness of the C ultural
Revolution; he ought to explain, in precise and u nambiguous terms, why
See generally B. BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS H UTCHINSON ( 1 974).
Kamenka, Communism, Philosophy Under, i n 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 1 66 ( P.
Edwards ed. 1 967).
340. I do not deny that there are differences between these ideologies, nor do I deny that they
338.
339.

have infl icted different quantities of suffering. It is of course worse to kill two million people than one
million; but the point I am trying to make has more to do with psychology than with statistics.
Somebody whose political theory can accomodate the deaths of one m illion people is u n l i kely to flinch
at six or twenty; and anybody who can turn a blind eye to the extermi nation of Tibetan culture is
unlikely to be moved by the extermination of anythi ng.
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the Maoist experiment went awry; and he ought to give a persuasive ac
count of the safeguards he i ntends to introduce so that his own theory of
"role jumbling" and "context smashing" will not lead to similar
destructiveness.
This Unger does not do. Of his safeguards I have already s poken; to his
historical analysis of the C ultural Revolution I now turn .
Unger does indeed grant that the Revolution was a fai lu re , but his rea
soning seems singularly misplaced. To his mind, the Red G uards focused
their attentions too narrowly on the contrast between masses and elites:
"[A] single-minded focus on these concerns to the exclusion of others nar
rows the front on which cultu ral revolution can be staged and leaves un
touched much of the structure of social life . " 341 The trouble with the Cul
t ural Revolution is not that i t was a moral and economic d isaster, not that
it was an experiment that could not possibly have worked, but that it was
"truncated," that it challenged too little of the "established structure of
social life" -not that it went too far, but that it did not go far enough.
This striking thesis, contained in his discussion of "role defi ance and role
jumbling," is supported by another long passage devoted entirely to ana
lyzing the history of the Cultural Revolution and the reasons for its fail
ure. Unger call s the Revolution "a possi ble breakthrough i nto a di fferent
form of industrial society, " but regrets that the political leaders of C h i na
were "halfhearted and confused" i n implementing it. H e notes that under
the " political intensification" brought about by the Red Guards, "the
boundaries of what coul d be done to people, who coul d be reached, and
what could be attacked began to fal l apart" -which could be interpreted
as a rebuke, were it not that the entire passage takes the side of the i nno
vative Red Guards against their "halfhearted" superiors. H e describes the
technique of "criticism and self-criticism" as "a subtle psychology of the
way an individual can be made to render himself transparent to his fel
lows." His chief regret is that the party bureaucrats called the interesting
experiment to a halt-that "not all surprises would be allowed to hap
pen"-that "[t]he economy remained as if subject to built-in forces but
341 .

The fu l l comment on "el ites and masses" reads as follows:
The crudest allocations of personal role, or the most rigid conceptions of the style of association
suitable to each domain of social l i fe, could be accepted so long as they did not overtly involve
the feared contrast between elite and mass.

The ideas, attitudes, and power relations implicated in the contrasts between mass and elite
or the pure and the impure do indeed act as a bar to the realization of the cultural
revol utionary program. But the single-minded focus on these concerns to the exclusion of
others narrows the front on which cultural revolution can be staged and leaves u ntouched
much of the established structure of social l ife. Stubborn fighting over the mastery of the state
and the organization of the economy often occurs side by side with the rebirth of styles of
personal association characteristic of an earlier, destroyed social order.
FN, supra note 4, at 569-70.
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only because, at the moment of oportunity, its two-hearted poli tical ene
mies had not dared invade it in the name of possibilities it excluded. "342
342.
Unger's quotation on the Cultural Revolution is as follows: "The Chi nese C u l tural Revolu
tion offers a contrasting case [to the Soviet Union]: the fai lure to achieve in fact what at one poi nt had
looked like a possible breakthrough into a different form of i ndustrial society strengthened by the very
forms of production and control that were i n i tially jeopardized." (As we shall soon see, U nger identi
fies the time of the possible breakthrough with the high-point of Red Guard activity.)
The Chinese C u l t u ral Revolution h ighlights the difficulties encountered i n the course of [ a ]
. confused a n d halfhearted attempt t o establish a stabi lized order capable of perpetuating a
higher measure of collective mobil ization and context-chal lenging conflict in the midst of every
day social life.
Consider the basic march of events. The first stage was one in which Mao and his faction
attempted to execute an internal cou p within the eli tes . . . . Even at its most radical, however,
this commitment seems never to have al lowed for the possibility of reorganizing power on a
radical ly new basis and institutionalizing popular participation on an unprecedented scale.
The second stage of the events started when the faction that had begun the q uarrel within
the elites attempted to enlist broader mass su pport i n order to do its will
. The call for
mass agitation became progressively more shril l , as befitted the confused, halfhearted assault
on bureaucratic power. The popular response, however, soon began to exceed the expectations
of its architects. Its major source of support l ay in the dispossessed (such as the temporary and
contract workers-the Chi nese underclass) and in the youth that had not yet acqu i red the
knack of discounting the value of words. Its centers were a few cities. Its major forms of action
were the mass demonstration and the transformation of self-criticism techniques. Self-crit icism
had been a subtle method for reasserting consensus and control through contained conflict-the
very image of routine politics, drawn i nto the microcosm of the enterprise, the work gang, or
the neighborhood and supplemented w ith a subtle psychology of the way an i ndividual can be
made to render himself transparent to his fellows.
At this stage, one should recal l what these "subtle methods" amounted to in practice: U nger is talking
about the height of the Cultural Revol ution, the time of maximum chaos, when the Tibetan monas
teries were being destroyed and schoolteachers bludgeoned to death. H is thesis is that the Red G uards
were reined in before their interesting experiment could turn against the bureaucrats and the estab
l ished social structures. The passage continues:
The fundamentals of power at every l evel would remain out of bounds to conflict and com
plaint. In the hands of the practicing cultural revolutionaries, however, self criticism became a
device for humiliating alleged enemies and bureaucratic superiors; the boundaries of what
could be done to people, who could be reached, and what could be attacked began to fall apart.
One might hope that Unger would register disapproval of these Red G uard i nnovations, but the
conti nuation of the passage makes i t clear whose side he is on:
This evolution, a paradigm of the way the very instruments of routine politics may turn i n to
the agencies of pol itical intensification, was symbolized by the assault on Liu S hao-chi, at once
leader of the party elites and consummate theorist of the mainstream tradition of sel f-criticism.
The widening conflict forced the politicians behind the C u l tural Revolution and their allies in
the army to choose between two options, which presented themselves i n ever starker and more
dangerous contrast as agitation grew . One option was to support the i nsurrectional movement
unequivocally, attempting to lead its temper. The other was to reassert control so that the basic
structure of party l eadership at the top levels and managerial authority at the lower ones
would not be destroyed; the popular tumults would then not depart too far from the purpose
originally meant for them: that they should serve as a weapon of intimidation in an elite
conflict. Not all surprises would be allowed to h appen.
This reassertion of control was the death of the Cultural Revolution:
The definitive choice of the latter option inaugurated a third stage: the effort to bring events
under control once agai n . . . . [T]he more radical factions among the political elites lost any
i ndependent channel by which to communicate with their potential supporters below. The
extent of the loss became clear only later. The nonarmy radicals found themselves reduced to
the condition of favorites at court with a tenure dependent on the survival of their master.
U nger does not mention the destructiveness of the Red G uards; nor does he expla i n what constraints
they were under. (The eyewitness accounts do not sound as though the constraints could have been
very severe.) He brushes aside the q uestion whether M ao's cultural i nnovations might have worked,
and simply asserts that the experiment never was properly tested:
So, once the assertion of control had taken place, the Cultural Revolution as a mass movement
was lost. . . [ Y]ou do not have to believe that anyone in the Cultural Revolu t ion-elites or

748

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 9 7 : 6 6 5

This argument is wil dly unpersuasive, and for reasons that go t o the
heart of Unger's theory. Unger, recall , is trying to sell the i deals of "con
text smashing" and "role jumbling" and "disentrenchment," ideals which
he fi nds partially exemplified i n the Chinese Cultural Revolution . Now, it
seems to many observers (i ncluding the present Communist leaders of
China) that these ideals themselves are precisely what was amiss with the
Cultural Revolution-that urging the masses to smash the contexts of so
cial existence inevitably leads to chaos , and that, if the Red G uards had
not been reined in, the disaster wou ld have been even worse. Certainly
there is ample evidence for this view : The M aoist experiment has been
tried in China, Tibet, and C ambodia, and the results have not been fel ici
tous . But Unger dissents from this view. H e bel ieves i n the context
smashing ideal and regrets that "not all surprises were allowed to hap
pen. " Perhaps he is right. But at the least he should say what surpri ses h e
has in mind and offer a n argument t o show that a more zealous pursui t o f
h i s ideals would have produced the "new man and woman" for which he
yearns. As matters stand, he i s merely brushing aside the empirical evi
dence against his theory . (I note in passing that, for all his praise of the
Red Guards, Unger has nothing to say about the suffering caused by their
experiments in human relations, nothing to say about the cultural destruc
tion: These matters are passed over in silence.)
Similar problems with Unger's ideal s are evident i n his long discussion
of "The Spirit of the Constitution. " Unger describes a "typical example"
of the esthetic presentation of the ideals of "empowerment" and "context
smashing" -ideals that his constitution is meant to serve. The example i s
Abel Gance's 1 9 34 film about Napoleon:
masses-was close to coming up w i th workable alternatives, or even that such plans of associa
tion as they might have found would have represented a change for the better. The poi n t is
that no alternatives were really put to the test and that the collective process of searching for
them was paralyzed close to the start.
Here, then is a case of fai lure in breakthrough toward an alternative mode of socialism and
industrialism . .

!d.

i\ much more immediate factor i n the outcome, however, was the illusion of a n elite faction
that thought it could have it both ways with mass mobi lization, that i t could use the agitated
populace at will as a club with wh ich to beat its enemies at the center of power, and yet keep
this mass fol lowing from posing any serious challenge to the basic structure of power. .
Just as the liberal identification of freedom and efficiency with a very deta i l ed system of
vested rights played a crucial part in the nineteenth-century American events d i scussed i n a n
earlier section, s o too t h e eq uation of t h e impersonal needs of organized power and national
development with the maintenance of a concrete system of vested rights performed an equally
important role in this episode of twentieth-century Chinese history. But whereas the American
belief was largely a mistake that helped cause the resul t i t did not describe, the C h inese belief
more :ruly described a situation. This truth, however, had been brought i n to bei ng by an
i l l usion, the ill usion of those who tried to play fast and loose with mass mobilization. The
economy remained as if subject to built-in forces but only because, at the moment of opportu
nity, its two-hearted pol itical enemies had not dared i nvade i t in the name of possibilities i t
excluded.
at 2 4 1 -46.
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There he is-the great hero, the man of will, embodying to the high
est degree the rage of transcendence and the transformative vocation .
He refuses to take the established contexts of action for granted and
repeatedly smashes, or t hreatens to smash, them . He combines an
acute insight into the opportunities and dangers of his situation with
an ability to imagine possibilities that the logic of this situation ex
cludes. H e conducts himself within the establ ished world as if he
possessed secret know ledge, and indeed he does.
The context smasher puts himself into situations that others would
regard as ridiculous and demeaning (e.g. , Napol eon 's awkward and
self-deceiving pursuit of the philanderer Josephine). He doesn't feel
tainted; he j ust doesn't give a damn. For one thing, his efforts are all
turned toward his great enterprise and away from the petty ambi
tions and fears of ordinary life. For another thing, he transvalues the
hierarchies of his contemporaries: his greater freedom from the con
text enables him to judge by another hierarchy of value. Therefore,
he appears to be shameless when he is in fact gui ded by an alterna
tive moral vision. This vision does not merely repl ace one hierarchy
of values by another; it partly liberates moral judgment from the
constraining effect of any clearly defined hierarchy .343
The tone of this passage i s already disturbing, not least because the tri
umph-of-the-will theme reminds one of several other European political
leaders, all of whom were in power in 1 934. But the passage con tinues:
Then there are the piercing eyes, the intense, wild expression that
the man of will shares with all the secondary characters and even the
ordinary mobs drawn i nto the momentous events he commands. It
reminds you of those books of nineteenth- and early twentieth cen
tury photographs of Chinese, J apanese, and Russians. The subject
looks into the camera with the same crazed expression . Perhaps his
disquiet comes from the unfamiliarity of the camera, which seems to
puncture the shell of social routine and produce a moment of dazed
incongruity in which the familiar l imits and aims of action fal l away
and deeper, wordless concerns rise u p . . . . The fierce-eyed subjects,
amid their ornate or ragged trivia, look as if they had seen beyond
the photographer and their circumstance to a reality previously hid
den from their eyes. They had seen something of the God who says,
No man sees me and lives.344
Unger does not say precisely which photographs evoke this response in
himself; but they certainly sound very interesting. I have already men
tioned what I find disquieting about the anti-real ity approach to politics,
and merely note its presence as the passage continues:
343. !d.
344. !d.

at
at

5 8 1 -82.
582.
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Similarly, in t h e Gance fil m , t h e actors looked at t h e moving camera
as the exotic photography subjects had looked at the still one. The
revolutionary interlude replaced with advantage the Western shock.
All the way from the transcendent man of will to the agitated
crowds, the participants seem in touch with another, higher reality,
with the things you see and feel when one conditional world has
been destroyed and another not yet emerged , as if this crack in the
finite provided a glimpse into the absolute. At any momen t , this con
text-breaking brio might be converted into an idolatrous delusion :
people might treat their particular h istorical endeavors as i f t hese
undertakings were themselves the absolute. Such were the risks and
complications of a more radiant vitality.345
The rhetoric in this passage is out of control-overblown, i f i t is meant as
a film review. One must wonder what it is doing in a book entitled Polit
ics. The answer is that Unger's discussion is not about the aesthetics of
film or about the h istorical N apoleon, but about the dictators of the 1 930's
and the "agitated crowds" that fol lowed them.34 6
Unger's attitude is certainly not one of undiluted approval. The entire
passage is entitled "empowerment imagined and perverted. " 347 The film,
he says, "shows the extraordinary force of this longing [ for the empower
ment ideal ] and the perverse forms it assumes when left u nrealized in the
ordinary lives of ordinary men and women. "348 Moreover, " [ t ]hese fanta
sies are not even meant to be lived out. When, in exce ptional circum345.
346.

!d.

348.

!d.

Unger says that in "the antinovelistic style of works of art like these" the aesthetic of em
powerment "reached its most crudely and overtly political but also most reveal i ng form." !d. at 584.
He devotes pages 582-83 to discussing the political implications of the Gance fil m ; part of this discus
sion is quoted infra note 356. The references to movements that exemplified "pseudorevolutionary
national ism" and "the cult of warlike force" seem to me entirely clear.
Unger's more abstract discussion of "empowerment" occurs in the previous section, entitled "The
Spirit of the Constitution: The Ideal of Empowerment." H e says of his constitution that " [ i]ts higher
spiritual significance consists in the assertion of transcendence as a diurnal context smashing," and he
describes "empowerment" as follows:
[T]he ideal effect and demand of the constitution u pon personality consists in the accum ul ation
of three mental tendencies, all of which meet in the practice of fantasy and enactment. The
first tendency is the accentuation of desire, of i ts scope and intensity. This goal holds for desire
in general, whatever its specific aim or relative weight. It applies, however, with special force
to those desires that aim at particular aspects of freedom itself. For such desires differ from
others in contributing directly to the central experience of human empowerment. They do
not-at least not inevitably-destabil ize the regime within which the ord i nary person can ex
perience this enhancement of the will nor do they have the quality of an obsessional fixity that
crowds out other desires. The second mental disposition is the enlargement o f the imagination.
The person imagines a broader spectum of circumstances within which desires can be satis
fied. . . The third mental tendency is the broadening of the actual opportuni ties to reali ze i n
practice t h e transformed desires produced b y t h e first two tendencies. Such expansion saves the
enhancement of the will and the i magination from issuing in a self-destructive experience of
constantly frustrated i nsatiability.
!d. at 579-80. The only place where Unger gives a concrete example of empowerment is in the
discussion of the Gance film.
347. !d. at 58 1 .
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stances, people have taken them seriously and acted upon them, the results
have often been disastrous. " 349
But al though Unger admits that such pol itical ral lies have risks, he
calls them "the risks and com plications of a more radiant vitality. "360 Not
everybody would put the point in quite this way. Indeed , there are several
possible answers to the question, "What is wrong with a fascist
rally ?"-and it makes a great difference which one you choose.
One answer worth considering is that "the frenzied pursuit of the
transformative vocation"361 -the untramel led striving for what Unger
calls empowerment and Aristotle calls i ncontinence-is itself a political
and moral vice. With this answer we are on fam i liar philosophical
ground, for there is nothing particularly modern about the "transcendent
man of will" Unger describes, or about his "display of impenitent gran
deur. "362 One thinks of Milton's Satan , striving against God and reality,
transvaluing the moral hierarchies ("Evil be thou my good" 353) , and "em
bodying to the h ighest degree the rage of transcendence" :
T o reign is worth ambition, though in H e l l :
Better t o reign in H el l than serve in H eave n . 364
Aristotle would regard the Napoleon-H itler-Mussolini psychology de
picted in the Gance film as unworthy of emulation, and he would regard
the following passage as a childish delusion:
All the way from the transcendent man of will to the agitated
crowds, the partici pants seem in touch with another, higher reality,
with the things you see and feel when one conditional world has
been destroyed and another not yet emerged, as if this crack in the
finite provided a glimpse into the absolute.366
B ut Unger's analysis i s not that of Aristotle. H e does not object to the
empowerment ideal, but to the way it is distributed-to the fact that the
audience are merely passive spectators, that their longing for the "psycho
logical experience of empowerment" is "left unrealized in the ordinary
lives of ordinary men and women. "36 6 His constitutionalism of p ermanent
349.
350.
35 I .
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

!d.
!d. at 583.
!d.
Jd. at 584.
J MILTON, PARADISE LosT bk. 4, L 1 1 0 ( 1 667).
Jd. bk. 1 , lL 262-63.
FN, supra note 4, at 582-83.

His analysis is as follows:
The leader achieved empowerment in a basically different fashion from the other people. H e
alone took events by the hand and thereby realized the transformative vocation i n a l l its
purity.
The exceptionalism of the leader was connected, obscurely but significantly, to the form of
his historical enterprise. In different degrees and in di fferent ways, pseudorevolutionary na-

752

The Yale Law J ournal

[Vol. 9 7 : 665

mobili zation is su pposed to do better-to "do justice to the human heart,"
and to make "the experience of empowerment . . . real rather than
vicarious. "35 7
As with his analysis of the C ultural Revolution , Unger ti ptoes past the
historical evidence against his ideal of "empowerment. " The twentieth
century offers several examples of politicians whose ral l ies fit Unger's
description of the Gance film, and there is abundant reason to think that
their lack of moderation , their lack of balance, their determination to
smash through every impediment was the cause of the ensu ing havoc. But
Unger wants more "frenzied pursuit of the transformative vocation"
rather than less. I see no reason to believe that the practical consequences
would be an improvement on the ill-conceived experiments of the past.
Nor do I find this particular "vision" attractive. A mob rally in which
each member of the mob tries to exemplify "the rage of transcendence" i s
a meeting most people would rather not attend-even if i t could be kept
peaceful, and no matter how much "radiant vitali ty" the "context
breaking brio" might offer. Unger has allowed himself to be carried away
by his vision of a society without h ierarchies, a society i n w h i ch t here will
be no constraints on self-development , and i n which "role jumbling" and
"context smashing" will enable us "to develop the richness of our subjec
tive life." Although he does explicitly say that individuals should have a
(minimal) set of rights to personal security, he pays too little attention to a
practical set of safeguards. It i s disheartening to see him propounding a
theory that is intended to guide grassroots political struggle, that promi ses
to enhance "the destructive powers of society,"358 that contemplates the
tional ism a n d i t s surrogates involved t h e superim position of a communal ideal u pon social
hierarchies that this ideal simultaneously adjusted and preserved. Such movements often em
braced the cult of warlike force, wielded by the col lectivity under the guidance of the l eader.
Thus, the psychological experience of empowerment was to be realized through socia l forms
that constrai ned or negated the different aspects of freedom. Yet empowerment meant freedom
if it meant anything. Here was a social experience at war with i tself: a monstrous equivoca
tion, already prefigured in the circumstance of followers whose access to the sense of empower
ment paradoxically depended upon their submission to a leader or upon their absorption i n a
crowd.
/d. at 583.

357.
1\ driving force of the constitutional program is the desire to do justice to the human heart, to
free it from i ndignity and satisfy i ts h idden and i nsulted longing for greatness i n a fashion it
need not be fearful or ashamed of. To this end, the experience of empowerment must be made
real rather than vicarious. It must be reconciled with the ordinary needs and attachments of
ordinary people. And it must be freed from its corrupting associations with the cult of leaders
and of violence.
/d. at 584-85.
358. The hundred or more pages he devotes to war and revolution are fiercer in tone than they
need be, and remarks like his observation on the military defeat of the Normans ("Thei r defeat
pleases as much as it i nstructs," PP, supra note 1 0, at 1 64-65) could conceivably give his readers the
wrong impression. Even if Unger himself would balk at the idea of killing for "negative capabil ity,"
his fol lowers in the third world might be forgiven for misunderstanding his i ntentions. H is strident
rhetoric is, to say the least, injudicious, and one wishes he had done more to temper the m il itant
aspects of his theory.
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possibil ity of violent revol ution , that envisions a regime o f "destabilization
rights," and that offers Nl ao' s Cul tural Revolution as a "rich" source for
his "vi sion" of an assault on the roles that "deserve to be smashed up at
the microlevel of cul tural-revolutionary defiance and i ncongruity as well
as at the macrolevel of institutional i nnovation"-particularly when all
this is backed by weak arguments, by an unconvinci ng moral psychology,
and by historical scholarsh ip that does not mention the excesses of the
Cultural Revolution.
The scholarly inaccuracy and the general a rgumentative con fusion that
have dogged Unger's work since Knowledge and Politics are h ardest to
excuse when they ignore and absolve mass killing and cultural destruc
tion; and here Unger has been remarkably lax.
V.

CONCLUSION

I shall now try to bring together my main conclusions; but fi.rst a word
about the reasons for U nger's success. Throughout this Article I have
been critical of his writings, but I do not mean to imply that they contain
nothing to admire. Unger w rites with enormous energy and displays a
passionate concern for social change-perhaps, at times, too passionate. I n
an age when academic moral philosophy i s often dedicated to dry analysis
or to justifying the status q uo - o r , at any rate, appears, on superficial
inspection, to be so dedicated-it is refreshing to see a thi nker who strives
to imagine radical alternatives; and it is easy to u nderstand why he has
won such a devoted following.
But passion and political good intentions are not enough. There must
also be some sort of solid intellectual foundation before Unger can plausi
bly claim to have "undermined the central i deas of modern legal thought
and put another conception of law in their place." My aim in this Article
was to evaluate U nger's philosophy and to assess the truth of this claim.
My methodology w as straightforward: I proceeded seriatim through his
most important writings, and at each stage I discussed his central argu
ments and his central scholarly arguments. I began with a detailed discus
sion of Knowledge and Politics. This is Unger's most influential book. I t
is the book o n which his reputation for learning i s based. I t claims to have
discovered "the context of i deas and sentiments within which philosophy
and politics must now be practiced. " It contains the most sophisticated
argument by a C LS theorist for the exciting thesis that "no coherent the
ory of adjudication is possible within liberal political thought . " So it is
well worth close i nspection.
For Unger's work to be useful to professional philosophers it would
have to contain either some reliable scholarshi p or some plausible and
original arguments. I examined in detail Unger's scholarshi p and showed
that he understands neither the Plato-Aristotle-Aquinas tradition he ap-
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plauds , nor the "l iberal " Hobbes- H ume-Kant- Rawls tradition he de
plores. His learned footnotes are wildly undependable, even on the sources
that are most central to his work. These errors are fundamen tal , they
occur in great profusion , and they cover every major period of Western
philosophy.
As for his arguments , it will suffice to recall a single example. I dis
cussed at length the central passage of Knowledge and Politics, the "An
tinomy of Theory and Fact ," where Unger employs a "third and yet un
defined mode of explanation that stands beyond the boundaries of formal
logic and causality" to show that "the dominant and central element in
modern thought" culmi nates in a simple logical contradiction-a contra
diction which shows the "incoherence of our idea of science, indeed of
knowledge in general . "359 It is hard to imagine a more astonishing claim ,
o r a claim that stands in greater need of argument-and i t is hard to
imagine a less adequate argument than the one Unger provides. Worse,
his "antinomy" rests on an elementary misunderstanding of Qui ne's phi
losophy of science-a misunderstanding that could easily have been recti
fied by walking across the H arvard Yard to seek Quine's opinion. The
refutation of modern thought surely deserved this much checking.
His refutation of LIBER A L I S M , in its b road outlines, turned out to be an
attack on a straw- person: It i s directed against a set of six vague and self
contradictory principles that no one ever held. And his specifi c arguments
against the principles turned out to be mere restatements of well-known
problems, intertwined with some elementary confusions abou t subjectivity
and the problem of universals. Unger's positive suggestion that we will be
enabled to "discover the organic unity in each other's personalities" if we
live in "communities of l i fe" is hopelessly vague-and the vagueness is
hardly remedied by his explanation that "we can never fully bridge the
gap between abstract and concrete knowledge, theory and prudence, sci
ence and art. That is why the doctrine of organic groups remains
indeterminate. "
T h e tone of Unger's book i s w e l l suited to i t s content , and reinforces
one's general i mpression of grandiloquent eccentricity. He tells us we need
a society that will be based upon "natural h armony, sympathy and con
crete universality"; he uses terms l ike "spiders" and "prison guards,"
"poison" and "tyranny," "secret empire" and "grovelling subjects" to
characterize the leading thin kers and intellectual movements of the l ast
four centuries; and he ends by saying, "Speak, God." He deals in uplift
rather than arguments, edifi cation rather than scholarship; and h e seems
not to have understood either the history or the difficulty of the p roblems
he discusses. Given the low q uality of his central scholarly references and
of his central arguments, i t is unlikely that he elsewhere soars to the level
359.

See supra text accompanying notes 1 2 1 -33.
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o f Spinoza or Virgil o r Marx. Professional philosophers can perhaps be
forgiven for not taking his work seriously.
I next discussed Unger's famous article on C L S . As an intellectual per
formance, it lags behind the standards of Knowledge and Politics. The
fi rst book contains a recognizable argument; the article is more of a ram
ble through the views of "our movement." The book contains footnotes;
the article does not. The book purports to show that law is impossible in
modern society; the corresponding passages in the article are much thinner
and repeat many of his earlier mistakes . Finally, having discussed Unger's
principal contributions to philosophy and to legal theory , I turned to his
concrete political recommendations as expressed in the central passages of
his recent Politics. I criticized his theories of "negative capability" and
"context smashing," of the "constitutionalism of permanent mobilization ,"
of "role defiance and role jumbling," of "cultural revolution. "
Despite many shifts of termi nology and position, Unger's visionary
writings all suffer from the same flaw, namely, a lack of careful thought
about the practical implications of his proposals. In this respect, as his
theories have become more concrete, his recommendations h ave become
less plausible with the years. His early theory of "organic groups," for all
its emptiness, was, practically speaking, ha�mless; but the military theo
rizing in Politics, the remarks on violent revolution, his admiration of
"smashing" and "trashing" and the sort of "empowerment" embodied in
Gance's film about Napoleon, the praise of Mao's Red Guards and of the
"rage of transcendence"-all this, if taken seriously and acted upon, has
the potential of causing serious harm. I do not wish to dispute the sincer
ity of Professor Unger's desire for a better universe; but he is more likely
to achieve his goal if he takes a bit more scholarly and argumentative care
than he has hitherto displayed.
This remark suggests a word of advice to legal reformers generally. It is
of course true that the present legal system contains many genuine evils.
The reformers are entirely right to be concerned with social justice. They
are right to reject "the calculations of Holmes' 'bad man,' who is con
cerned with law only as a means or an obstacle to the accomplishment of
his antisocial ends. "360 They are right to deplore the cynicism, greed, and
opportunism that undoubtedly exist in the l egal profession and i n society
at large. But amateur philosophy and ill-considered rhetoric are more
likely to hinder their cause than to assist it. For the implicit message of
slogans like "Law Is Nonsense" and "Trashing Is Scholarship" and
" Everything Is Politics" is that careful philosophical argument-rational
discussion about law and justice-is a sham, a deception, not worth the
effort: In the end, law is nonsense, and so is philosophy. Ironically, there
360. Kenned y , Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1 685,
1 773 ( 1 976).
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is nothing new about this particular philosophy of law. It was already old
hat long before Nero put Seneca to death , and it provides the best of all
possible justifications for economic exploitation and political oppression . It
is preci sely the legal philosophy of the "bad man"-of the person who
would rather make a profit or win an election than listen to " philosophi
cal" speculations about right and wrong.
The only way to make progress against this sort of cynicism, the only
way to make the legal system more just, is by patient, piecemeal ef
forts-by the sort of hard thought that has always been characteristic of
the best work in law and philosophy. Nothing will come of fundamentally
frivolous speculations about "organic groups" and "intelligible essences"
and "disentrenchment of formative structures" -however attractive such
theories may appear to the gullible.
I have argued that, far from having "undermined the central ideas of
modern legal thought," Unger does not live u p to the standards of ordi
nary good scholarship, and in his philosophical writings he is far out of
his depth . Certainly Unger is not in a strong position to denounce his
colleagues in the legal academy for having "degraded" history and
"abased" philosophy and " perverted" the social sciences:
H aving failed to persuade themselves of all but the most equivocal
versions of the inherited creed, they nevertheless clung to its implica
tions and brazenly advertised their own failure as the triumph of
worldly wisdom over intellectual and political enthusiasm. H istory
they degraded into the retrospective rationalization of events. Philos
ophy they abased into an inexhaustible compendium of excuses for
the truncation of legal analysis. The social sciences they perverted
into the source of argumentative ploys with which to give their arbi
trary though stylized policy decisions the blessing of a s pecious
authority.
When we came, they w ere like a priesthood that has lost their
faith and kept their jobs. They stood in tedious embarrassment
before cold altars. But we turned away from those altars, and found
the mind's opportunity i n the heart's revenge.361
As with this passage, so with Unger's philosophy as a whole: It tries very
hard to impress, and it is not impressive.
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